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ABSTRACT 
The number of power electronic and distorting loads, continue to grow at a rapid pace. Accom-
panying this growth in distortion sources is an increased sensitivity of certain types of loads to 
harmonic distortion, and poor power quality in general. The result is greater variance in the 
value loads place on a harmonic free supply, and therefore what they are prepared to pay to 
mitigate the potential consequences of harmonic distortion. 
Harmonic distortion imposes costs worth considering, if not, no action would be taken by 
networks to mitigate the effects of harmonic injections. This thesis develops tools that allow 
the valuation of the harmonic injections made by loads throughout a network. The ability to 
accurately value harmonic distortion is critical if an optimal allocation of resources committed to 
the problem is to be achieved. Also this work develops methods by which an optimal allocation 
of resources can be brought about, and ways the costs of any action taken, can be distributed 
in a manner deemed fair. 
Marginal pricing is the technique used to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. In a 
decentralised framework, marginal pricing will encourage efficient behaviour from each network 
participant. This is achieved by making the cost of each load's actions transparent, and borne by 
that load. Also marginal pricing fully utilises all the available knowledge throughout the system. 
The utilisation of knowledge is the key to solving all economic problems, and the difficulty 
associated with gathering knowledge makes centralised decision making inherently inefficient. 
This thesis develops marginal prices for harmonic injections, and these prices are demon-
strated to encourage efficient behaviour from each load with respect to reducing the injection 
they make into the system. It is also shown marginal pricing has the ability to encourage effi-
cient allocation of filter resources. By determining exactly how much the distortion is worth, it 
is possible establish exactly how much the network is willing to pay, to reduce that distortion. 
There are multiple ways marginal pricing can be implemented, depending on whether charges 
are based on the Norton injections of each load or the total harmonic injection. The advantages 
and disadvantages of each method are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL 
Like the consumers of any good or commodity, the consumers of electrical energy are interested 
in the quality of their purchase. Not all power is of equal quality, and the key components of 
power quality are: 
Ell Voltage Stability The voltage at each busbar is predictable in magnitude and not subject 
to periodic dips. 
Ell Frequency Stability The frequency at each busbar is predictable and does not suffer 
from long or short term fluctuations. 
Ell Harmonic Distortion The voltage waveform at each busbar is predictable and does not 
suffer excessive steady state or transient harmonic distortion. 
Ell Security of Supply The power supply has a high level of reliability, so that loads can be 
assured their demands will be met as required. 
The area of power quality considered in this thesis is harmonic distortion. Increased pro-
liferation of power electronic devices throughout most electrical networks has seen an increase 
in the level of harmonic current injected into each network. This has increased the potential 
for harmonic distortion to negatively affect loads throughout the network, or the network itself. 
Compounding this problem is that the sensitivity of many loads to poor power quality has also 
increased. In particular the electronic automation of most industrial process and the comput-
erisation of most workplaces, has increased the value some loads place on power quality. Some 
loads though (such as heating loads), are relatively insensitive to power quality and are likely 
to remain so, the result being an increased divergence of the power quality needs of the most 
sensitive loads and the most robust loads. 
In dealing with harmonic distortion there are six basic steps which need to be undertaken: 
1. Measurement of the harmonic distortion. Without the ability to quantify the level of 
distortion, any mitigation efforts are likely to prove inefficient and futile. 
2. Assessment of whether the harmonic distortion present meets the requirements of the 
network. Specifically is there a problem? The cost impact of the harmonic injections 
needs to be assessed. This will include the impact on tranmission and distribution of 
equipment, along with the impact on customers. 
3. Decision as to what level of distortion is desirable. If it is decided that the level of harmonic 
distortion present does not meet the needs of the network, a decision as to the level of 
distortion acceptable must be made. 
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4. Decision on the mitigation method to be employed. Having decided the need to reduce 
the level of distortion present, technical decisions as to what is the most effective way to 
achieve this reduction must be made. 
5. Implementation of mitigation techniques. This will include the decision of who is respon-
sible for taking the appropiate action. 
6. Assessment of the harmonic management undertaken. The consequences of any action 
taken must be monitored and reviewed so that future situations benefit from past experi-
ences. 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
This thesis relates to items two, three and four in the above list. Specifically this work attempts 
to develop techniques that theoretically allow an efficient allocation of resources for mitigation of 
harmonic distortion. Also it works towards finding methods by which the costs associated with 
the harmonic mitigation can be distributed in a manner perceived as fair amongst the power 
system participants. 
In achieving an efficient allocation of resources, there is a need to quantify the harmonic 
problem. A valuation must be placed on harmonic distortion. Much of the work in this thesis 
centres on how to value the harmonic distortion present. Then, given what the distortion is 
worth and the available means by which it can be mitigated, it must be determined what is the 
best course of action to take. Having found an efficient resource allocation the final question is 
how can this allocation be brought about. 
Any effort to mitigate harmonic resources will cost money, and the cost must ultimately 
be borne by the loads in the network. The loads therefore ultimately have a collective interest 
in seeing that whatever action taken is efficient. Individually though, they have an interest in 
seeing that they bear costs which are no more than the benefits received. As such, a critical 
component of any resource allocation system is the perception by the network participants of 
'fairness' in the allocation of harmonic mitigation costs. 
In meeting the above requirements this thesis explores the use of marginal pricing. 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 contains a brief description of the costs associated with harmonic distortion and the tech-
niques used to manage harmonic distortion. Some of the techniques developed to allocate 
harmonic costs are detailed. The move towards value based network planning is mentioned 
along with the marginal pricing of energy. 
Chapter 3 details the development of the harmonic marginal prices for the simplest possible network 
model. The behaviour of the prices are characterised as the network parameters are varied. 
It is demonstrated, for this simple case, that the marginal prices provide the required 
incentives for an efficient allocation of resources. The different ways harmonic property 
rights can be allocated and the consequences of this for marginal pricing are covered. 
Moreover one of the weaknesses in marginal pricing of harmonic injections is examined. 
An example showing the improvements in network and individual welfare which can result 
from the implementation of marginal pricing is presented. 
Chapter 4 looks at the resultant payments made by each loads, when marginal pricing is implemented. 
It considers how to deal with loads being charged a complex amount for their injections. 
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It also provides an interpretation of such payments. The variation in individual payments 
is detailed as the injections of other loads are varied. 
Chapter 5 considers the inclusion of an active filter in the network Characterisation of the optimal 
active filter resource allocation is developed and marginal prices are shown to potentially 
encourage such an allocation of resources. Circumstances that will prevent marginal pricing 
achieving an efficient allocation of harmonic resources are detailed. A comparison of the 
marginal pricing and Toll road pricing, where there is an active filter included in the 
network, is detailed. 
Chapter 6 looks at marginal harmonic pricing where a passive filter can be included in the network 
The conditions that describe the optimal allocation of passive filter resources are developed 
and it is shown marginal pricing has the potential to bring about such an allocation. The 
potential for filter owners to exploit any market power they posses, is investigated and the 
consequences of such market power exploitation are determined. An example of marginal 
pricing where filters are included in the network is presented. 
Chapter 7 considers the consequences of modelling the nonlinear loads as voltage dependent current 
sources or as Norton equivalents (compared with only a fixed current source). The implica-
tions for marginal pricing, of loads' nonlinear injections being dependent on the distortion 
seen at the local busbar, are considered. 
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions of this thesis looking at the problem from a 'knowledge utilisation' 
point of view. areas of future work which can improve and extend the material 
presented in this thesis are detailed. 

Chapter 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ideally the supply voltage should be undistorted at each busbar through out the network. A 
distortion free supply restricts the possible voltage waveform seen by all equipment to a sine wave 
of fundamental frequency, with a bounded amplitude. Such a highly specified supply voltage 
would ease the design process of all electrical equipment. It would also improve the operational 
performance of all equipment as the more predictable the supply voltage, the less likely it is 
to fall outside the design parameters of any piece of equipment. But this ideal state cannot be 
achieved as harmonic currents are injected into the system from a variety sources. The main 
sources being large power converters (such as those used for HVDC links), industrial sites, 
and increasingly large commercial premises. So that designers and users of equipment have some 
assurance as to the quality of voltage supply and hence performance of their products, harmonic 
standards or regulations are usually stipulated for any given network. These can vary from 
network to network and often take the form of maximum allowable harmonic current injections 
as a function of short circuit ratio (Isclh), for different harmonic orders as shown in Table 2.1. 
50 - 100 
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Also often stipulated is the maximum harmonic voltage content present at any busbar as a 
function of harmonic order. example of such a regulation is shown in Table 
Finally there are composite measures for both the current injections and voltage har-
monics such as Total Harmonic Distortion Voltage/Current, and Equivalent Disturbing Volt-
age/Current. These measures are intended to limit the combined effect of all the harmonics 
acting together. The expressions for the voltage measures are given in equations 2.1 and 2.2, 
the current equations are equivalent except the voltage terms are replaced by current terms. 
THD (2.1) 
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Table 2.2 NZCEP 36 Harmonic Voltage Limits 
Harmonic Order Harmonic Voltage Level (As a percentage of nominal phase voltage) 
3 2.3 
5 1.4 
7 1.0 
9 0.8 
11 0.7 
13 0.6 
15 0.5 
17-21 0.4 
23-49 0.3 
50 
EDV 6.25 x 10-5 L (nPnVn)2 (2.2) 
n=2 
Where Pn is the weighting given to the frequency 50n in the psophometric weighting table. 
One well known standard incorporating such rules is IEEE 519-1992 [519-19921993]' though 
various equivalents are in place all over the world, examples being that which exist in Ar-
gentina [SanRoman and Ubeda1998], and used to exist in New Zealand [361993]. 
To this point these standards have provided a level of harmonic power quality which has 
satisfied most loads. Given this fact one may ask why not stay with the status quo, if adequate? 
The problem with the standards is that they give no consideration towards efficiency. They fail 
to consider if it is actually worth while for a given load to clean up their injections. Considering 
the growth in distorting loads such as power electronics, adjustable speed drives and computing 
equipment [McGranaghan and Mueller1999] [Makram et al.1993] [Emanuel et al.1995] dealing 
with the consequences of harmonic distortion is likely to become more important in the future. 
Considering the large expense associated with power system investment and the fact that some-
one must pay for what ever actions are taken to deal with any harmonic distortion, it stands to 
reason that tools need to be developed so that harmonics can be dealt with in the most efficient 
manner possible. 
2.2 HARMONIC DISTORTION COSTS 
The implicit assumption all this work is that harmonic distortion does have some detrimental 
effects on equipment and network participants. If not then the distortion seen by loads would be 
worthless and one would make no effort in trying to limit harmonic injections. But harmonics do 
have an affect, with different types of equipment affected to different degrees and with different 
results. 
2.2.1 Capacitors 
With capacitors the presence of results in additional heating and dielectric stress. 
Capacitors are also of interest in that they can have a substantial effect on the harmonic voltage 
through out the network. The capacitor can interact with the network so to cause a resonance at 
a frequency where harmonics are This resonance can result in harmonic voltage many 
times greater than may of otherwise expected and is likely to result in blown fuses for the 
capacitor bank [Wagner et al.1993]. 
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2.2.2 Circuit and Fuses 
Severe harmonic distortion can influence the operation of circuit breakers and fuses. Any device 
which operates on the basis of a thermal mechanism, will be influenced by harmonic currents. It 
has been suggested that and some circuit breakers may have there operating point shifted 
due to the extra heating caused by harmonic currents [Brozek1990]. Though it can be argued 
that these devices are RMS devices and that the harmonics do not shift the operating point at 
all, but instead change the RMS current from what is suggested by the fundamental current 
alone. 
2.2.3 Electronic Equipment 
Considering the role that electronics and power electronics have in almost all commercial and 
industrial processes, the effects harmonic distortion can have on electronic equipment have the 
most serious consequences. Should the voltage distortion be such that extra zero crossings exist 
any equipment that uses the zero crossing as a trigger is likely to misfire [Wagner et al.1993]. 
Harmonics will have an on the peak voltage seen by any electronic equipment. Should 
these peaks be larger than designed for, the resultant over voltages have the potential to damage 
some equipment. Harmonics are equally capable of flattening voltage waveforms. In power 
electronic circuits where the voltage peaks are used to charge a DC bus capacitor a flattening of 
the voltage waveform will mean the electronic equipment will have a DC under voltage condition. 
Therefore its operation will be more susceptible to any further under voltage conditions on the 
supply side. 
Even without extra zero crossing a distorted harmonic voltage will effects on the op-
eration of equipment such as large power converters. The firing angle of thyristors will become 
modulated and may be altered compered to the non-distorted case. This will alter the character-
istic harmonic injections of the converter and possibly result in the injection of non-characteristic 
harmonics. This alteration of switching instants will effect any power electronic equipment and 
may reduce the performance of equipment such as thyristor controlled reactors, if not accounted 
for [Montano et al.1993]. 
2.2.4 Metering 
Many modern RMS meters are relatively unaffected by harmonic distortion. But induction disk 
meters (the most common type of meter in use) are likely to be effected by harmonic distortion. 
These have been found to often read high when the load being metered consists of harmonic 
generating equipment [Arrillaga et al.1985] 
2.2.5 Transformers 
Harmonics voltages increase iron losses and can cause increased stress on insulation. Where the 
voltage peak is increased, partial discharge between windings is possible. Harmonic currents 
are likely to increase copper losses [Arrillaga et al.1985]' this increased heating can reduce the 
life expectancy of the transformer. Another consideration is that should a transformer with a 
delta wound secondary feed a higply distorted load, triplen harmonics will circulate in the delta 
winding, resulting in increased loading on this winding. 
Transformers can also act a source of harmonic currents due to their non-linear magnet i-
sation characteristics. The harmonic generation will increase substantially should it supply an 
asymmetrical load, as any DC load current will result in saturation of the magnetic circuit. 
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2.2.6 Rotating Machines 
Harmonic distortion will cause temperature rise in rotating machines [Fuchs et al.1987] [Fuchs et al.1986]' 
due to additional losses in the stator windings and rotor circuits. These temperature rises due 
to harmonic currents are likely to be localised causing hot spots, which will reduce the operating 
life of the machinery. 
Harmonics have little affect on the mean torque produced by machines. But harmonic 
currents within a machine are likely to produce a pulsating air gap flux, which in turn will 
produce a pulsating torque. Consideration of these torque must be made to ensure that they do 
not excite any mechanical resonances. 
Another potential problem exists in harmonic distortion may stop a machine coming up to 
speed due to ripples in the torque/speed characteristic. 
2.2.7 Protective Relaying 
Relaying can be affected by the presence of harmonic currents under fault conditions. In particu-
lar the operation of distance relays can be effected as measurement of the fundamental impedance 
can be subject to large errors in the presence of a highly distorted current [Arrillaga et al.1985]. 
This can result in costly false trippings. 
Another effect is the false operation of some overcurrent relays, as relays with a simple 
rectifier input circuits respond to the rectified peak of the input rather than the RMS value. 
2.2.8 Cumulative Costs For Utility and Load 
Given all the above effects that harmonic voltages and currents have on the equipment owned 
by utilities and loads what is the total cost or value of harmonic distortion to loads and the 
utility serving them? Very little work has taken place in an attempt to answer this question. On 
the utility side it has been suggested Pileggi et al [Pileggi et al.1995] that the cost to utilities 
of harmonic distortion may be very little. In this study the author attempted to find the cost 
(looking forward from 1990 to 2010) that harmonic injections have in terms of additional energy 
losses and capital costs associated with mitigation equipment installed, to a utility operating 
in the Northeast United States. Mitigation equipment was installed on the basis that THDv 
does not exceed 5% at any busbar (broadly in line with IEEE-519). A number of different 
feeder configurations and load forecasts were used, as depending on the growth of different 
type of harmonic load and the feeder configuration the resultant harmonic voltage could vary 
considerably. The cost of distortion was found to be as low as US$2.00/KVA/year in cases 
where no mitigation equipment was required to be installed. But in cases where mitigation 
equipment was required, or where there was a short supply of generating capacity (so that the 
harmonic losses became valuable) the cost of harmonics were liable to increase by two orders of 
magnitude. It is worth noting that this study found that majority of the costs resulted from 
installing mitigation equipment to satisfy harmonic standards. Hence for an efficient allocation 
of resources with respect to harmonics, the basis for deciding on the level of mitigation equipment 
required is critical. The basis on which this is presently done is to comply with the regulations 
or standard in place. But working to any standard cannot produce an efficient allocation of 
resources where there are large disparities in how different loads value voltage distortion. 
Unfortunately there seems to have been little work done with respect to determining the 
value of harmonic distortion to different types of loads. However there have been some studies of 
the cost interruption of supply has to different types of load [Sullivan et al.1996] [Sullivan et al.1997]. 
It is thought by this author, that interruption of supply can act as a reasonable proxy for har-
monic distortion at least when trying to compare relative costs between different load groups. 
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Moreover using interrupted supply as a proxy can be justified in the sense that severe distortion 
can have the effect of making equipment temporarily inoperable, which has the same conse-
quences as a loss of supply. These studies found a very large disparity between the valuation 
residential, commercial and industrial loads put of a loss of supply. Not surprising the valuation 
individual residential loads, place on any loss of supply is small (in the vicinity of US$5.00 /event). 
While commercial loads had valuations that are two orders of magnitude above those of resi-
dential loads, and industrial loads were another order of magnitude larger again. It was noted 
that there is considerable variation within the industrial customers as to how they valued an 
interruption ranging from close to nil to more than US$lmillion per event. From these studies 
one can see the value different loads put on their electrical supply has a variation of six orders 
of magnitude. From this it should be safe to conclude that there will be a similar variations on 
how harmonic distortion is valued. 
Given that 'what is good for the goose may not be good for the gander', the question 
can asked, if harmonics are to be controlled by regulations or standards how are these to be 
determined. It seems to be the case these standards are such that most loads will not suffer 
any ill effects from harmonic distortion. But this cannot be efficient in the face of such variable 
valuations of distortion, as those few loads which are sensitive to the distortion allowed, may 
be those with the highest resultant costs. Also it can be argued why should loads that are 
ambivalent to harmonic distortion be forced to pay for mitigation equipment to meet a standard 
far in excess of their requirements? 
2.3 ALLOCATION OF HARMONIC COSTS 
There have been a number of methods put forward for dealing with the costs generated by 
harmonic current injections. These range from the purely theoretical methods that assume 
complete knowledge of the system and the actions of each load in the system, to methods which 
can be implemented with the instrumentation currently available and installed in most systems. 
2.3.1 Allocation of Harmonic Costs: The Complications 
There are a number of characteristics of harmonic distortion that complicate the allocation of 
resultant costs [Emanue11999]. Some of these characteristics include: 
ill Considerable range of harmonic orders which can effect the network. 
ill Loads may not be consistent injectors or absorbers of harmonics. A load which injects 
harmonic current of order i, may absorb harmonics of order j. 
ill Voltage distortion will effect the injections produced by non-linear loads and the injections 
in turn will have an effect on any voltage distortion present. 
ill Negative sequence (as a result of unbalanced loads) results in the generation of non-
characteristic harmonics 
ill Both harmonic currents and voltages have consequences 
ill Different loads have different mechanisms that make them susceptible to distortion 
ill Existing equipment has been designed to existing standards and will still have a substantial 
remaining life 
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There can also be problems establishing who is responsible for the injections seen at the 
point of common coupling between the load and the network [Xu and Liu2000]. Figure 2.1 
shows Xu's model of both the harmonic load and the utility it is connected to, where both the 
utility and load are represented as Norton equivalents. Given this representation should the 
Norton impedance looking into the network from the point of common coupling (Zu) change, 
then this will effect the harmonic current injected in to the network at the point of common 
coupling (Jpcc). It can be argued that a load should not be responsible for changes on the 
utility side. 
PCC Jpcc 
. ~ 
Figure 2.1 Harmonic equivalent circuit of a distorting load and network 
There have been suggestions that charges for harmonic injections can be based on the 
flow of harmonic power. assumption underlying this being that should a load be injecting 
harmonic energy into the network as shown in Figure 2.2, then that loads actions are aggravating 
the harmonic problem throughout the network. There are a number of problems with using the 
flow of real harmonic power as the basis for charges. The first is that the real harmonic power 
flows often tend to be very small. At harmonic frequencies the networks look overwhelmingly 
inductive, hence the voltages generated and current injections will be very close to quadrature. 
The vast majority of harmonic flows are reactive flows and to base charges on the real flows 
is a failure to identify what is causing the problem. Another reason why charges based on 
Figure 2.2 Harmonic power injection into a network 
real current injections is not suitable is that is it possible to inject real harmonic power into the 
network (Re{VhI;;} > 0) but not have any effect on the harmonic voltages throughout 
the network [Emanue11995]. Should the network look inductive then any real harmonic power 
injection is likely to have little on the voltage throughout the network. Also the presence 
of resonances may mean injections, while lowering voltage at one busbar, may be aggravating 
the problem at another. 
2.3.2 Allocation of Harmonic Costs: The Methods 
It would be nice to have harmonic charges based on some single composite measure so that they 
are easily understood by all. Unfortunately harmonics are not well described by single composite 
numbers and many traditional measures such as reactive power and power factor, which were 
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developed for fundamental frequencies become a bit impractical in the presence of harmonics. 
None the less some such allocations methods have been put forward. 
Emanual [Emanue11995] suggested a potential method to account for harmonic distortion 
based on separating the apparent power into the fundamental and the non-fundamental compo-
nent. 
(2.3) 
Where 8 1 the conventional fundamental apparent power, the non fundamental 
apparent power 
(2.4) 
Dr = VI1H = Current Distortion Power 
DlI = VHh = Voltage Distortion Power 
8H = VH1H Harmonic Apparent Power 
V2 = I:h# Vf H 
12 = I:h# 1~ H 
By taking the ratio of equation 2.4 and 81 the resultant is 
J(THDr)2 + (THDlI)2 + (THDlI . THDr)2 (2.5) 
Given that in many cases THDI » THDy the expression in 2.5 can be generally be 
simplified to 
(2.6) 
This suggests that if one were interested in using 8N, as the basis for harmonic charges, this 
amount is simply calculated. A problem lies in that THDr gives no indication as to what effect 
the current is having on voltages through out the network. An active filter is likely to have a 
very high T H D r, but clearly they should not be penalised. 
There was also work performed by McEarchern et al looking at different ways to allocate 
the cost of harmonics, each with their own characteristics and problems [McEachern et a1.1995]. 
III RegUlation -With regulations economic efficiency is unlikely, and there are issues as to 
the appropriate actions when a load fails to comply . 
• Rebate restrictions Rebate restrictions refers to the fact on some networks, rebates 
are offered to who go to the expense of installing energy efficient loads. But these 
energy efficient loads are often distorting loads such as fluorescent lights or asynchronous 
speed drives. one must make sure any rebate reflects the harmonic costs the energy 
efficient device on the network . 
• Charge for hours - Charging for KVA hours is nice in that it allows one to wrap 
conventional power charges and harmonic charges together into one payment. The 
down side is that KVA hour charges fail to reflect the fact that higher order harmonics 
tend to be more costly and damaging than lower order. 
e Charge for - Where 8 2 p2 + Q2 + D2 charge for D. This is the same as charges 
based on 8N as above, with the same problems. It is some times suggested the problem 
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with charges based on D, is that D has little physical meaning. While technically true, as 
demonstrated by Emanuel, D generally corresponds pretty closely to T H Dr. 
• Charge for true power factor - Power factor can be calculated in two different ways, 
which are both equivalent if dealing with sinusoidal voltages and currents. 
Displacement Power FactordPF = cos(av - ar) 
P 
True Power Factor tP F = V I 
RMS RMS 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
Often power factor charges are based on the dPF, and amount which has questionable 
meaning in the presence of harmonic distortion. The tPF will reflect harmonic distortion, 
but it has a weakness in that it treats all harmonic orders equally. 
• Harmonic adjusted watt hours- Charge for power flow at each harmonic order ego 
$O.10c/kwh for fundamental and $1.50c/kwh for fifth harmonic. Where the harmonic 
charges would be independent of power flow direction (for reasons explained previously). 
A problem exists in that non-distorting loads will still have harmonic flows, but clearly 
should not be charged. In fact passive resistive loads are likely to be those with the largest 
real harmonic power flows, because as mentioned before an active source injecting into an 
inductive network is likely to generate a voltage which is quadrature to the injections. 
• Harmonic adjusted power factor - This was the preferred solution from MacEachern, 
it is similar to using the True Power Factor as above except that a weighted RMS voltage 
and current are used. 
P 
Harmonic Adjusted Power Factor hP F = =-=------=-
VHAIHA 
1 
WhereVHA = [I::cNvJr-
1 
IHA = [I::KNIi,rr 
N: Harmonic order 
eN: Weighting term for voltage term of order N 
IN: Weighting term for current term of order N 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
The question then arrises what weighting terms should be used for the different harmonic 
orders. For current harmonics, suggestions have included KN = N, KN = N1.333, KN = 
--IN, K N = [1 + x . (N2 - 1) J. These weighting terms are chosen on the basis of conve-
nience, are related to IEEE 519, or reflect the effect of reduced skin depth with increasing 
frequency. 
Work has been performed to investigate the different harmonic measures as proposed by 
MacEachern [Arseneau1999j. Using sample data from three medium industrial sites the harmonic 
measures of Displacement Power Factor, True Power Factor and Harmonic Adjusted Power 
Factor (KN = N1.333 & KN = --IN) were calculated, the results of these calculations are shown 
in Table 2.3. 
The first point to note is, despite the fact that both the current and voltages at the sites 
examined were distorted, the displacement power factor still measures unity. Considerable dif-
ferences between the harmonic measures can be seen, therefore charges based on these measures 
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Results of Different Single Point Harmonic Measures 
Site 1 
Site 2 
Site 3 
Harmonic Measure 
0.92 0.42 
0.48 0.11 
0.44 0.11 
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will need to vary considerably based on which is chosen. One also finds the Harmonic Adjusted 
Power Factor is heavily dependent on the weighting chosen. This huge variability leads to the 
question of which measure is appropriate, as if one is appropriate the others certainly are not. 
The answer to this lies in what is the value of harmonic injections made by each load. A question 
that all these measures fail to answer. 
Work on allocation of harmonic costs has also been undertaken by Davis et al [Davis et ai.2000b]. 
Known as the Toll Road method it looks to obtain a fair allocation of harmonic costs based on 
the assumption costs associated with harmonics are proportional to the square of injected cur-
rents. In the Toll Road methods injections are separated into those that increase (Iph) and those 
that decrease (Inh) the harmonic current through a certain component of the network. So that 
the current through the component is given by 
(2.12) 
Given the assumption that the costs associated with harmonic current flow are proportional to 
the square of the current, then the harmonic costs are: 
(2.13) 
The Toll Road method sparates the interaction contribution of the two positive and negative 
currents (-2Iph l n h), based on the square of the currents, so that equation 2.13 can be simplified 
to: 
(2.14) 
Using this result the Toll Road method suggests that individual injectors should contribute to the 
costs of harmonic mitigation based on the proportion of the load they place on the equipment. 
In the case of a harmonic source which makes a positive contribution to the current through the 
component 
Harmonic Charges for Load i = (ACC) 8~O _JO-~O-T--'--~-- (2.15) 
Where ACC: Annual cost of capital of equipment 
T: Number of hours load i injected harmonic current into the component 
allocate the costs for harmonic mitigation equipment according to the Toll Road method 
requires synchronous measurements of harmonic currents and voltage through out the net-
work. Such measurements are not readily available throughout most networks, so Davis et 
al [Davis et al.2000a] looked at a number of single point measurements to see how close they 
could come to the idealised Toll Road Method in allocating costs. single point measures 
considered were 
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e Harmonic Active Power 
Ph = 3 I: V,.h COS(eh) 
h#1 
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(2.16) 
• Harmonic Apparent Power This is the same measure as described in equation 2.4. 
Where the three phase equivalent the measure is 
(2.17) 
• Non Fundamental Apparent Power - Again as described in 2.4 with 
(2.18 ) 
• Total Harmonic Current Squared - fir 
• Non Fundamental Apparent Power Squared - S'iv 
Using these single point measurements the harmonic costs are allocated according to 
r Ivl: 
Harmonic ,-,""'k,"",'''"" for Load i = (ACC) 8760 J1;[; WhereA1.T (2.19 ) 
Mi Single point measurement quantity 
It was found that using harmonic active power as the measurement quantity produces a cost 
allocation with a very low correlation with the Toll Road method. On the other hand s'fv, 
produces a cost allocation very similar to the Toll Road method. f1£ and SNare also found to 
result in an allocation reasonably close to the Toll Road method. This suggests that if one is 
to accept the Toll Road method as the proper way to allocate costs associated with harmonic 
mitigation equipment (as is put forward by Davis et al), then it is possible to get results very 
close to those obtained from the Toll Road method without using synchronous measurements. 
With the Toll Road method both loads whose injections are in phase with the prevail-
ing voltages and those which are out of phase, make a contribution to any costs associated 
with harmonic mitigation. This runs contrary to economic conditions for efficient allocation of 
resources, which require that each individual face the costs of their actions. A paper by 
emn [Bergeron and Slimanil999] goes part of the way to bridging the gap between the Toll Road 
Method and marginal pricing. It follows the same basic methodology as the Toll road method, 
however only loads whose injections are increasing the prevailing harmonic voltages are required 
to contribute to the costs associated with the harmonics. These costs are shared out amongst 
those loads, which make a positive contribution to the prevailing voltages on either a linear or 
quadratic basis. So that if 
lIt I Projection of load i current on to resultant 
T Total costs to be paid 
Amount paid by load i or (2.20) 
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2.4 VALUE BASED NETWORK PLANNING 
As can be seen there have been a number of methods developed to produce a "fair" allocation of 
the costs associated with harmonic distortion. These costs being those associated with meeting 
a standard or regulation. But the allocation of costs is only the second half the problem, with 
the first half being determining what is the optimal network investment and action to be taken 
given present conditions. In other words all the previous methods lacked the ability to discover 
what is the efficient course of action to be taken with respect to any harmonic distortion which 
may exist. 
The planning and investment process for transmission and distribution assets (not asso-
ciated with harmonic mitigation), also used to be based on idea that the transmission and 
distribution networks should have sufficient capacity to withstand a set of pre-defined con-
tingencies [Vojdani et al.1996]. The results being that systems were often over built to avoid 
disruption for low probability events or to avoid interruption of low value loads. But there has 
been a movement towards value based transmission planning in which there is an attempt to 
overcome the short comings associated with deterministic planning methods. In one example 
the value based approach [Dalton et al.1996], the following factors are taken into account. 
III Likelihood of different contingencies (and likely duration) 
• Likelihood of an over load given a contingency 
• Value of lost load to different customers 
Considering that all costs borne by the utility are ultimately borne by the customer, the IS 
to minimise the customers' total costs, which consist of the utility costs and the customer 
costs. There are difficulties in attempting to under take such an investment methodology, these 
include establishing realistic estimates for network component outages along with estimates of 
customers valuation of lost load under different circumstances. But despite these difficulties this 
approach is one that attempts to find an efficient solution to the resource allocation problem. It 
suggests ideas, which the harmonic allocation methods should incorporate so that they are not 
only fair, but also efficient. 
2.5 MARGINAL PRICING 
The ideal system is one, which will both allocate resources efficiently and then distributes costs 
in a manner, which is perceived to be fair. Characteristics exhibited by the marginal pricing 
approach taken in economics. It can be shown that in the solution of a constrained optimisation 
problem yields a set of shadow prices which can be used to achieve an optimal allocation of 
resources, and distribute any costs/benefits fairly [Varian1992] [Intriligator1971]. With marginal 
pricing each individual is faced with the true marginal costs of their actions, and they are then 
free to make decisions based upon their own costs and benefits of each action. Marginal pricing 
has already been well developed with respect to electrical energy (real power), with much of the 
pioneering in this area was done by Schweppe et at [Schweppe et al.1988]. Schweppe's marginal 
energy prices can be expressed on a component basis as shown in equation 2.21 
(2.21) 
16 CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
Where the components which make up the price are: 
I'F(t): Generation Marginal Fuel 
I'M(t): Generation Marginal Maintenance 
I'Qs(t): Generation Quality of Supply 
I'R(t): Generation Revenue Reconciliation 
'TlL,k(t): Network Marginal Losses 
'TlQS,k(t): Network Quality of Supply 
'TlR,dt): Network Revenue Reconciliation 
Schweppe's formulation of marginal energy prices was derived from the following Lagrangian: 
£(t) = G [g(t)] + N [z(t)] - B [d(t)] + f-te(t) [d(t) + L [z(t)] - g(t)] 
Where G [g(t)]: Generation Costs and Constraints 
N [z(t)]: Network Costs and Constraints 
B [d(t)]: Customer Benefit 
f-te(t) [d(t) + L [z(t)] - g(t)]: Energy Balance Constraint 
The first order conditions of equation 2.22 yeilds equation 2.23. 
_ 8B [d(t)] 8N [z(t)] ( ) [1 8L [z(t)]] _ 
8dk(t) + 8dk(t) + f-te t + 8dk(t) - 0 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
Assuming that the customer acts rationally in that the marginal utility gained equals the mar-
ginal price paid for the energy equation 2.23, can be rewritten to show the market clearing 
marginal price for energy. 
[ 
8L [z(t)]] 8N [z(t)] 
Pk(t) = f-te(t) 1 + 8dk(t) + 8dk(t) (2.24) 
Calculating these prices is not a trivial task for any network of realistic size. To ease 
the calculation process Schweppe proposes the use of a DC load-flow, which looks at the real 
energy flows only. This cut down load-flow works reasonably well for large transmission systems. 
Though it is possible given modern computing technology to use a full AC load flow solution, 
which has the advantage of allowing reactive power pricing to be incorporated. 
The marginal pricing should lead to an optimal allocation of resources in the presence of a 
perfect (or near to perfect) market. The existence of an efficient market is dependent on there 
being a limit of the economies of scale available in relation to the size of the market. Should 
the minimum efficient scale be of a similar size as the market, a natural monopoly is the result. 
The usefulness of marginal pricing techniques to achieve efficient outcomes for energy is hence 
dependent on the minimum efficient scale compared with the market size. Evidence suggests 
that a competitive market can operate in the energy industry, despite the very large economies 
of scale present, due to a huge market, and growth in that market which outpaces the growth 
in the minimum efficient scale [Green2000j. In fact with the development of combined cycle 
technology (compared with traditional single cycle coal plants) the minimum efficient scale has 
been shrinking. 
Marginal pricing of energy is being increasingly implemented through out the world due 
to its afore mentioned desirable characteristics. This had lead to considerable research into the 
potential uses of marginal pricing into other parts of the power system. Work has been performed 
that suggests marginal pricing should be used for reactive power [Baughman and Siddiqi1991] 
to achieve efficient investment outcomes for utilities and their customers. Chattopadhyay et 
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al [Chattopadhyay et al.1995] uses marginal pricing of reactive power as the basis for the recovery 
of the costs associated with providing reactive power, and there has been work performed on 
different ways reactive power pricing may be implemented in practice [Gil et al.2000]. 
The study of marginal pricing techniques has moved beyond real and reactive power and 
its use has been proposed for system security [Berger and Schweppe1989] [Kaye et al.1995] (al-
though at this stage the short time frame over which prices have to be calculated can prove 
prohibitive with respect to using prices to coordinate system security). Finally there have 
been attempts to construct a 'complete' marginal pricing systems for electrical systems which 
incorporate real and reactive power along with system security [M.L.Baughman et al.1997] 
[Baughman et al.1997]. 
This work to date has developed a sound frame work on which the operation of many 
power systems are based. Specifically marginal pricing of real energy is used as the basis of 
generation dispatch in areas such as New Zealand, Australia and parts of the United States. 
Marginal pricing of reactive power or other power system quantities has yet be implimented in 
any system, and due to some of the associated time scale difficulties is unlikely to implimented 
in the near future. The rapid pace at which the marginal pricing of energy has been adopted 
serves as evidence the techniques have merit, and are worthy of implimentation in other areas. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The presence of harmonic currents and voltage through out an electrical network will have 
consequences for a range of equipment. Given the effects that harmonic distortion will have 
on the utility and different loads, which are almost always of a negative nature, actions have 
been taken to limit harmonic injections. Currently harmonics tend to be controlled by a set of 
regulations and standards. Unfortunately with increasing variance between the power quality 
requirements of different loads any single standard is increasing unable to deliver an efficient 
solution to the harmonic problem. 
To this point there has been little interest in methods to solve for efficient harmonic solutions 
with much of the study going towards establishing 'fair' distributions of the cost generated by 
meeting whatever standard is in place. Unfortunately without a good measure of the value of 
harmonic injections, any attempt to allocate the costs of harmonic injections will always be 
somewhat arbitrary. It is also the case that unless the level of costs associated with harmonic 
injections is efficient no allocation of these costs can ever be fair. For these reasons having 
an arbitrary standard and then trying to fairly allocate the costs of meeting the standard is 
fundamentally flawed. 
In both the areas of network planning and in particular energy delivery there have been 
movements towards value based allocation of resources. With respect to energy it has been 
shown the use of marginal pricing is effective in ensuring an efficient allocation of resources as 
each participant is faced with the true value of their actions. A fair allocation of costs is also 
a result as each participant is free to make their own decision based on knowledge of the costs 
and benefits of their own actions. Given these favourable properties this thesis explores the use 
of marginal pricing as a tool to properly value harmonic injections, and as method to optimise 
the harmonic resource allocation, along with fairly allocating the costs. 

Chapter 3 
BASIC PRICE DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Harmonic distortion has some value to individual network participants and the existing methods 
of allocating the costs are unlikely to achieve an optimal allocation of resources. This chapter 
looks at the development of basic marginal harmonic prices which will both achieve an optimal 
allocation of resources along with allocating the costs in a manner deemed fair. The use of static 
optimisation techniques to develop energy prices is well established and has proved successful 
in making the value of individuals' actions transparent, allowing for an optimal allocation of 
resources. It is thought the use of marginal prices will have the same effect with harmonics. 
Some of the assumptions underlying the development of the prices are also outlined followed by 
the basic form of the prices. The properties of the basic prices are discussed, and it is shown 
that the prices do in fact provide incentives for the loads to optimise their behaviour. The use 
of harmonic prices can be shown to lead to an optimal allocation of resources, but it provides no 
information as to what the appropriate harmonic property rights might be. Harmonic pricing is 
shown to be of value no matter how those property rights are allocated. The developed marginal 
prices are a function of the different characteristics of each load in the network. How the prices 
behave as the characteristics of the loads within the network change is investigated. Finally one 
of the potential pitfalls associated with the use of marginal pricing is detailed. 
3.2 UTILITY AND OPTIMISATION 
The underlying motivation for this work is that harmonic distortion at a busbar has some sort 
of negative impact on the local load (discussed in Chapter 2). This isn't always true, and for 
this reason it is likely that marginal pricing need only be implemented in specific areas of a 
distribution system such as commercial or industrial centres where harmonic disturbances do 
have a value/cost (in this thesis there is assumed to be only one load at each bus bar ) and it is 
this cost the pricing system will try to minimise. 
In order that the model is not overly complex this chapter considers only one harmonic order, 
however the model is easily extended to include others. Moreover with the appropriate models 
of the nonlinear loads one can also consider cross modulation between harmonics. It is assumed 
that the cost of harmonic distortion to a load is a function of the harmonic voltage magnitude 
at that busbar. This cost is expressed in the form of a utility function, which quantifies the 
negative benefit associated with harmonic voltages. 
Ui(Vhd = Utility of the load at busbar i ::; 0 (3.1) 
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n 
U(Vh) = L Uhi(Vhi) = Total system utility (3.2) 
i=l 
In optimising this utility function there is only one constraint, the system nodal equation: 
(3.3) 
Some assumptions have been made with respect to the variables that form this constraint. 
Initially will assume that the injections made by any nonlinear load are fixed and not subject to 
change (relaxed in Section 3.4). Also these injections are also assumed to be independent of the 
harmonic voltage at the busbar. It is also considered that the linear and nonlinear loads at each 
busbar are exogenous. In the short term no load is going to manage their operations around 
what they pay for harmonics. The consequences of these assumptions is that both Ih and [Yh] 
are fixed. 
The Lagrangian for this system is: 
(3.4) 
The first order conditions for this system are given by: 
8J: 8U(Vh) 
- [Yi ]8Vh 0 = - J-Lh h--8Vh 8Vh 8Vh (3~5) 
8J: 
Ih - [Yhl"Vh 0 8jih (3.6) 
Given that: 
( Vhl
CJ
:' 1 Vh2eJ 2 
Vh= 
Vhn ejBn 
(T 0 0 1 = Ie;"] 8V h e jB2 =} 8Vh 
e jBn 
(3.7) 
It follows from equation 3.5 that the optimal prices for harmonic current injections are given 
by: 
- = 8U(Vh) [ j(}]-l[Yi ]-1 
J-Lh 8Vh e h (3.8) 
Should each load have a constant marginal utility resulting from harmonic distortion such that 
U(Vh) 
U(Vh) 
Where K 
I:~=1 ki Vhi 
KVh 
(k1' k2 , . .. ,kn ) 
(3.9) 
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Then equation 3.8 can be simplified to: 
(3.10) 
3.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF ji,H 
An important requirement of any prices developed is that the full cost of harmonic distortion is 
collected from those injecting harmonic currents. For the prices developed in equation 3.10 this 
is easily shown to be the case. 
iihh = K[ej Oj-l[Yht1Ih 
K[ej Oj-l [Yht 1[Yh]'V h 
= K[ejOj-l[ejOjVh 
KVh 
Total payments Harmonic distortion costs 
(3.11) 
This result is of interest as while in general the prices charged for harmonic injections will be 
complex, 3.11 shows the total amount collected from the distorting loads is a real number, and 
is equal to the total costs the distortions impose on other loads. There is an implicit assumption 
here that each load has a right to a pollution free supply. This need not be the case, the harmonic 
property rights can just as easily be assigned so that each load has a right to inject what it likes 
into the system, this is expanded upon in Section 3.5. 
In general the prices given in 3.10 will be a complex number, which will vary depending 
on the harmonic utility functions of the loads, and the resulting harmonic voltage profile. In 
the case of constant marginal utility the only endogenous variable is the angle of the voltage 
harmonic at each busbar. As such knowledge on how the harmonic voltage angles behave, will 
provide information on how the prices will behave. The system nodal equation can be expressed 
as 
(3.12) 
Which implies 
Vh [yhr1[e ja jh 
( ~l --1 ... ) ( eja, 0 ) Ih Y12 --1 --1 " . 0 e ja2 Y21 Y22 
( --1 ja, --1 ja2 y-l ej a n ) U~) Yl1 e Y12 e In --1 jal --1 ja2 y-le j a n Y21 e Y22 e 2n 
--1 ja! --1 ja2 y-1e j a n Ynl e Yn2 e nn 
( L-~ ~k'eJa, hk ) I:n --1 Jak! k Y2k e hk 
I:n --1 jak! k Ynk e hk 
(3.13) 
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Hence the voltage at busbar m is given by 
Vhm 
n I:: Y~Vhk sin(!3~k + OOk) 
:::} tan(em ) = -n:.:..k --------
I:: Y~Vhk cos(!3~k + O'k) 
k 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
It can be seen that the prices for injected harmonics given in 3.10, will be dependent on the 
elements of the inverse admittance matrix. 
By making some assumptions about the network it is possible to simplify equation 3.15. 
First assume all the branch admittances have an angle which is approximately equal (!3rnk = 
13 ~ constant, V m i- k; this assumption is used by Schweppe et al [Schweppe et al.1988] in 
their DC load flow). Then given the way the inverse admittance matrix is constructed each 
term in [Yh]-l will have an angle that is approximately equal, or zero magnitude (!3~k = 13-1 ~ 
const V Y~~k i- 0). if all the non-linear loads inject harmonics at a common angle 
(OOk = a = constant) one is left with the following expression for voltage angle 
n 
sin(!3-1 + 0') I:: Y~lhk 
k 
n 
cos(!3-1 + 0') I:: Y~Vhk 
k 
tan(!3-1 + 0') 
13-1 + a 
(3.16) 
So that under these assumptions the diagonal matrix of voltage angles [ej9h ] is by 
(3.17) 
Therefore the resulting prices by equation 3.10 will all have an angle ~ -a, and the 
marginal price for some injection at busbar m will be that shown in equation 3.18. 
n 
/l-hrn 
t=l 
-lk Ytrn t (3.18) 
It should be noted that should a filter or infinite busbar appear in the so that the 
shunt admittance at that busbar was similar to that of the branch admittances then equation 3.18 
may not be the resultant price that busbar. Instead the price at that busbar will be zero. 
Intuitively this makes sense as at an infinite busbar no harmonic voltage can exist, 
the value of any currents injected into that busbar will be zero. But in the case of non-infinite 
busbars throughout the network, the payments made to each harmonic source will be by: 
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n 
iihmlhm = hm L y~ kt 
t::=l (3.19) 
= hmlkhm 
Under the assumptions, the marginal pricing of the harmonics has the nice property that 
each load will be charged a real amount for their injections. The restriction that each load can 
only inject at a common angle is rather strong and unrealistic. When this is relaxed, loads will 
be charged complex amounts for their injections. It is shown in Chapter 4 that it is only the 
real part of the amount charged to any load, that is of importance. The complex parts of the 
amounts charged, is linked to injections by the sources, which are quadrature to the prevailing 
harmonic voltage. All the complex payments cancel each other out across a whole network, as 
equation 3.11 indicates the total payments must sum to a real number. 
To this point the assumption has been made that all loads inject harmonics at the same 
angle. Relaxing this assumption slightly it is possible to consider the payments of loads, which 
inject harmonics with a 1r radian phase shift, ie. loads which absorb harmonic current from the 
network. Should there be a minority of loads which inject into the network with a phase shift of 
1r radians, the prices given in equation 3.10 will still be valid as the prevailing harmonic voltage 
through out the network will be unchanged (though the magnitudes will not). Should 
such a load exist at busbar k: 
.(3.20) 
the amount charged to such a load which is sucking harmonic current from the network is 
given by: 
n 
iihk1hk = hkej(a+7r)e-ja Ly;.lkt 
t::=l 
n 
= -hkLy;.lkt 
(3.21) 
t::=l 
= -hklkhk 
Comparison of equation 3.21 with 3.19, indicates that a load which sucks the prevailing harmonic 
current from the system faces the opposites charges of the other loads, or in other words they 
will paid for their injections. This makes sense in that their injections are in fact reducing the 
prevailing voltages through out the network, and hence at the margin improving the utility of all 
connected to the network. This treatment of those making beneficial injections into the network 
is not universally accepted, with Emanuel of the belief that all injections into the network should 
be treated as harmful and hence charged a positive amount [Emanue11999]. I disagree with this 
view, as efficiency can never be achieved unless each party faces the marginal costs of their 
actions. at the margin a particular action is of benefit it should be encouraged, as is shown 
to be case in equation 3.21. 
This section contains examples of marginal prices based on the test system detailed in Appen-
dix Along with the development of the prices, the amount of money paid and received by each 
load is calculated, and the results of changing the valuation of harmonic distortion (8u8V,:~i) for 
some i), and harmonic injections (lhi) by loads, is investigated. The resultant harmonic voltages 
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and harmonic prices for each of the busbars is given in Table 3.1 and Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. It 
should be noted the cardinal value of all prices and payments in this thesis are meaningless, they 
have comparitive vaue only. This is on account of the fact the marginal valuation of distortion 
for each load (ki), as described in Appendix A are just arbitrary numbers. As mentioned in 
section 2.2, there has been little effort to this point, in finding realistic distortion valuations. 
Table 3.1 Result Harmonic Voltages and Prices for Base Case Test System 
Busbar 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Harmonic Voltage V h (pu) 
-0.062 + jO.051 
-0.061 + jO.052 
-0.062 + jO.051 
-0.062 + jO.051 
-0.061 + jO.052 
-0.062 + jO.051 
-0.061 + jO.052 
-0.062 + jO.051 
-0.062 + jO.051 
O.OB 
0.Q7 
~ 
,9;006 ] 
.~ 
~ 0.05 
~ 
'" ro ~ . 
. Q 
~ . 
:r: 
Harmonic Injection Price f-£h ($/pu) 
5 
Busbar 
9.10 + j34.27 
9.60 + j34.94 
9.12 + j34.24 
9.21 + j34.17 
9.47 + j34.02 
9.11 + j34.22 
9.42 + j34.06 
9.14 + j34.26 
9.06 + j34.38 
Figure 3.1 Harmonic voltage magnitude at each busbar 
Of note here is that the harmonic voltage magnitudes and prices, are approximately equal 
for each busbar. This is as would be expected for a small strong network such as our test system. 
In such a case where the injections at anyone busbar are likely to have an equal effect on all 
other busbars throughout the network, one would expect the prices and voltages to be roughly 
equal throughout the network. In equation 3.18 it was shown that the price for harmonic current 
injection at any busbar should have the opposite phase angle of the injection itself. This is shown 
to be the case in Table 3.1. The result being that amounts charged to each of the loads for their 
injections is a real number, despite the fact that both the injections and prices have a complex 
form. The payments made to the loads, by the loads and the net payments by the loads are 
shown in Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. 
The payments made to the loads is the compensation the loads receive for the voltage 
distortion seen at their busbar and these payments are given by 
Payment made to the load at busbari = -kiVhi (3.22) 
3.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF jiH 25 
Figure 3.2 Magnitude of marginal price for harmonic injections 
7 
Busbar 
Figure 3.3 Angle of marginal prices for harmonic injections 
Figure 3.4 Harmonic payments made to each load as compensation for distortion at local busbar 
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The payments given by equation 3.22 are based on the harmonic property rights being allocated 
so that loads have the right to a clean voltage supply at their bus bar. This need not be the 
case and other possible allocation of harmonic property rights are detailed in section 3.5. Given 
that the harmonic voltage seen at each busbar is the same throughout the network, the different 
payments to each load reflect the different valuation the loads place on voltage distortion (ie. 
the magnitude of the elements of-K). 
3 5 
Busbar 
Figure 3.5 Harmonic payments made by each load for current injections 
As the price for harmonic injections is roughly equal throughout the network, the amount 
charged to each load reflects the magnitude of their injections into the network (in the case 
where all loads inject at a common angle). The result being, in this example (3.5) the loads at 
bus bars four and six end up paying the majority of charges, as they account for the majority of 
injections (detailed in Appendix A) . 
." 
~ -1 
...J 
E 
C ~ -2 
f 
qj -3 
z 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7L-~L-~--~--~--~5---7---7---7--~--~ 
8usbar 
Figure 3.6 Net payment made to the loads at each busbar 
Figure 3.6 shows the net payments made to each load. This is of interest as it shows as 
result of the marginal pricing system, is the loads at busbars four and six, end up compensating 
the other loads for the distortion they cause. That is not to say that the other loads do not cause 
voltage distortion (they do) or that the polluting loads are not compensated for the distortion 
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they see (they are). But in this test system there are two loads causing the majority of all 
distortion seen in the system, and hence under marginal pricing they bear the majority of the 
harmonic costs this distortion creates through out the network. This characteristic of each load 
seeing the true cost their actions have on the whole network, is an important one with respect 
to achieving economic efficiency. 
Having established what the prices and the payments between the loads look like to the 
base case test system, Figues 3.7, 3.8,3.9 and 3.10, show how the harmonic prices and payments 
between loads vary when the load at busbar four has a marginal valuation of voltage distortion 
that varies between 0 and -350 $/pu. 
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Valuation of Distortion at Bwbar 4 (k4) 
Figure 3.7 Magnitude of harmonic prices as k4 is varied from 0 to -350 
Figure 3.7, shows that the mean price magnitude for harmonic injections through out the 
network. The price at each busbar will be approximately equal to this value, as the test system 
is a strong network. As k4 increases (in magnitude) there is a linear increase in the price 
magnitude, this is as expected given that under these simplified conditions the price is a linear 
function of the different marginal distortion valuations as shown in equation 3.18. 
Figure 3.8 shows the distortion compensation payments received by each load as k4 changes. 
The harmonic current injections into the network are not changing and hence neither is the 
harmonic voltages seen at each busbar. The result being that the compensation received by 
each load is constant except for the load at bus four, which has a varying valuation of voltage 
distortion. As the load at busbar four increases its valuation of harmonic distortion (k4) it is 
paid more compensation. This naturally leads to the question of weather loads are going to have 
incentives to misrepresent their valuation of distortion in an effort to extract extra payments, 
this question is dealt with in Section 3.6. 
Figure 3.9, shows the payments made by each load for their harmonic injections. As a result 
of the marginal prices being a linear function of k4, the payments made by each load are also a 
linear function of k4, as the actual injections made by each load are not changing. 
Finally figure 3.10 shows the net payments received by each load as k4 is varied. Again 
the net payments received by each load will be a linear function of k4, as both what they are 
charged for their injections and what they receive in compensation for voltage distortion are 
linear functions of k4. Of interest here is how as the costs of voltage distortion increase for the 
load at busbar four, that load goes from being harmonic cashflow negative to harmonic cashflow 
positive. This is as when k4 = -350, over half all the value the network places on harmonic 
distortion is attributable to the load at busbar four. So despite that the load at busbar four, is 
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Figure 3.8 Payments made to the loads at each busbar as k4 is varied from 0 to -350 
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Figure 3.9 Payments made by the loads at each busbar as k4 is varied from 0 to -350 
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Figure 3.10 Net payment made to the loads at each busbar as k4 is varied from 0 to -350 
responsible for close to half the distortion, it is still paid. 
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Also noteworthy is how these elementary prices behave in the presence of a load whose 
harmonic injections into the network are not constant. In figures 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15, 
the behaviour of the harmonic voltages, prices and payments between loads is demonstrated as 
the harmonic current injections for the load at busbar four is varied from 0 to 1.5 pu. 
0.2,-------------,-------------.----------------, 
" .eo . 
0.18 
0.18 
'S 0.14 
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0.04 L-____________ '--____________ "-__________ _ 
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Harmonic Injection at Bus bar Four lh4 (pu) 
Figure 3.11 Harmonic voltage magnitude throughout the network as h4 is varied from 0 to 1.5 pu 
Figure 3.11, shows how the prevailing voltage magnitude behaves as h4, is increased. No 
great insights here considering that the voltages through out the network are a linear function 
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of the current injections as shown in equation 3.23. 
35l--------------------------------~ 
30 
10 
5 
Figure 3.12 Harmonic price 
0.5 1 1.5 
Harmonk: Injection at Busbar Four Ih4 (pu) 
throughout the network as 1,.4 is varied from 0 to 1.5 pu 
(3.23) 
Figure 3.12 demonstrates an interesting property which exists when the cost of harmonic 
distortion to loads is a linear function of the the distortion magnitude as assumed here. As 
shown in equations 3.18 and marginal price for harmonic injections is independent of 
the voltage magnitude where = K. This makes sense in that should costs to loads 
be a linear function of the voltage distortion, the aggregate marginal value to the network of 
any injected harmonic, is independent of the harmonic state of the network, and constant prices 
reflects this. 
The under assumptions of this example the payments made to each load as compensation 
for the voltage distortion, is a linear function of the voltage magnitude (this is shown in equa-
tion 3.22). Given the linear increase in prevailing harmonic voltages with h4, one would also 
expect to see a linear increase the compensation payments each load receives as is seen to be 
the case in figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.14 shows how the only payments made by the load at busbar four vary. This makes 
sense in that the marginal value of injected current is constant (as described by the prices) and 
only the load at busbar four is changing their level of injected harmonic current. 
Figure 3.15 shows how when the load at busbar four, increases its injections the result is 
increasing net payments being made to all the other loads in the network due to the effect that 
action has on these loads. As such the load at busbar four, clearly sees and bears the cost of 
his increased injections. This leaves the load at busbar four, in a position to make a rational 
decision based on their valuation of the increased injection versus the compensation payments it 
will need to make to the other network participants. Under marginal pricing all the other loads 
are indifferent to the actions of the loads at busbar four, as they are compensated to the extent 
of any costs they face due to his actions. 
OPTIMISATION 
two examples in the Section 3.3.1 showed how when the value of harmonic distortion to 
the network changed, this change was transmitted to each member of the network via the prices 
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Figure 3.15 Net payments made to the loads, as h4 is varied from 0 to 1.5 pu 
they face for their injections. While on the other hand each load was indifferent any action 
a given member of the network may take so long as it does not effect the marginal value of 
their injections. Hence the previous examples highlighted how marginal pricing has the ability 
to coordinate the activities of individuals so that optimality is achieved. A proof of this is 
demonstrated here. When developing the prices earlier the loads were considered inert, in that 
their actions were not influenced by the harmonic prices. Should this be the case in reality there 
would be no point in developing the prices (apart from the fact they would "fairly" allocate the 
costs the harmonics incurred on others). So the question is when one allows the loads to respond 
to prices do they act in an optimal fashion? 
Consider that loads have the have the ability to reduce their injections into the at a 
cost dependent on the magnitude of the current reduction (IR). 
Harmonic reduction cost for busbari = RCi(IRi) (3.24) 
So that the total cost to the system due to the reduction of harmonic injections will be a function 
of the vector of current reductions (IR). 
Total harmonic reduction cost = RC(IR ) 
There are two constraints on 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
Equation 3.26 reflects that IR is a magnitude vector and hence cannot be negative. If were 
to go negative this would be the equivalent of the load taking action to inject more harmonic 
current into the system, it's assumed this is not possible. Equation 3.27 implies that any load 
can only reduce their harmonic output to zero, they can not inject the harmonic with a phase 
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shift of 1f radians. That is no load will install excess harmonic reduction capacity. 
To show that harmonic pricing will lead to an efficient out come the optimum must be found. 
The Lagrangian for this new model is: 
L(Vh,IR,JLh,Al,A2) =U(Vh) - RC(IR) + JLh(Ih -IR - [YhlVh) 
+ Al (IR) + A2 (Ih - IR) 
The first order conditions which describe optimality for this revised problem are 
aL 
aIR 
aRC(IR) 
=} aIR 
aU(Vh) ~ [Yi 1avh 
aVh - J-Lh h aVh o 
(Identical to equation 3.5) 
_ aRC(IR ) _ JLh aIR + Al - A2 
aIR aIR 
o 
-JLh[ejaj + Al - A2 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
Equation 3.30 states that in the absence of any constraints each load should continue to 
reduce their harmonic injections to the point where the cost of doing so equals what that load is 
effectively paid for the reduction. In the case where harmonic injections into the network impose 
large costs on others (=} J1hi is large) the amount paid for harmonic reductions (J1hi) may always 
exceed the marginal cost(8R~}~~Ri)), in this case A2 > O. Similarly where the marginal cost of 
reducing the harmonics always exceeds the value of doing so Al > O. These results intuitively 
make sense, reduce your injections. until it is no longer worth your while or until they have been 
reduced to zero. 
Equation 3.30 states the optimality condition for the system as a whole. This condition in 
terms of each load can be expressed as: 
(3.31) 
As can be seen equation 3.29 is identical to equation 3.5. This suggests that the optimal 
prices to be used are the same as those before. Its is worth noting that no knowledge of the 
loads' reduction costs are required in calculating these prices. The problem then faced by the 
load is: 
Maximise iih/ihi - JRi ) - RCi(IRi) 
Subject to IRi ;:::: 0 
IRi ::::; hi 
So the Lagrangian for the individual load is 
Which has the following first order condition. 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
Equation 3.36 shows the same condition as equation 3.31. The Lagrange multipliers take on 
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the same value, as the constraints faced are identical along with the cost function and harmonic 
injection price. This shows that the marginal prices, which are calculated using just voltage 
measurements and knowledge of individual preferences, can be used to coordinate harmonic 
reduction amongst the loads. In this section it was assumed that each load is a price taker (has 
no or little ability to influence the price). This price taker assumption is valid where there are 
many loads in the network, or where the utility of each load is a linear function of the harmonic 
voltage distortion seen at their busbar (as in equation 3.9). 
3.5 MARKET IMPLEMENTATION AND PROPERTY 
By using marginal pricing to convey the value of harmonic injections to each network partici-
pant it is possible coordinate actions so optimality is achieved. This opens up the theoretical 
possibility of using a harmonic market to manage distortion levels and compensate loads (as 
done previously in section 3.3.1). But before harmonic prices can be used as the basis for a 
harmonic market, harmonic property rights must first be established. There are a number of 
different ways the market for harmonic injections can operate depending on how one wants to 
allocate harmonic property rights. There are two basic methods by which harmonic property 
rights can be allocated: 
1. Every load has a right to a harmonic free supply. Nonlinear loads will be charged for their 
harmonic injections and these payments will be passed on to the effected loads 
2. Every load has the right to inject what it likes into the system. Effected loads have the 
right to pay other loads to reduce their harmonic inputs. 
It is also possible to get an allocation anywhere in between these two allocations by allocating 
pollution rights, which are then tradeable. Of interest is what role pricing of harmonic injections 
has under these two different allocations and how the payments among participants differ 
as the property rights differ. 
3.5.1 Right to a Clean Supply 
Under this system every load has the right to charge for any voltage distortion seen at their 
busbar. These charges form system utility function U(V h), in the case where each load has a 
constant marginal cost associated with distortion this function is given by U(V h) KV h. This 
system utility function is used to the optimal prices for harmonic injections (given in 
equation 3.10). 
To implement this system a market mechanism must be set up which will process the 
harmonic charges (develop U(Vh))i calculate the appropriate prices ('ii'h); charge the offending 
loads the appropriate amount; and compensate each load i according to Ui(Vhi)l as described 
in equation 3.22. Under this system, loads have two options. They can do nothing to 
their harmonic injections, an option which will be taken when 8R~Ji~Ri) > /-ihi. Or should 
8R~J~~Ri) < /-ihi the load will choose to reduce their harmonic input until either .:::.::..:.,~~ 
or until harmonic injections are reduced to zero. These actions on behalf of the Uv.uuuc;,;u 
match the optimality conditions in 3.31. Hence this allocation of property rights in conjunction 
with the developed harmonic prices will lead to an optimal outcome. 
3.5.2 Right to Pollute 
Or one could give each load the right to inject what they liked into the system. Under this 
situation it may appear that there would be no need for a formal pricing system to be set up, as 
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no loads are charged for their injections. Though each load has the right to pay other loads to 
reduce their harmonic injections. It is shown in Appendix B, that in the absence of an organised 
market if each load is left on an individual basis to decide what to pay the other loads the result 
will be non-optimal. This is as the harmonic injections have similar properties to that of a public 
good. As such should each load be given the right to pollute, then it will still be desirable to 
have an organised market in which harmonic prices are explicitly calculated. 
With an Organised Market 
A formal market mechanism to establish prices, allows individual's actions to be coordinated 
and optimality achieved. When loads are given the right to pollute a market mechanism similar 
to that in section 3.5.1 must be developed. Again all market participants would submit their 
valuation of harmonic voltage distortion, which would be used to develop the system utility 
function U(Vh)' This is used to develop prices for the injections. As shown in equation 3.18, 
should the loads have a fixed marginal utility of harmonic distortion and the harmonic currents 
be injected with a common angle (or 'if radians out of phase), the shadow price at a busbar s, is 
given by 
n 
J.ths = Lkjyj/ 
j 
(3.37) 
This price is known to represent the system's marginal valuation of the injected harmonic 
at busbar s. Hence 3.37 is what the system as a whole is willing to pay the load s, to reduce 
their harmonic output. This payment to load at s, would then be split amongst all the other 
loads according to 
k -1 
Payment by load z = :Yzs -1 J.thsIrs I:j kjYjs 
Where equation 3.38 is easily simplified to: 
Payment by load z = kzY;/ Irs 
(3.38) 
(3.39) 
The marginal cost for the load at s reducing their harmonic injections, compared to J.ths will 
determine whether or not s reduces their harmonic injections. This is in contrast to the case 
where there is no organised market and the level of harmonic reduction is determined by the 
relationship of Ps and the largest value of (t~;J Yi/ V t. 
While the above section has detailed how to encourage efficient behaviour from the load at 
s (given it's right to pollute), there is no reason why any individual could not install mitigation 
equipment at busbar s, and receive the payment J.ths. As in section 3.5.1 an optimal harmonic 
profile should be achieved. 
3.5.3 Comparison of Property Rights 
It has been shown in Section 3.4 that marginal pricing should provide incentives to act in an 
optimal fashion, and hence minimise the total costs to the system of harmonic distortion. It 
was also shown in Section 3.5 that there are multiple ways in which marginal pricing can be 
implemented depending on how the harmonic property rights are allocated. In this section using 
the test system described in Appendix A, marginal prices are calculated, and each load reacts in 
a rational manner. This rational behaviour was described earlier in equation 3.36. In the case 
where each load has a right to a clean supply (marginal clean pricing), rational behaviour means 
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that should the price of harmonic injections exceed the cost of reducing injections, the load will 
reduce their injections to the point where the two are equal, or till injections have been reduced 
to zero. In the case where each load has the right to pollute (marginal dirty pricing), each load 
sees what the rest of the network as a whole is willing to pay them to reduce their injections, and 
should this amount exceed their costs of rejection reduction, they will reduce their injections till 
the price equals the cost, or they have reduced their injections to zero. Independent of how the 
property rights are allocated the the decision each load makes with respect to their injections 
is based on the marginal prices, which represent the marginal value of those injections to the 
whole network. The consequences of allowing the loads to adjust their injections in a rational 
manner to the prices they face is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Resultant Harmonic Injections and Voltages Before and After Injection Reductions 
Busbar h (pu) Intial V h (pu) J-Lh ($/pu) p ($/pu) Ih - IR (pu) Final V h (pu) 
1 0.0600 0.0804 35.46 60 0.0600 0.0461 
2 0.0080 0.0800 35.27 100 0.0080 0.0459 
3 0.0600 0.0804 35.44 25 0.0000 0.0461 
4 0.3000 0.0805 35.39 80 0.3000 0.0463 
5 0.0080 0.0801 35.32 100 0.0080 0.0459 
6 0.3000 0.0807 35.41 15 0.0000 0.0456 
7 0.0400 0.0802 35.34 42 0.0400 0.0459 
8 0.0243 0.0805 35.46 58 0.0243 0.0457 
9 0.0400 0.0804 35.56 42 0.0400 0.0457 
In this example, as before each load is assumed to have a constant marginal utility that 
results from harmonic distortion seen at their busbar (8~D,:~il = ki ), and it is also assumed that 
each load can reduce their injections at a constant marginal cost (8R~j~~Ri) = Pi). The first 
thing to note is that P3 < /kh3 and P6 < /kh6' Hence the loads at both busbars three and six 
have an incentive to reduce their injections to zero, resulting in a reduction in the prevailing 
harmonic voltage throughout the network. This action from the loads at busbars three and 
six has consequences for the total harmonic utility/costs of the network. In the case of both 
marginal clean and dirty pricing the total utility of network participants (resulting from harmonic 
distortion) is given by equation 3.40. The resultant harmonic utility for the test system from 
before and after the pricing is implemented is shown in Table 3.3. 
The implementation of the marginal pricing scheme, provided an incentive for the loads at 
busbars three and six to under take action which improved the welfare of the whole network. It 
is worth noting that the actions, which result from marginal pricing are Pareto efficient. That 
is once property rights have been assigned either explicitly or implicitly (in the case where no 
marginal pricing exists), no network participant is worse off from the establishment and trading 
on the basis of marginal prices; yet the welfare of the network in aggregate is improved. A 
corollary of this is that any network in which the value of the actions of each individual is not 
clearly signalled, and in which there is no incentive for loads to move towards efficient injection 
levels is unlikely to be operating at a Pareto efficient point. 
Total Distortion Utility = KV h - pIR (3.40) 
It is of interest here that both possible allocations of property rights, result in the same 
action from all loads in terms of harmonic reduction implemented, resulting in the same costs 
to the network from harmonic distortion. This is a product of the way the load's preferences 
were constructed. As stated each load has the choice to pay the market price at their busbar 
for harmonic injections or reduce their injections. Essentially tllis problem for each load boils 
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Table 3.3 Total Utility Due to Harmonic Distortion Before and After Marginal Pricing 
Before Marginal Pricing After Marginal Pricing 
Marginal Clean -29.76 -23.01 
Marginal Dirty -29.76 -23.01 
down to a situation where is load is has the option to purchase all other goods (which takes 
the form of money) or harmonic injections. Money has a nominal price equal to unity, and the 
utility of every load is assumed to be a linear function of the amount of m~mey received. This 
was an assumption implicitly made when the utility function for harmonic 'distortion was given 
monetary units. On the other hand the utility of harmonic distortion is a decreasing function of 
the distortion present (in our example a linear function but it need not be). The reason being 
that each load has quasi-linear utility functions in the harmonic-money space. In this case the 
final equilibrium harmonic distortion present will be independent of the allocation of property 
rights [Varian1996]. 
Having seen that both marginal clean and marginal dirty pricing has the improved the 
welfare of the network participants, figures 3.16, 3.17 and 3.18 show how the payments made 
by the loads, to the loads, and the net payments to the loads, vary between the two pricing 
systems. 
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Figure 3.16 Payments made to the loads under marginal clean and marginal dirty pricing 
Figure 3.16, shows how there are considerable differences in the payments made to the loads 
from the two different pricing systems. In the case of marginal clean pricing, the payment made 
to each load represents their marginal valuation of voltage distortion seen at their busbar, and 
all loads are paid. On the other hand with marginal dirty pricing only the two loads that reduce 
their injections are paid. But one has the opposite situation in Figure 3.17, which shows the 
amount paid by each load. Under marginal dirty pricing the amount paid by each load now 
represents the marginal valuation of distortion by each load, while the payments under marginal 
clean pricing are a reflection of each loads injections. 
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Figure 3.18, shows that there are considerable differences between the resultant payments 
made by the loads depending on which pricing system is used. In some cases it is not only the 
magnitude of the payments which differ but the direction of the payments, meaning a load which 
under one system had a cash inflow, under the other system may suffer a cash out flow. This 
would seem to make the previous statement "that once property rights have been assigned, no 
network participant is worse off from the establishment and trading on the basis of marginal 
prices" difficult to believe. But this is shown to be the case in Table 3.4, where the utility of each 
load as a result of harmonic distortion before and after the implementation of both marginal 
pricing schemes, is shown. 
Table 3.4 Load utility under different allocations harmonic property rights 
Marginal Clean Marginal Dirty 
Busbar Before Pricing After Pricing Before Pricing After Pricing 
1 -2.13 -2.13 -4.82 -4.82 
2 -0.28 -0.28 -0.80 -0.80 
3 -2.13 -1.50 -4.02 -3.39 
4 -10.62 -10.62 -5.63 -5.63 
5 -0.28 -0.28 -0.80 -0.80 
6 -10.62 -4.50 -4.03 2.09 
7 -1.41 -1.41 -2.40 -2.40 
8 -0.86 -0.86 -3.22 -3.22 
9 -1.42 -1.42 -4.02 -4.02 
As can be seen from Table 3.4, it is the actual assignment of property rights which has the 
large effect on the welfare of each load, espeCially those that make large harmonic injections 
into the network, or those which have a very high valuation of voltage distortion seen at their 
busbar. The specification of marginal prices has only positive effects on the welfare of each load 
once the property rights are assigned, due to the incentive they provide for efficient action to be 
taken. The property rights either explicitly stated or not, exist in every network and hence all 
networks stand to benefit from the calculation of marginal prices. It was mentioned that any 
system used for allocating harmonic costs should be both efficient and fair. It's been shown that 
marginal pricing is efficient, Table 3.4 suggests that marginal pricing is also fair, in that once 
the harmonic property rights have been allocated the loads which reduce their impact on the 
network are rewarded by an amount equal to the value the network places on the action taken. 
The cost of this action is shared by all the loads based on their personal valuation of the action. 
3.6 LOAD INCENTIVES 
The previous sections demonstrated how harmonic prices could be used to coordinate loads so 
that optimal behaviour on behalf of each is achieved, leading to the possibility of setting up a 
harmonic market. There are some issues that may not make this initially desirable (apart from 
the technical metering issues). There was a tacit assumption that the prices were an accurate 
reflection of the true costs the loads face due to harmonic voltage distortion. In other words, 
that the loads are truthful when they specify their value of ki (= aUJV:il). Should there be an 
incentive for the load to state a marginal value of harmonic distortion ki that differs from their 
true value ki, then the prices will not accurately reflect the value of distortion. These distorted 
signals to network participants will ultimately result in non-optimal behaviour. 
First looking at marginal clean pricing, in considering how any load i will behave with 
respect to stated ki, how all the other loads behave when facing the prices Ph must first be 
considered. Assuming that none of the constraints with respect to IR will be binding, the result 
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is that each load will reduce their harmonic injections until the marginal costs of doing so equals 
the marginal payments for the reductions. 
aRC(IR) 
- ilh[ejQ:] (3.41 ) 
aIR 
=} aRCi(IRi) 
- ja (3.42) 
aIRi -/lhi
e 
As shown before this behaviour is optimal so long as we have proper valuation for the 
harmonic injections (true 'iih). Note that in the decision making process where each load m, 
decides how they want to behave when faced with fihm) Vhm is not a decision variable. This is 
true for any load which states k:'n km . When this is the case any load is indifferent to voltage 
distortion that they see at their busbar, as the compensation they receive is equal to their loss 
of utility. 
Now looking at the behaviour of a load which has the option of stating a cost function due to 
distortion which differs from their true cost function (that is ki need not equal ki ), the problem 
is to: 
Maximise Vhi(ki ki) + fihlfhi - IRi) - RCi(IRi) 
Subject to aR~I~~~-i) + 'iih_i[eJa- i ] 0 
Ih - IR - [YhrVh 0 
ilh - K*[ej8]-1[yh]-1 = 0 
where 
k::j::i 
IR-i Vector IR with element i removed 
J-Lh-i Vector fih with element i removed 
Therefore a load which is looking to optimise ki has the Lagrangian 
With associated first order conditions 
'2 = aUtility of load i Given that /\ 
ah 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
(3.45) 
(3.46) 
(3.47) 
(3.48) 
(3.49) 
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Equation 3.48 can be rewritten as 
Marginal income to load i due to 
harmonic current injections 
Marginal cost to load i due to 
harmonic current injections 
41 
(3.50) 
Marginal income to load i Marginal utility to load i Marginal cost to load i 
=? from harmonic reduction + from harmonic reduction = from harmonic reduction 
For a large network it is generally considered that the marginal utility to load i resultant from 
the reduction of their own injections is small. This condition was assumed in Section 3.4, and 
equivalent to assuming that the load is responsible for a small fraction of the total injections 
into the network. Numerically this implies that A2i, is small with respect to Ilphili. 
8£ TT (jO·--l jO·--l jO.--l), 0 8k,!,=Vhi- e 'Yil,e 'Yi2,···,e 'Yin /\3= 
t 
Harmonic voltage 
=? at busbar i 
Resultant due to current 
injections at all the busbars 
Of particular interest is equation 3.48, which can be rewritten as 
(3.51 ) 
(3.52) 
Equation 3.52 shows that in general there will be an incentive for a load to misstate their 
marginal costs due to harmonic distortion, in an effort to extract a profit out of other loads in 
the network. The degree to which this incentive will exist will depend the total share of voltage 
distortion at busbar i, the load at busbar i is responsible for. In the case where the load is 
small in the context of the given network (11.\211 ~ 0), the load has little incentive to misstate 
the harmonic valuation. This is as any extra return which can be squeezed out of the other 
members of the network are limited on account of the fact they will reduce their injections in 
the face of the increasing prices. On the other hand, a load which accounts for a significant 
proportion of the voltage distortion throughout the network, will have an incentive to misstate 
their harmonic valuations, in an attempt to claw back some of the payments they make to the 
other loads in the network. 
This presents a potential pit fall in the use of marginal clean pricing of harmonic injections. 
Should there be a couple of large loads which are responsible for a large percentage of the total 
harmonic distortion, they will find it optimal to inflate their valuation of harmonic distortion 
(Ui(Vhi)), in an attempt to minimise the harmonic payments made to other loads. This situation 
is analogous to the imperfect market situation as described by a Cournot equilibrium where in 
the presence of a competitive market with many firms, prices approach true marginal costs. But 
in the presence of a firm with considerable market share or market power, the resultant price 
will differ from true marginal costs [Varian1992]. 
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In the presence of inflated marginal harmonic prices some loads will find it optimal to reduce 
their injections into the network when it is not efficient to do so, lowering the overall welfare of 
the network. But this loss of welfare is not fate accompli, as should there be many polluting 
loads each responsible for a small faction of the total distortion, there is no incentive for loads 
to misrepresent their valuation of distortion, and the marginal prices will closely represent the 
marginal valuation of inject harmonic current. 
It should also be noted that the above analysis was of a long run nature. The model implies 
that loads instantly adjust their harmonic injections to the prices they see. In reality the process 
of reducing harmonic injections will not be instant, and in the case of larger loads is likely to 
require months rather than This lag between seeing the and responding means 
there may in fact be some incentive for all loads to inflate their valuation of harmonic distortion. 
As in the presence of a response lag a small load i (:::;. 11'\211 ~ 0), who receives no long term 
benefit from inflation of ki, will be in a position to make excess profits from the other loads during 
the lag between seeing the prices and responding in the form of lower injections. Naturally the 
longer the response time from all loads the greater the incentive will be for each to inflate 
their valuations of distortion. there may be some need for oversight of a harmonic market 
to ensure that no individual with a short term horizon is in a position to prevent efficient market 
operation. 
It is also possible to look at the incentives, which exist under marginal dirty pricing. As-
suming that all the loads are small compared to the network, and the load at busbar i, is offered 
a marginal price Phi for reduction in their harmonic injections, rational behaviour dictates that 
equation 3.42 be satisfied for load. With the decision made with respect; to harmonic reduc-
tion optimised according to equation 3.42, the other two things which effect each load's welfare 
are: 
as: 
• Utility due to harmonic distortion seen at the local busbar 'Ui (Vhi) ki Vhi 
Cit Payment to other loads for harmonic reduction 2::; kiYi~l IRs (as described by equation 3.39) 
Therefore under marginal dirty pricing the problem for the load at busbar i, can be expressed 
Maximise 
Subject to 
Where 5';1 
Yi-1 
Vhiki + kiYi-1IR 
Ih IR - [Yh]"Vh = 0 
-::-=-'--"-'-'- + K*[e.i°rl[Yhrl[e.iCX] = 0 
Row vector contianing row i of[Yht1 
Maginitude of 5'; 1 
(3.53 ) 
(3.54) 
(3.55) 
This optimisation problem can be solved using the Lagrangian 
[YfJVh) + (aR~~R) + K*[eiOl-l[Yhrl[eicxl) '\2 
(3.56) 
3,7 CONCLUSION 
first order conditions for this problem are: 
( 
Yli ) Y2i 'I), 
, eJ 1 = 0 
Yni 
oC I 1 
- = y' - IR + y' - A2 = 0 ok'!' 1 1 
,£ 
oC * 1 '\ [ jCX] fJIR = k i Yi - ~ Al e = 0 
In equation 3.59 it is assumed that the cost of harmonic reduction is 
current magnitude. 
( 
Yli ) 
Y2i 'I) o [YhrV h Given that eJ , = = ........;..----'-
: OVhi 
Yni 
Substituting equation 3.60 into 3.59 the result is 
can be rewritten as 
k~ .-l_k' aVhi rejCX]=0 
t Yl 2 a(ih _ IR) l 
kiYi-1 - kiYi-1 0 
~ ki ki 
43 
(3.57) 
(3.58) 
(3.59) 
function of the 
(3.60) 
(3.61) 
Yi -1, equation 3.61 
(3.62) 
This is the same result as was found for marginal clean pricing where 11'\211 = O. This is as 
is expected as the above result was developed under under the assumption equation 3.42 holds 
which as shown earlier is equivalent to saying 11'\211 O. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated how using only information about the harmonic voltage at each bus-
bar, and how the loads are effected by this voltage, it is possible to develop a set of prices for 
harmonic injections which accurately reflect the value of these injections to the rest of the net-
work. The calculation of these prices is not trivial, as along with needing information as to the 
magnitude of the harmonic voltage, information is also required as to the phase of the voltage. 
This requires synchronous measurements throughout the network, which are generally unavail-
able. But with the continued development of harmonic state estimation [Arrillaga et a1.2000] 
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and cheaper metering technology, with time, measurement of these distortion voltages becomes 
more feasible. 
The marginal harmonic prices are also of interest as they represent the first attempt to 
actually measure the value of injected harmonic currents. It is only with the network 
as a whole places on a given injection, is it possible to make optimal decisions, which maximise 
the utility of the network. As demonstrated when a load is presented with a marginal price, 
which is a true reflection of the cost of their actions, the load should behave in a manner which 
improves the welfare of every load in the network. But along with achieving an efficient outcome 
marginal pricing has the important property that it is inherently fair, as the prices only provide 
signals to which each load responds. 
Given an allocation of harmonic property rights marginal pricing can only improve the 
welfare of each load. It should be noted though that the welfare of each load will be effected by 
the allocation of the harmonic property rights. The decision if each load has a right to a clean 
supply, or the right to inject what it wishes into the network will have a substantial effect on the 
utility of each network participant. This thesis in no way tries to suggest how the property rights 
should be allocated. But given the allocation of the property rights (which for every network is 
already done either explicitly or implicitly) the development and use of marginal prices can only 
improve the welfare of each load. 
Marginal prices do have a weakness in that large polluting loads may well have an incentive 
to misstate their valuation of harmonic distortion, resulting in prices which no the 
true cost to network. These distorted incentives are unlikely to lead to an optimal outcome. 
This potential problem though does not destroy all the value in marginal prices, as the distorted 
signals will lead the network towards an equilibrium, which is more efficient than before. That 
is while the incentive for some loads to misrepresent their harmonic valuations may result in full 
efficiency not being achieved, some improvement in overall network utility is still likely to occur. 
It should be noted though, with the distorted prices it is likely that the resultant harmonic 
payments will not be deemed as fair, as some loads will prosper at the expense of But 
as mentioned, in the situation where all loads are small compared with the network, there will 
be no incentive the loads to misrepresent their distortion values and an optimal equilibrium 
should be achieved. either event, some level of over sight to ensure some individuals are 
not attempting to prosper at the expense of others will ensure the marginal prices remain both 
efficient and fair. 
Chapter 4 
COMPLEX PRICES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 marginal prices for harmonic injections were developed under the assumption that 
all harmonic sources inject harmonic current into the network at a common angle. Clearly this 
restriction is unrealistic. While it is likely there will be certain distortion sources common to 
most of the loads in a network (computer power supplies, fluorescent lights), it is highly unlikely 
that the nonlinear loads at each busbar will be identical. This chapter investigates marginal 
pricing of harmonic injections where not all harmonic current is injected into the network with 
a common phase angle. Specifically considered are the incentives for some load z, which has the 
ability to inject harmonic current into the network at any possible phase. 
Initially this chapter investigates the behaviour of the harmonic voltage magnitudes and 
angles as the angle of injection from load z (c¥z), is varied. This behaviour is then used to 
formulate the marginal harmonic prices in this more general environment. An investigation of 
how these more general prices behave and how the payments amongst the loads vary, as C¥z 
varies, is then carried out. Previously when all injections were at a common angle it was found 
that each load is conveniently charged a real amount for their injections. This is not the case 
when loads can inject into the network at any angle, as complex payments by loads result. An 
interpretation of these complex payments is developed along with a proof that only the real 
parts of these complex payments are important. Moreover using the test system an example of 
the marginal pricing in this more general envirnoment is constructed 
4.2 VOLTAGES 
It was shown in Section 3.2 that the voltages through out the network are given by the equa-
tion 4.1. 
( 4.1) 
Earlier when looking at these voltages C¥k was fixed for all k. Here this constraint is relaxed, 
in that the load at busbar z will be allowed to inject current into the network at any angle. The 
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result being: 
4.3 
ak = 0; V k i- z 
Equation 4.1, is easily adjusted to account for this injection behaviour. 
Then equation 
L "n -II et Dk# Yik hk = /'i 
Yi/hz = ~i 
can be simplified to: 
( 
/'1 ej ({3-1 +a) + 6 eJ({3-1+az ) 1 
/'2 ej ({3-1+a) + 6ej ({3-1+az) 
/'nej ({3-1+a) + ~nej({3-1+az) 
From equation 4.5, the voltage magnitude (Appendix 0) and angle are .easily derived. 
tan(O) 
( 
Ilsin({3-1+cxH6sin(fJ-l+cxz) ) 
IICOS(fJ 1+a:H6cos(fJ l+cxz ) 
In sin({3-1+a: HEn sin({3-1 +a:z ) 
'YnCos(fJ 1+a:)+~nCOS(fJ 1+%) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
The fact that the harmonic injection angles are no longer constrained will not effect the expres-
sion from which the optimal marginal prices are calculated. That is the optimal marginal prices 
are still given by equation 3.8, i.e. 
~ aU(Vh) [ jej-l[17 j-l 
J.Lh = aVh e h 
Or in the case of linear utility functions equation 3.10, i.e. 
~ K[ Je'-I[l' ]-1 J.Lh = e J h 
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The voltage angles from equation 4.7 can be substituted into the above expressions and 
prices calculated. The resulting equations though are complex and provide little insight into 
how the marginal prices behave. Looking at the expression for the voltage angle at busbar i. 
Equation 4.8, is of the form 
a + sin(¢) 
tan(ehd = b + cos(¢) 
(4.8) 
( 4.9) 
Where a and b are constants» sin( ¢) and cos (¢) respectively. Equation 4.9 has a simple 
graphical representation shown in figure 4.1. 
y 
(b,a) 
o 
(0,0) X 
Figure 4.1 Geometric representation of the voltage angle 
The expression for the voltage angle in 4.8 and 4.9 can be linearised using the Talyor series 
expansion of tan( e) 
tan(e + .6.e) ~ tan(e) + sec2 (e).6.e (4.10) 
Therefore in the case where e = 0 
tan( .6.e) = .6.e (4.11) 
Given that a» sin(¢), and b » cos(¢); we need only consider variation in the circle which 
is tangent to the line (0,0) -t (b, a). 
y 
tan(.6.e) = -
x 
sin( ¢) 
x 
sin( ¢) 
--
b 
(4.12) 
for e = 0 
48 
Generalisation to any point on the plane 
6J) = sin( ¢ - ()) 
11(0,0) --7 (b,a)11 
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(4.13) 
Since tan(6B) = t::..B (4.11), applying this result to the voltage angle seen at some busbar i, 
gives: 
AB. = sin(az - a) 
L..l.~ 1i. (4.14) 
~i 
The result being the voltage angle at each bus bar can be approximated by: 
B (3 -1 sin(az - a) i= +a+ 1i. (4.15) 
~i 
Equation 4.15 is much simpler than 4.8, and can be used to derive manageable expressions 
for the resultant prices and payments made by the loads. 
(4.16) 
_j (f3-1+0+sin(az-al) 
e f,f 
In the case where each loads utility is a linear function of the votage magnitude at local 
busbar, the marginal price vector is given by: 
iih = K 
_j (a+Sin(az-al) 
1 * Yii e 1 
. ( + sin(az -a l ) 
-1 -J a f,f 
Yn 1 e n 
_j (a+ sin(az -al) y;~e f,f 
As such the optimal marginal price for any busbar i is given by 
n _j (a+sin(~~-a») 
Jihi = L: kjyj/e it 
j 
The amounts paid to each load for their injections are given by 
i=/=z 
( 4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
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PAYMENTS 
4.4.1 Optimality 
Equations 4.19 and 4.20 are of interest, as unlike previously (equation 3.19), each of the loads 
will be charged a complex amount for their harmonic injections into the network. This posses 
problems from both a practical standpoint, and from theoretical standpoint. Just what is a 
complex payment and what does it represent? In solving this problem the first aspect to consider 
is that equation 3.11 indicates no matter what the angles ofthe injected harmonics the payments 
received from the distorting loads will equal those due to the effected loads, that is: 
iih1h = KVh 
Total payments Harmonic distortion costs 
Implicit in this result is that the imaginary part of the payments due from all the loads 
sum to zero, as KVh is a real number. This leads to the solution of ignoring the imaginary 
amount charged to each load on the basis that these imaginary payments sum to zero. While the 
correct amount of money will raised, before implementing harmonic charges this way, one needs 
to ensure ignoring the imaginary payments will still provide the correct incentive~ to each load, 
so that efficiency can be achieved. Will charging each load i the real part of Jihihi' encourage 
that load to act an efficient manner? 
To achieve efficiency, the pricing system must be such that for any load z, incentives are 
aligned with the system utility function. That is the payments made by the distorting load must 
be a minimum when the system voltage profile is minimised, and the payments made by the 
distorting load maximised when the system voltage profile is maximised. 
The magnitude of voltage distortion at busbar i, is given in eqaution 4.6 as: 
(4.21) 
The overall system harmonic utility (KV h) is maximised when the harmonic voltage dis-
tortion is minimised, and vice versa. From equation 4.6, it can be seen that the stationary 
points for the voltage magnitude at each busbar are coincident upon a common value of O:z. The 
stationary points of total network utility are given by: 
"Yiei sin( 0: O:z) 1 = 0 
[If + 2"Yiei cos (0: - O:z) + ef]2 ( 4.22) 
This suggests the voltage magnitude at each busbar the stationary points at O:z = 0: ± mr 
= 0: ± 2nn 
"Yi + ei -t max 
0: ± (2n l)n 
= "Yi ei -+ min 
(where n is an interger) 
Having established the optimal values of O:z from the network's point of view, the next step 
is to compare this with the incentives provided to the load at busbar z. The real and imaginary 
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parts of the payments due from a load at busbar z C;;'hzihz) are shown in equation 4.23 and 4.24. 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
Given that it is proposed to only charge loads the real part of fihzihz , to find the likely 
behaviour of the loads in this situation the stationary points of equation 4.23 have to be found. 
8Re{fihz i hz} ~ 1 ( ~j ( )). ( ~j . ) 8 = -hz L.- kjYiz -1 + ---:- cos a z - a sm a - a z + ---:- sm(az - a) = 0 
~ . ~ ~ J 
From 4.25 it can seen that stationary points exist at a z = a ± n7r, where 
For a z 
Re{fihzihz} 
For a z 
Re{fihzihz} 
a ± 2n7r 
I ""n k -1 . hz L..tj jYjz -t mm 
a ± (2n - 1)1f 
-hz I:j kjYiz1 -t max 
(askj<O'ij) 
(4.25) 
This demonstrates that by charging each load z the real part of fihzhz encourages behaviour 
that will minimise the harmonic voltages around the system. This suggests charging each load 
z, only the real part of equation 4.20 is a vi~le solution to the problem of complex payments. 
Charging each load only the real part of fihihi is easily implimented and such a structure will 
collect the correct amount of harmonic payments, while still encouraging efficient behaviour. 
4.4.2 Payment Characteristics 
Each load i only being charged the real part of fihihi' produces some interesting results with 
respect to how the payments from each load change, as angle of injected harmonics from load z 
(az ) changes. 
First looking at a load i =1= z, which injects at the common angle a, the real and imaginary 
parts of what they are charged is given by 
(4.26) 
( 4.27) 
To easily get insight into how these terms behave as a z is varied equations 4.26 and 4.27 
are linearised to give: 
As ~j ---t 0 =} 
'rj 
cos (~sin(az - a)] 
sin (~sin(az - a) 
---t 1 
---t ~sin(az - a) 
4.4 RESULTING PAYMENTS 
Equations 4.26 and 4.27 can be simplified to yield: 
n 
Re{!1hJhi} ~ hi 2: kjyj/ 
j 
Im{!1hJhi} ~ -hi t kjyj/ ej sin(Ciz - Ci) 
. "(J 
J 
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( 4.28) 
(4.29) 
Equations 4.28 and 4.29 suggest an interesting result. By only charging each load i i= z 
the real part of !1hJhi the amount paid is independent of Ciz. That is, in a large network 
where all the loads are small relative to the network, the amount of money due from the other 
loads is unaffected. This intuitively seems fair, in that no small load should be able to enter 
a network and substantially affect the payments due from the others loads. Of course the fact 
that there is a new load in the network injecting harmonics at a different angle will change the 
har~onic voltage profile throughout the system, and this is reflected in the complex part of 
!1hihi' It should be noted though, should the load z, be responsible for a significant proportion 
of the harmonic distortion, then the linearisation becomes invalid and the load i i= z, will have 
payments affected by Ciz . The question of what is a significant prportion of the distortion is 
dealt with in Section 4.5. 
To see how the payments due from a load z (which injects at a different angle to the rest of 
the system) behave, equations 4.23 and 4.24 are simplified using the fact # -----+ O. This gives 
n 
Re{!1hz1hz} ~ hz 2: kjyj/COS(Ci - Ciz) 
j 
n 
Im{!1hz1hz} ~ -hz 2: kjyizlsin(Ci - Ciz) 
j 
( 4.30) 
(4.31) 
Naturally the payments made by load z will be dependent on the angle of the injections. As 
demonstrated before the payments due are such, that load z is encouraged to act in an optimal 
way ie. set Ciz = Ci ± 1f if possible. 
The above results may seem a bit contrived in the sense that they were developed based on 
the assumption that all loads inject at a common angle, except one, but the result is more general 
then the under lying assumptions may suggest. The result shown in Section 4.4.1, that any small 
load has incentives aligned with that of the whole network holds irrelevant of what angles the 
other harmonic injections are made. Similarly the result in equation 4.28 that payments by 
any load with constant injection angle will be largely unaffected by the injections of some load 
z, whose angle may change, is true for any large network where no single large loads have the 
ability to substantially effect the harmonic voltage profile. 
This leaves the question of what does the imaginary part of the complex payments represent? 
Initially when considering the case where all loads were injected at a common angle it was stated 
the marginal price at a busbar represented, the marginal value to the whole network of injections 
_ 8Network Utility 
at that busbar is J-th = . Hence the total payments made by a load represent 
8Ih 
the cost those injections have to all members of the network. This result was a product of 
the assumption, that all the injections made by a load are in phase with the prevailing voltage 
(actually considering the network looks overwhelmingly inductive the current injections are 
about ninety degrees out of phase with the voltage). Another interpretation of the payments is 
that they were complex, with a imaginary component equal to zero. Considering that all the 
injections were in phase with the prevailing voltage, the conclusion then follows that the real part 
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of the complex payments made is the value to the network of injections, which are in phase with 
the voltage. As such the imaginary part of the payments is related to the quadrature component 
of the injections. As this quadrature component does not effect the prevailing voltage magnitude 
(at the its value is zero (hence why ignoring it, still encourages an efficient result). As 
such imaginary part of iihJhi is the value of the quadrature current had it been phase with 
the prevailing voltage. 
4.5 VALIDITY CHECK 
All the previous conclusions made about the behaviour of the harmonic load payments is im-
plicitly based on the assumption that the linearisations preform~d are valid. Linearisations of 
the voltage angle 8hi and of the real and imaginary parts of iihihi' were used to simplify these 
expressions so that insights into how the marginal harmonic prices behaved could be 5"'.lHCcu. 
Naturally these insights are only as good as the assumptions used to develop them. 
In Section 4.3 it was shown so long as t » 1, then at any busbar i 
t;sin({3-1 + a) + sin({3-1 + a z ) 
t;cos({3-1 + a) + cos ({3-1 + a z ) 
Can be approximated by the the expression 
This should be the case for a large network with a great number of harmonic injecting loads. 
How good the is demonstrated in Fig. 4.2, where the actual and aproximated 
voltage angle are shown as az is varied, for two different ratios of t; 
" ,., 
(b) I'i/~i ;::; 10 
Figure 4.2 TI"T',,""'Hl of the angles given by equations 4.8 and 4.15 
Fig. 4.2 shows that the linearisation does produce a good approximation of the voltage angle 
so long as there are a significant number of loads in the system. Even in the case where there 
are only three loads in the network ({i/ei ;:::::i 2), the linearisation produces results which are 
relatively close to the actual. 
It was shown in Section that the payments made to the harmonic sources are approxi-
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mat ely given by 
(4.32) 
Equation 4.32 was used to make some generalisations about how the payments from each 
load varied as a z varied. To check that these generalisations are valid must show that the total 
payments due as described by equation 4.32, are equal to the total due as described by KV h, 
l.e. 
n n n L kj/j + L kjej cos(a - a z ) ~ L kjh} + 2"Yjej cos(a - a z ) + e;l~ (4.33) 
j j j 
This can be simplified to showing that 
(4.34) 
Both terms in equation 4.34 represent the voltage magnitude at some busbar j. The term 
on the left of equation 4.34 being the simplifed version resulting from the linearisation of the 
voltage angle and assumptions about the ratio 'Yj / ej. Graphs of both the actual and simplied 
voltage magnitude terms are shown in Fig. 4.3 for different relative values of 'Yj and ej' As 
expected the approximation is better the larger the ratio between the two. But even for small 
ratios the approximation looks to be valid. 
(b) "filei = 10 
Figure 4.3 Comparision of the magintudes given in equation 4.34 
Given that it has been shown that the simplifed version of L.:~ Re{'ii'hJhi} ~ KV h, the 
conclusions drawn in section 4.4 can be relied upon to portray their true behaviour. 
4.6 EXAMPLE 
Using the test system detailed in Appendix A, this section investigates the behaviour of the 
harmonic marginal prices and the payments amongst the loads, as the injection angle of the load 
at busbar three (a3) is varied from 0 -+ 21f. The phase of harmonic injections made by all other 
loads is kept constant. 
The harmonic voltage magnitude and angle, shown in Figure 4.4, are approximately equal 
at each busbar and have a sinusoidal dependence on a3. This sinusoidal dependence and 900 
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phase shift between the harmonic voltage magnitude and angle is exactly that suggested by the 
linearised equations 4.15 and 4.34. 
aid variation (b) Vhi variation 
Figure 4.4 Busbar voltages as ctz is varied 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show how the complex price behaves in response to variation in a3. Again 
there is a very close correlation with that suggested by the linearised price in equation In 
this example the absolute value of the resultant harmonic prices is independent of a3. Only the 
phase of the marginal show a sinusoidal dependence on a3. Had the utility of each load 
not been specified as a linear function of the voltage distortion seen at their busbar, this would 
not have been the case. 
1.24 
(a) Harmonic magnitude Ilki (b) Harmonic price angle 
4.5 Harmonic Price magnitude and angle as ctz is varied 
As each load was a linear harmonic utility function (Ui(Vhi) = ki Vhi), the sinusoidal 
variation in the harmonic voltage magnitude will also be seen in the compensation payments 
made to each load (Figure 4.7). 
Given that the compensation payments made to each load as shown in Figure 4.7 have a 
sinusoidal dependence on a3, the total payments made by all loads will have a similar dependency. 
This is shown in Figure 4.8, along with the total payments made by all the loads. As shown 
previously the summation of the real part of all the complex charges L. Re{fihJhiJ, is equal to 
the total compensation payments due KVh' 
In Section 4.4.2, it was suggested that in the case when all loads are small compared to the 
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Figure 4.8 Total payments made to and by the loads as c\:z is varied 
network (or at least not responsible for more than a third of distortion), the payments from each 
load will be independent ofthe actions of the other loads in the network (at the margin). This is 
clearly shown in Figure 4.9, where the payments due from all the loads i #- 3, (Refji'hJhi}Yi #- 3) 
are stationary, while the load at busbar three, faces payments which directly reflect the value 
of his injections to the rest of the network (as shown in Figure 4.8). This property that the 
value of the different harmonic injection angles is clearly signalled to each load, is required for 
efficiency to be achieved. This allows loads to make efficient decisions not just with respect to 
the magnitude of their injections but also as to the phase of their injections. Admittedly there 
are very few situations where a load has any sort of control over the angle of harmonic injections, 
but in planning a new nonlinear load these pricing signals will improve the welfare of the whole 
network. 
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Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the complex and absolute payments due from each load. Of note 
is that the absolute payment due from each load is a fixed amount equal to that which would be 
paid if all the loads inject at a common angle. This provides further evidence that making the 
value of the injection angle transparent can only improve overall welfare. The example suggests 
the linearised model developed accurately describes the system, and the conclusions drawn are 
valid. 
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Figure 4.10 Absolute amount charged to each load ('iihJhi) as a z is varied 
4.7 MARGINAL DIRTY PRICING REVISTED 
The previous example was carried out on the basis that each load has the right to a clean voltage 
supply. As discussed in Section 3.5, it is also possible to allocate the harmonic property rights 
so loads have the right to inject what they wish into the network (marginal dirty pricing). Here 
the payments made by each load under marginal dirty pricing are derived. 
Consider the injections into the network by a load at busbar s. The injections made by the 
load at busbar s, have a value to the rest of the network given by equation 4.35 
Value to network of injections by load s = Re{iihs1hs} 
= Re( ( ~ k,y;;le- j B,) 1h,} (4.35) 
From this it naturally follows: 
Payment by load z = Re{kzy;/e-iBz Ihs } (4.36) 
In the case where the network is strong, so the voltage will be approximately equal through 
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Figure 4.11 Complex amount charged to each load as O:z is varied 
out, equation 4.36 can be simplified to: 
k -1 b 1 d 'zYzs R {~ I~ } Payment y oa z = ~ . -1 e ILhs hs ~i k~Yis 
(4.37) 
Equation 4.37, is very similar to equation 3.38, representing the general solution of the 
special case detailed in equation 4.37. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In the general case each load will be charged a complex amount for their harmonic injections. 
In the context of how we think about money and value this may seem nonsensical, but that is 
as as we generally live in a one dimensional economy, or we structure it to look one dimensional. 
Harmonic injections into a network on the other hand is a two dimensional quantity. Current 
has magnitude and phase, and hence any attempt to price this commodity and the resulting 
payments must in turn have two dimensions. 
In the previous chapter, specifying that all injections are made at a common angle, is equiva-
lent to constraining the problem to a one dimensional form (single line across a plane of possible 
inputs), the result being dimensional payments. Generally when an economic problem 
has multiple dimensions the solution space is manipulated to reduce problem back down to 
a single dimension. Often this is done by artificially creating numerous different commodities 
from the single commodity to allow for the extra dimension in the problem. Where each cre-
ated commodity is a restricted case of the more general commodity (ie. different lines on the 
plane). For example looking at petrol, here there is a multi-dimensional problem, in that both 
the volume and octane rating of petrol affect its value. To allow petrol to easily fit into a single 
dimensional currency system, two different categories are created: low octane and high octane. 
Within these categories the two different types of petrol can be prices linearly. But if petrol is 
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considered as a single commodity, the result is that all petrol must have a common price and 
splitting petrol in two sub products, is simply looking at two different constrained input spaces. 
In a similar way the pricing of harmonic current can be reduced to a single dimension problem by 
only considering the in phase component of all current injections. The point being that because 
a complex amount is charged to each load, does not necessarily mean things do not reconcile. 
This occurs all the time (in fact with any commodity where quality is not consistent), except 
instead of expressing our prices and payments in multi dimensional form, we create seperate 
discrete commodities to remove the imaginary part. As an aside it is of interest to consider 
the consequences of two dimensional or complex utility functions would be complex prices and 
payments for everything. 
Having established that for a two dimensional commodity, one should expect two dimensional 
prices and payments, the next step is to understand what the real and imaginary amounts 
charged to each load represent. As was shown, the real part of the load represents the value 
of the in phase current injected by the load, while the imaginary part attaches a value to the 
quadrature component of the injection. That is the imaginary part of iihJhi, charged to each 
load i, indicates the value of the quadrature component, had it been in phase with the prevailing 
voltage. But as the quadrature component at the margin has no effect on the prevailing voltage, 
and hence the utility of the network, this value is specified as the imaginary component. The 
fact that the imaginary part has no value allows us to discard this part, and only charge each 
load the real part ofthe complex amount. Not only does this raise the correct amount of money, 
but provides the correct incentives to each load so efficiency can be achieved. 
Also demonstrated was that so long as all loads are relatively small with respect to the 
network, the amount paid by each load at the margin is independent of the actions of all the 
other loads. This is very convenient as most loads would probably be unhappy at the thought 
their harmonic charges are beyond their control, and sensitive to the actions of others. But at 
a macro level the value of any injection is directly dependent on the actions of others in the 
network, and the marginal prices reflect this allowing efficiency to be achieved. In other words, 
the amount charged to a static load should will not vary rapidly, period to period, due to the 
actions of any other single load, instead only moving slowly due to a change in the state of the 
whole network. 

INCLUSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary motivation behind the development of marginal prices for harmonic injections, is 
to encourage an efficient allocation of resources towards harmonic mitigation. This allocation of 
resources can take two forms of action: 
1. Efforts by individualloads to reduce harmonic current injected into the system 
2. Installation of harmonic mitigation equipment (filters) in the network 
Efficient allocation of resources requires an efficient split of resources between the two actions, 
and that each action be carried out optimally. To this point only action has been 
considered. The installation of a filter will dramatically reduce the voltage distortion throughout 
the network. Therefore the ability of marginal pricing to encourage efficient behaviour with 
respect to the allocation of filter resources is critical if marginal pricing is to prove efficient. 
As well as efficiency, fairness is also important. It is important that marginal pricing dis-
tributes the costs of any installed filter throughout the network in a manner deemed fair. 
In this chapter active filters in a marginal harmonic pricing environment are investigated. 
the purposes of this chapter, active filters are modelled as controllable current sources 
5.1). This restriction is relaxed in Chapter 7. 
System 
Control 
Figure 5.1 Active harmonic filter model 
Where active filter injection at busbar i Ifi Ifiej1jJi 
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In this chapter the assumed cost structure for any installed active filter is specified. Given 
this structure, the optimal filter resource allocation is identified and compared with the in-
centives that exist for any potential filter owners. Here both single period and multi-period 
optimization situations are considered. It is found the provision of filter services violates some 
our previous assumptions, as the filter has such a large effect on the harmonic voltages through-
out the network. The consequences of this are considered. As discussed in Chapter 2, there have 
been a number of methods put forward for allocating filter costs. An example is constructed 
and a comparison is made between the cost allocation resulting from marginal pricing (marginal 
clean), compared with the Toll Road method. 
5.2 OPTIMAL ACTIVE FILTER 
In the development of the conditions that describe the optimal allocation of active filter resources, 
the possibility is left open that there could be an active filter built at any, and all busbars. For 
various reasons, all busbars in a network may not be feasible sites for a filter. Moreover in the 
presence of diminishing marginal capital costs (should they exist), it is likely that one large 
filter is optimal for a strong network (as opposed to a number of smaller filters). If required the 
problem is easily adjusted so filters can be placed at limited number of busbars. But for the 
purposes of this work the solution is kept as general as possible. It should be noted if the cost 
structure of an active filter make a single large filter preferable to many small filters, this should 
become evident from the general solution. 
5.2.1 Pricing Time Period 
To this point the decision making process has always been described as a single period optimi-
sation problem, without any reference to the length of this time period (referred to hence forth 
as the billing period). In one sense it would be is convenient to think of a billing period as one 
year, though it can be any length of time, and there may be good reason for not choosing a 
year. Given a billing period the next consideration is how often the prices are updated (pricing 
period). The behaviour described in Chapter 3 was based on the assumption that there is only 
a single price during the billing period, ie. the pricing period and billing period are equal. From 
the point of view of describing the behaviour of the network participants this assumption is 
very natural. While the billing period can differ to the pricing period, this separation is very 
artificial, and for the purposes of describing individual behaviour, once one has been established 
so has the other. As such the question arises what is a reasonable pricing period? 
As the types of load in a network change slowly, the value a network places on voltage 
distortion will also only change slowly. That is, the network is likely to value some given level 
of harmonic distortion identically in six months or a year as it does today. This suggests that 
an appropriate pricing period could be a year, as the aggregate network preferences are fairly 
static over the period of a year. 
There is a trade off between the length of the pricing period and the level of efficiency 
achieved. This is because the amount charged to a load during a pricing period must be based 
on their mean current injections, and the mean harmonic state of the network over the period. 
It was previously demonstrated that the value the network places on injections is given by 
equation 3.8, ie. 
- = 8U(V h) [ j8]-1 [Yi ]-1 
J-.th 8Vh e h 
The above equation states that in general the value of any injection will be dependent on the 
harmonic state of the network, that is the voltage magnitude and the voltage angle. For the 
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marginal prices to encourage efficient behaviour they must accurately reflect the true value of 
the injections. It is highly unlikely that the harmonic state of the network will be constant for 
a period of a year, using the mean harmonic state over a year as the basis for an annual price, 
is unlikely to encourage efficient behaviour. To encourage efficient behaviour, there is a need for 
a pricing period closer to an hour. Given network preferences that are reasonably constant a 
pricing period of an hour is quite feasible (or at least as feasible as a pricing period of a year, 
as the same amount of information on the harmonic state of the network is required for both). 
As an efficient allocation of resources is one of the primary purposes for using marginal pricing, 
clearly it is desirable to use a short pricing period such as an hour. 
Having established that for marginal pricing of harmonic injections to be efficient, the pric-
ing/billing period must be in the order of an hour, what implications does this have for the load 
behaviour described before in Chapter 3. Basically it has little influence on the previous results, 
due to the way te problem was structured. Previously it was assumed that loads could take some 
measure to reduce their injections into the network at some cost (described by RCi(IRi) for load 
i). There was no suggestion that these measures were permanent. As such all the previous 
results in Chapter 3, which resulted from a single period optimisation problem still hold in a 
dynamic world (under the no permanence assumption). 
The situation changes slightly when filters or other multiple period measures are introduced 
into the problem. Here a decision has to be made as to the amount of capital to be invested in an 
asset which will deliver returns over multiple periods. This added dimension, and how it effects 
the decision making process for a network, is detailed in the next section. It should be noted 
that in this work the pricing period is purposely left unspecified. The ideal pricing period will 
almost certainly depend on the circumstance and the technology available. Any filter installed 
in a network will have an operating life in excess of a single pricing period. 
5.2.2 Network Optimum 
Despite having just stated that the problem of finding the optimal filter is a dynamic optimisation 
problem, for simplicity this section starts off by looking at the single period case. In finding 
the optimal active filter(s), the cost associated with such filters must be specified. Here it is 
assumed that for each time period the active filter at a busbar i, has a operating cost associated 
with the magnitude of the current injected into the network. 
Operating Cost of Filter at Busbar i = F~(Ifi) (5.1) 
In all likelihood the operating cost will be essentially zero, but it is included for completeness. 
The major cost associated with an active filter is the capital cost associated with its construction, 
and on going maintenance and inventory costs. These costs are assumed to be dependent on 
the rating/capacity of the filter. That is, the capital costs are assumed to be a function of the 
maximum possible filter current Ifimax. Given an annual cost of capital and service life of the 
filter, this lump sum capital cost can easily be converted to a fixed term annuity, based on a 
compounding period equal to the pricing period. 
Cost of Filter Capital For Filter at Busbar i = FFi(Ifimax) (5.2) 
... Total Cost For Filter at Busbar i = F~(Ifi) + FFi(Ifimax) (5.3) 
Using the cost functions for the filter at each busbar (should they exist), network filter cost 
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functions are easily specified. 
n 
Total Operating Cost of Active Filter Injections = FV(If ) = L FVi(Iji) (5.4) 
n 
Total Capital Cost of Active Filter Injections = F F(Ifmax ) = L F Fi(Ijimax) (5.5) 
The network utility maximisation problem in the case where active filters are allowed to be 
installed at any busbar is described by: 
Maximise U(Vh) - FV(If ) - FF(Ifmax ) 
Subject to Ih + If - [YhrV h = 0 
If ~ Ifmax 
This problem can be solved using the Lagrangian given in equation 5.9 
The first order conditions of interest are: 
ae = aU(Vh) _ - [Yi][ j(}] = 0 
aVh aVh /-Lh h e 
ae _ aFV(If) - [N] '- - 0 
- - - + /-Lh e - Ai -
alf alf 
ae = _ aFF(Ifmax ) + Ai = 0 
alfmax aIrmax 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
Equation 5.10, describes the same expression for calculating the marginal prices as was 
used in Chapter 3. The presence of an active filter in no way changes how the marginal prices 
are calculated. This is attractive, as the according to equation 5.10, to calculate the prices 
information is only required on the harmonic voltage distribution through out the network and 
the loads' preferences. No information about the active filter is required in calculating the prices. 
Looking at equation 5.11 and considering the case where the constraint is not binding, the 
result is: 
aFV(If) _ - [N] 
alf - /-Lh e (5.13) 
Given that 8FJr;Ir) is a real number, JLh[eN ] must also be a real number. The implication being: 
(5.14) 
Equation 5.14 makes sense, stating that the angle of current injection from an active filter will 
be that which yeilds the owner of the filter the largest payoff. This angle will be in phase, or 
7r radians out of phase with the prevailing angle of current injection, depending on how loads 
value harmonic distortion. As demonstrated in Section 3.3, equation 5.10 can manipulated to 
show: 
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Note that in Section 3.3 a was the common angle of harmonic current injection. Here no such 
restriction is placed on the angle of harmonic injections. As such a represents an the equivalent 
common angle of injection, for the rest of the network. The angle of the price described above 
will be dependent on a~K~t). To this point it has been assumed that loads receive negative 
utility from voltage distortion =>- aUJK~t) < 0 Vt. When this is the case the marginal price can 
be rewritten as: 
(5.15) 
When 'l/Ji = a + 7r Vi 
This intuitively makes sense as it says in the case where loads dislike harmonic voltage dis-
tortion, the prices will provide active filters an incentive to inject current into the network, 7r 
radians out of phase. Or in other words, when harmonic distortion imposes a cost on the net-
work, active filters will maximise their revenue by minimising the voltage distortion throughout 
the network. This is an example of how marginal pricing acts to encourage behaviour, which 
improves the welfare of the aggregate network. 
On the other hand should harmonic distortion result in positive utility for each of the loads: 
Vi 
That is should loads benefit from harmonic distortion (an silly notion, but considered for com-
pleteness) the optimal solution has active filters injecting harmonic current into the network in 
phase with the prevailing injections. That is, there exists an incentive for loads to maximise 
the harmonic distortion throughout the network, which is consistent with utility maximisation 
where aUJK~tl > 0 Vt. The different load current, filter current and marginal price angles, for 
the two different cases are shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
Apart from information as to what is the optimal phase for active filter injections, equa-
tion 5.13, provides information as to the optimal magnitude of current injections. It states an 
active filter at each busbar should make injections into the network until the marginal cost of 
making injections equals the marginal payment received for the injections (the price magnitude 
/.Lh). This too is what one would intuitively expect from the network optimality condition. 
As mentioned previously the marginal costs for active filter injections are likely to be close 
to zero, and hence the capacity constraint on the active filter is likely to be binding. When this 
is the case equations 5.11 and 5.12 can be combined to describe the optimal operating state of 
the active filter(s). 
- [N] a FV (If) _a F----,F,--("----If'--'.m __ axc..:..) /.Lh e = + oIf oIfmax 
Marginal payment Marginal cost Marginal cost of capital 
for injection of injection + associated with the injection 
(5.16) 
Given marginal operating costs are likely to be approximately zero, equation 5.16 states 
that filter capacity should continue to be added until the marginal cost of that filter capacity 
exceeds the value of the harmonic injections (as described by iih)' The general solution to the 
active filter allocation problem (equation 5.16), suggested that filter capacity can be present at 
each busbar. In the case of a strong network where there is a declining marginal capital cost for 
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o 
Figure 5.2 Filter current, load current and marginal price angles, where =-=,c~'-'- < 0 Yt 
1T 
1r 
2 
1r 
2 
o 
Figure 5.3 Filter current, load current and marginal price angles, where oU~\~~~t) >0 Yt 
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capacity, this optimal solution will consist of single filter at some preferred busbar. The capacity 
of this filter should be increased to the point where the harmonic marginal price reduces to meet 
the marginal capital cost of filter capacity. In the case of linear utility functions, this means 
installing a filter of sufficient size to reduce the harmonic voltage through out the network to 
zero. Of course should the marginal capital cost of filter capacity always exceed the value of the 
injections, the optimal solution is to not install any capacity. Simply put the above result shows 
the optimal filter for each busbar in the network is one whose marginal cost per period, equals 
the marginal value of the distortion reduction provided (equation 5.17). 
Vi (5.17) 
The solution to the filter resource allocation problem above is a single period solution. As 
mentioned, though the decision on how much filter capacity to install may have implications 
beyond a single period. Only a single filter may need to be added to the system for many years. 
Hence the decision regarding the size of the filter may determine what the filter current will be 
constrained to over a number of years. Having said that, if active filters were cheap and easily 
installed into the network the dynamic model may not be necessary. In this case the amount of 
filter capacity could be quickly adjusted, and the amount of capacity installed during one period 
need not act as a constraint during other periods. If filter capacity is easily adjusted, the single 
period solution given by equation 5.17 describes the optimal network conditions. Next the case 
where the filter decision is a multi-period problem is examined. The internalised problem, which 
gives the optimal level of filter investment for the network is: 
Maximise U(Vh) - FVD(Ir) - FFD(Ifmax) 
Subject to i h + if - [[Yh ]] V h = Q 
If ~ Ifmaxl 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
Where FV D(If) and F F D(Ifmax ) are the multiperiod fixed and variable filter costs, which 
are a function of the injected filter current and the installed capacity. This optimisation problem 
extends over an unspecified number of pricing periods. To represent the different states of the 
network during each time period, the voltage and current vectors have been altered so that 
information is contained for each period under consideration. If any decision can not be altered 
for T periods, then the voltage vector V h, will contain the voltage at each of the n busbars, for 
each of the T periods. Previously the voltages throughout the network were given by: 
To distinguish between the different time periods, the vector of busbar voltages for period 
t, is denoted by Vht, and the vector of voltage for all periods is constructed so that: 
Vh= 
The network nodal equation constraint when expanded, takes the form shown in equa-
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tion 5.21. 
(5.21) 
(Bold symbols represent a spacial vector, showing the values at each of the different busbars. 
Underlined varaibles are temporal vectors showing values for each of the T different pricing pe-
riods. Variables both bold and underlined are vectors, which contain both spacial and temporal 
information) 
The first order conditions for this multi-period optimisation problem look very similar to 
those of the single period problem, i.e. 
Be = BU(Vh) _ - [[Yi ]-1 [[ Hi]] = 0 
BV h BV h J-th h _ e - (5.22) 
Be _ BFVD(If ) -[[ N]] "\ _ 
- - - + J-th e - - Af - Q Blf Blf - -
(5.23) 
Be = _ BFFD(Ifmax) + Af[!] = 0 
BIrmax Blfmax --
(5.24) 
Equation 5.22 defines the optimal marginal prices for each of the T periods. For each period 
the prices given by equation 5.22, are identical to the single period solution in equation 5.10. 
This is important as the value of marginal pricing is diminished, if multiple time periods need 
to be considered in the calculation of the prices. The prices contain valuable information as to 
the value the network places on harmonic injections, calculation of these values is not feasible, if 
knowledge of the intended actions of each load, and the state of technology for some unspecified 
period into the future is required. It is shown in Section 5.2.3, that these prices encourage optimal 
behaviour over the course of time from all loads. This implies, by only using the information 
about the present harmonic state of the network and load preferences, it is possible to encourage 
each load to act in an optimal fashion, over an extended time horizon. 
Again in a similar result as before, equation 5.23, states that the marginal price during 
each period should equal the marginal cost of the injections, plus an extra amount if the filter 
injections are constrained by installed capacity. Using the previous result Ljiht = -'ljJt, and the 
fact marginal injections costs are minimal compared to capital costs equation 5.23 can simplified 
to: 
BFVD(If ) 
J-th = aIf + Af (5.25) 
r::::J Af 
Over the period of consideration, the summation of the constraint terms at each busbar, 
should equal the marginal cost of filter capacity installed at that bus bar. Equation 5.24 can be 
restated in a way that makes this apparent. 
T 
I:Afi = BFFD(Ifmax ) 
. Blfmax 
(5.26) 
~ 
Using equation 5.26, equation 5.25, states that in optimality filter capacity should be added 
to each bus bar, until the marginal cost of filter capital is equal to the summation of the difference 
5.2 OPTIMAL ACTIVE FILTER 69 
between injection prices and the marginal operating costs. Simply stated filter capacity should 
be added until the marginal cost of capacity over the life of the filter, equals the level of payments 
received after paying for the marginal injection costs. Figure 5.4, depicts the price duration curve 
for a filter at busbar i. In this diagram the shaded area must be equal to element i in I:J A fj. 
The excess of price over marginal costs must equal the cost of marginal capital. 
Price duration curve of harmonic 
/injections at busbar i 
Figure 5.4 Active filter resource allocation 
T 
5.4, shows how over the life of the filter the price should exceed the marginal operating 
costs, so that the fixed costs associated with the filter are covered. 
5.2.3 Individual Optimum 
looked at the active filter conditions for the network as a whole, here the single period 
decision making process, for an individual who is considering installing active filter capacity at 
busbar i, is investigated. Given price Phi, for harmonic injections at busbar i, the problem they 
face is: 
Subject to 
This can be solved using the Lagrangian: 
order conditions for this problem are given below. 
(5.27) 
(5.28) 
(5.29) 
(5.30) 
(5.31) 
Equations 5.30 and 5.31 can be combined to produce exactly the same condition as the 
network optimum shown in equation 5.17 
(5.32) 
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The same conclusions can be drawn from equation 5.32, as were drawn for the network previously. 
The optimal phase angle active filter current is 'ljJi = - L.,!ihi. Moreover equation 5.32 states that 
the optimal unconstrained filter injections are those that drive the price down to the marginal 
operating cost ( In the constrained case, prices over the life of the filter should be such 
that both the and capital costs are covered. 
While equation 5.32, demonstrates that marginal pricing should encourage efficient decisions 
over a single period, problem as posed is not that confronted by the individual loads. As 
shown in Chapter 4, !ihJhi will in general be complex, and it is only the real part that is of 
importance, and hence needs to be charged. The concept of maximising a number can 
be a bit ambiguous, and mis-leading if loads are in reality only charged the real component of 
!ihJ/i' (The case was detailed, as it provides tidy results). To demons~ate that optimal single 
period decisions will result if loads are only charged the real part !ihilji, the decision making 
process for a load i, is detailed below. The problem this load at busbar i, faces can be expressed 
as: 
Subject to 
This can be solved the Lagrangian: 
e = Re{!ihJji} FVi(Iji) - FFi(Ijimax) + Ai (I jim ax - Ijd 
fthJji COS(L.,!ihi + 'ljJi) - FVi(Iji) - FFi(Ijimax) + Ai(Ijimax Iji) 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
ae 
ae 
alfimax 
8e 
8'l/Ji 
_ aFVi(Ijd 
{thi COS(Lfthi + 'ljJi) - 8Iji - Ai = 0 
--::---=--- + Ai = 0 
(5.33) 
(5.34) 
(5.35) 
(5.36) 
(5.37) 
(5.38) 
Equation 5.38 has multiple solutions at 'ljJi -L!ihi +mf, where n is an interger. But given that 
The optimal angle of injected currrent from the active filter is 'ljJi = -L.,!ihi, this is consistent 
with equation 5.17. Substituting this result into equation 5.36 and 5.37 the result is: 
fthi (5.39) 
Again this result is consistent with equation 5.17, demonstrating if loads only pay the real 
part of the harmonic charges, optimal active filter investment decisions will be made. 
But as was the case for the network, individual decisions made with respect to installation 
of active filters, are likely to have consequences for a number of periods. Like before the active 
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filter allocation problem is a dynamic optimisation problem. It can be described as: 
Maximise E[/hi]lji - FV Di(Iji) - FFDi(Ijimax) 
Subject to Iji ~ Ijimaxl 
Where ( ~:~ ) 
IjiT 
= Vector of filter injections at busbar i over time 
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(5.40) 
(5.41 ) 
E[l1hi] = Vector of expected prices for harmonic injections at busbart i over time 
This problem can be solved using the Lagrangian: 
(5.42) 
The first order conditions for this Lagrangian are: 
(5.43) 
(5.44) 
Again equation 5.43, specifies the injected angle of filter current into the network for each 
time period. Incorporating the fact that injected current at each period will have the opposite 
angle to the price (implied in equation 5.43, and shown previously), equation 5.43 can be restated 
as: 
(5.45) 
Equation 5.45, reflects the fact that the marginal operating costs of the filter are likely to 
be small compared with the cost of capital. Should the expectation of future harmonic prices 
used in the decision making process, prove to be equal to the actual prices that eventuate, this 
equation is identical to equation 5.25 (if decomposed into optimal conditions at each busbar). 
That is should some load i, have accurate expectations as to the future harmonic prices, they 
shoud behave in a way that is optimal for the network at large. 
The obvious question is, how likely are the expectations about future prices, to prove reason-
ably accurate, and what are the consequences if they are not? The second part of that question 
is easiest to answer. Should an individual under estimate the harmonic price over the T time pe-
riods (the price representing the value of harmonic injections to the network), they will commit 
a sub-optimal amount of capital towards installing active filter capacity at any busbar. On the 
other hand any individual whom over estimates the future harmonic prices will be inclined to 
install excess capacity at a given busbar. This is a situation very similar to the classic "winner 
curse" that exists with tender auctions of goods with a common value. That is: 
When an item to be tendered has an uncertain but common value to all bidding, the indi-
vidual who bids the highest price will win the tender. In the case where each individuals bidding 
have reasonable expectations of the true value of the tender item, the mean expected value of 
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the tender item amongst all the bidders, will be equal to its true value. As such the hightest bid 
that wins the tender must over estimate the items true value. Therefore he who wins must do 
so because they overpaid. 
The value of an installed filter will have a common value, as whoever owns it will receive 
the same payments for its current injections, and will face the same operating and capital costs. 
The decision to build a filter is likely to mimic that of an auction of a single item, as in the 
case of a strong network there are likely to be limited number of filters present, as any single 
filter will influence the distortion present at all busbars. In a weak system this is not the case, 
but here the consequences of any harmonic injections are felt mainly at the busbar where they 
occur, therefore all the externalities are internalised, and optimal individual behaviour does not 
require guidance in the form of marginal prices. The consequence of this is those who add filter 
capacity to the network, are those who over estimate the value of the filters injections, and these 
individuals are likely to install a greater than optimal level of filter capacity. So long as the 
trend of increasing harmonic injections into the network continues, this capacity will eventually 
be utilised, but by that time there is likely to have been advances in technology, which will 
provide a cheaper solution to the problem. 
The extent to which this over investment in filter resources takes place, will be dependent 
on how accurately individuals can predict the future value of harmonic injections. It is hard to 
make any statements about this, apart from anecdotal observations, which lead the author to 
believe individual's belief in their ability to forecast the future, tends to be far in excess of their 
actual abilities. The result being, individuals fail to appropriately discount the values they place 
on these items, due to the fact they are rather confident of their predictions. The winners curse 
would not exist if all bidding accepted the fact they were uncertain as to the item's true value, 
and discounted their bid accordingly. 
The possibility that the expected future value of injections may not be accurate, does not 
leave marginal pricing as redundant, as to achieve an efficient allocation of resources some 
effort towards establishing this value must be taken. A decision to use other techniques on 
the basis that the exact future value of distortion cannot be accurately established would be 
illogical, as it suggests it is preferable to be certainly wrong, than possibly correct. Also financial 
disappointment will come to those less skilled towards predicting the future value of harmonic 
distortion, leading these individuals away from making such decisions, and an improvement in 
accuracy of decision making over time. As the consequences of this uncertainty, is an excess of 
filter capacity above the optimal level, those with a conservative engineering approach to such 
problems should not be too troubled by this result. 
Individual Incentive 
If investing in filter capacity when others are not implies that the decision is not wise, why 
would any rational individual do so? The profit maximisation problem as described above, 
may not match reality, as the installation of filter capacity might be used to deter others from 
entering the market (ie. installing competing capacity). It is also likely the active filter will have 
considerable influence over the marginal harmonic price throughout the network. The previous 
work implicitly assumed the owner of the filter had little ability to control the harmonic price. 
This assumption is valid so long as any filter owner is unable to prevent other individuals from 
installing filter capacity, if economic to do so. But in reality spare filter capacity can be used 
to deter others from installing filters, as the incumbent has the potential to drive the price 
for harmonics down to zero in the event another individual enters the market. This situation is 
common in commodity industries [Varian1996]. To demonstrate this the decision making process 
for an individual is detailed again, where the expected harmonic price is defined as a function of 
the injected current of the filter, along with the amount of filter capacity installed. This revised 
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profit maximisation problem then is: 
Maximise E[!ihi(Ifi,Ifimax)]lfi - FVDi(Ifi) - FFDi(Ifimax) 
Subject to Ifi ::; Ifimaxl 
where 1 = [ ! I 
This problem can be solved using the Lagrangian 
The first order conditions for this Lagrangian are: 
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(5.46) 
(5.47) 
(5.48) 
(5.49) 
( 5.50) 
(5.51) 
The conditions detailed in equations 5.50 and 5.51, clearly no longer match those of the 
network optimum detailed in 5.25. These expressions can be simplified to remove reference to 
the angle of filter injections, or the angle of the harmonic price. 
Marginal income from 
filter injections 
Marginal lost revenue due Marginal cost of 
to price reductions + filter injections + 
Marginal cost of 
capital constraint 
(5.52) 
Similarly the value of the constraint terms differ, to reflect the fact the filter capacity has 
value in its abilityto deter filter investment by others, which pushes up the price. 
~ 8FFDi (Ifimax) 8E[!ihi(Ifi,Ifimax)]-
L.,; Aij = - Ifi 
. 8Ifimax 8Ifimax-
J (5.53) 
Sumation of Capital cost of marginal Marginal increase in revenue 
constraint terms unit of filter capacity due to marginal filter capacity 
Equation 5.52, is identical to the optimal conditions described earlier except for the extra 
OE[!lhi(Jji,Ijimax)]- h' d'b h d .. h 1 f term - oJ . I fi. T IS term escn es t e re uctlon m revenue t at resu ts rom a j. -
marginal increase in filter injections, due to the effect those injections have on the prevailing 
price. This demonstrates how when in a position of market power, it may be optimal for the 
owner of the filter to withhold injections from the network, as the increased voltage distortion 
levels throughout the network, will increase the value of the injections the active filter does make. 
It should be noted that the constraint term in this case also has a different meaning. Previously 
the constraint was related solely to the cost of capital, of the marginal unit of filter capacity. 
In this case the value of the constraint is reduced, as the filter capacity now posses value, in 
that it acts as a deterrent to other individuals adding capacity to the network. The value of 
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h· .. db h 8El!7hi(Ili,Ilimax)lI~ Th f h h . . t IS capacIty IS capture y t e term 8J ' Ii' e act t at t e constramt term IS I,max -
reduced will act to reduce the extent to which the monopoly filter will boost prices as compared 
b £ . h" . £ h 8El!7hi(Ili,J/imax)] I~ . . to e ore, Ie. some of t e prIce rIse resultmg orm t e - - 8I ' Ii term WIll m fact /1 _ 
be contributing towards the cost of capital as now 2:JT Aij < 8F~r;:(Jlimax). But the extent to jtmax 
h· h th t 8El!7hi(Ili,Ilimax)]I~ '11' k th 't 1 t '11 b l' . d .. 1 w IC e erm - 8J ' ji, WI plC up e capI a cos s WI e Imlte ,as It IS on y 
I' -
spare filter capacity abovethe optimal amount that is able to provide any sort of deterrence to 
h dd ' .. 8El!7hi(Ili,I/imax)] 0 £ I 1 h h h' h . . I ot ers a mg capacIty, Ie 8J ' -+ or limax ess t an t at w IC IS optIma. I,max 
It is hard to make any definitive conclusions as to how an individual would behave in such 
a situation as so much is dependent of the cost structure of filter technology (minimum efficient 
scale in particular); of which this work makes no assumptions. But it is clear there is the 
potential incentive for a filter owner to hold back filter injections so as to profit at the expense 
of the network. This may not be a problem, in that active filters are designed to minimise the 
voltage distortion seen at the filter busbar. The re-engineering of any active filter to maximise 
income may prove to be an expensive task, making any such plans uneconomic. Another option 
is rules can be imposed stipulating that any filter capacity installed in the network must operate 
so to minimise the voltage distortion present up to the full capacity of the filter. There are 
property right issues associated with such a rule, which may not make it attractive (and which 
are not discussed here), but it would work. Finally, filter investment could be made by an entity 
that has no interest at profiting from the harmonic market. It is likely for the foreseeable future 
a harmonic market will not be formed, and network infrastructure companies will own filters to 
provide a given level of service quality. In this situaton marginal pricing techniques can still be 
used by the network operator as a guide as to the optimal level of filter investment. In these 
circumstances where there is no potential to profit from a harmonic market, the marginal prices 
will provide valuable information leading to an efficient level of investment, the costs of which 
can be distributed fairly. 
5.3 ACTIVE FILTER EXAMPLE 
Using the test system detailed in Appendix A, an example of an active filter within a marginal 
pricing environment is presented in this section. To keep things simple in this example the 
single period optimisation framework is used. While not a realistic representation of the decision 
making process regarding filters, it was shown previously that the results gleaned from this model 
carry through to the more realistic multi-period framework. 
It was also discussed previously that marginal pricing had value in its ability to specify the 
optimal placement of filters within a network. For the test system used here, the placement of 
the filter makes little difference to it value. This because all the busbars are closely coupled, and 
the injections into one bus bar have a similar effect at all the others throughout the network. The 
fact that there is no highly preferred busbar for the placement of a harmonic filter, can be seen 
in previous example in Section 3.3.1, as the harmonic price at each busbar was approximately 
equal. In an uncoupled network the prices through out the network will vary to reflect the fact 
injections at different points have a different value. As such it was decided the for following 
example an active filter would be located at busbar one (Figure 5.5). 
In Section 5.2.3, it was shown there potentially exist incentives for the owner of a filter to 
withhold injections from the network, to push up the harmonic price. This example assumes 
that those issues have been dealt with, so that the owner of a filter is unable to manipulate the 
price. It should be noted though, even with the filter owner taking non-competitive actions to 
boost the value of their injections, the network is better off in that situation, than in the absence 
of the filter. 
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Figure 5.5 Test network with an active filter located at busbar one 
For this example it will be assumed that the marginal cost of harmonic injections is negligible. 
So that the only cost associated with a filter is the cost of capital. It is assumed that cost of 
capital for the filter at busbar one is a function of the installed capacity squared. 
Cost of capital for filter at busbar one FFi(Ifimax) = FIJimax 
1 
Where F = $SO/A2 
In this example three different cases are detailed: 
1. No filter in the system, no action taken by loads to reduce their injections 
2. Optimal filter in the system, loads do not respond to harmonic prices 
3. Optimal filter in the system, loads respond to harmonic prices if profitable 
(5.54) 
The loads all have linear harmonic utility functions, and linear costs of harmonic reduction 
as detailed in Appendix A. As a result, so long as there is some level of harmonic voltage 
throughout the network the marginal price for harmonic injections is constant with a magnitude 
approximately equal to $35/pu. Given this constant price, in case three, it is optimal for the 
loads at bus bars three and six to reduce their injections to zero. Moreover due to the constant 
marginal price the optimal level active filter capacity (and injections) for both cases two and 
three is constant. This would not be the case if after the harmonic reductions IR3 and IR6 , the 
filter injections of case two were greater than that required to reduce the harmonic voltages to 
zero. 
Table 5.1 Resultant harmonic injections and voltages before and after injection reductions 
Harmonic Price J.Lhi ($/pu) Filter Capacity Iflmax (pu) IR3 (pu) IR6 (pu) 
Case 1 35.40 0.0000 0.00 0.00 
Case 2 35.40 0.3545 0.00 0.00 
Case 3 35.40 0.3545 0.06 0.30 
Figure 5.6 shows the resultant harmonic voltage magnitude throughout the network for the 
three cases. For each case, the voltage at each busbar is approximately equal, a result of the 
strong test system. It can be seen that the active filter injections, and the reduction in injections 
by the loads at busbars two and three, reduce the distortion magnitude by 85%. 
Figure 5.7, shows how the harmonic payments made by each load vary for the three cases. 
As the marginal prices are constant each load pays the same amount, except the loads at bus bars 
three and six, who pay nothing in case three as they reduce their injections to zero. 
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Figure 5.6 The harmonic voltage magnitude at each of the busbars for the three cases 
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Figure 5.7 The harmonic payments made by each load for the three cases 
Figure 5.8 The harmonic compensation payments made to each load for the three cases 
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Figure 5.8, shows how the harmonic compensation payments vary with each case. Given the 
payment to each load= ki Vhi, the graph just represents each loads valuation of voltage distortion, 
scaled by the distortion magnitude for each case. 
Of interest is the effect the marginal pricing has on the aggregate utility of the network, 
as a result of the signals and incentives provided to loads and potential filter owners. It was 
put forward earlier that marginal pricing would encourage optimal investment in filter resources, 
which should result in a corresponding increase in network utility. The aggregate network utility 
is detailed for each of the cases in Table 5.2, and indeed this is the case. 
Table 5.2 
Total Network utility 
The total utility calculated above for each of the three cases was done so using equation 5.55 
Total System Utility = Harmonic Voltage Utility - Cost of Harmonic Reductions - Cost of Filter 
= KVh - pIR - FIJimax 
(5.55) 
Table 5.2, indicates that the system as a whole, benefits from the filter and reduction in 
injected harmonic current that is signalled as optimal by the marginal prices. Figure 5.9, shows 
that each individual load is no worse or better off,as a result of the filter injections and reduction 
in load injections that result from marginal pricing. 
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Figure 5.9 Harmonic utility for each load for the three cases 
The utility for each of the individual loads is calculated as: 
Utility of Load i = -Harmonic Payments By i-Cost of Any Harmonic Reductions By i 
= -Re{jhlihi -IRi)} - pJRi 
( 5.56) 
In equation 5.56, load i's utility due to harmonic voltage distortion at the local busbar, and the 
harmonic payments received are not included as they cancel out. 
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Having established that the marginal prices should lead to actions, which make the aggregate 
network and each particular load better off, the final point of interest is to look at how the filter 
owner fairs under marginal pricing. The filter owner is paid iihl, for its injections into the 
system, while the cost of filter capital required to produce those injections are F IJlmax' Given 
the assumptions that the filter owner is not going to attempt to abuse any market power they 
may posses, it is clearly optimal for the owner to make injections into the network up to filter 
capacity. As such filter owner utility is given by: 
Utility of Filter Owner = iihliflmax - F IJlmax 
= 6.28 
(5.57) 
It is evident that this particular example the owner of the filter was clearly advantaged by 
having the opportunity to sell injections into the network at their marginal value. This example 
therefore demonstrates how marginal pricing acts to coordinate load and filter owners in the 
network, so that each acts in a way that improves their own welfare, along with that of the 
aggregate network. 
5.3.1 Toll Road Comparison 
Next the allocation of costs that results from marginal pricing are compared to those which would 
result from the Toll Road methodology (Section 2.3.2). Consider the case where the amount of 
filter capacity installed is the optimal amount found in cases two and three previously. The cost 
of filter capacity in this section is identical to that before (equation 5.54). 
Filter Capacity Installed = 0.3545pu 
=?- Cost of Filter Capital = $6.28 
Figure 5.10 shows the net payments made by each load under both Toll Road and Marginal 
pricing. The net payments in the case of Toll Road pricing, refers to the payments made 
to pay for the installed filter. In the case of marginal pricing, net payments, refers to the 
harmonic payments made (Re{iihJhd V i), less the compensation payments received for the 
voltage distortion seen at their busbar (ki Vhi V i), the sum of these residual payments equal 
the payments made to the filter (iihlihl)' At this point the possibilility of loads reducing their 
injections due to the prices has not been included. 
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Figure 5.10 Comparison of the net payments made by loads under Toll Road and Marginal Pricing 
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It can be seen that there are clearly considerable differences between the payments made 
under the two systems. The most obvious difference is that with marginal pricing, the net 
payments by some loads are negative, while with Toll Road pricing all loads face positive net 
payments. This should not be interpreted as saying under marginal pricing some loads are paid 
for their injections. To the contrary all loads face the same price for their injections (fJ,h), and 
pay an amount, which reflects their impact on the aggregate system (Re{iihJhd 'vi i). Instead 
with marginal pricing loads are paid compensation for the voltage distortion seen at their busbar 
(ki Vhi \:f i). For some loads these compensation payments are in excess of the harmonic payments 
made. Under Toll Road pricing no such compensation payments exist. 
In the test system used the loads at busbars four and six are responsible for the majority of 
the harmonic injections, therefore under both pricing systems they have the largest payments 
to make. With marginal pricing they are required to make considerably larger payments, as 
not only do filter costs have to be met, but so do the costs their injections impose on others 
through out the network. 
Note that the payments to the filter differ considerably under Toll Road and marginal 
pricing. Under marginal pricing the filter is paid the harmonic price for all injections, that is 
the filter is paid in accordance with the value those injections have to the aggregate network. 
Toll Road pricing on the other hand makes no consideration of what the filter payments are 
worth, and instead a set amount is collected from the network that equals the filter cost over 
the period. 
Table 5.3 Total payments to the filter under Toll Road and Marginal Pricing 
Toll Road Pricing Marginal Pricing 
Filter Payments 6.28 12.57 
This highlights the greatest weakness in Toll Road pricing, in that it provides no signals as 
to what level of filter investment is optimal, and no incentive exists for that level of investment 
to take place. As shown in Table 5.3, under marginal pricing the filter owner receives payments 
in excess of the costs. These excess payments are maximised at the point where the optimal level 
of filter capacity is installed, providing the incentive to move towards an efficient level of filter 
investment. An efficient investment is one where value in excess of the costs is created. With 
marginal pricing this excess value is available to the filter owner, with Toll Road pricing this 
excess value, should it exist, is distributed to the loads, and hence there is no incentive or signal 
as to what is the optimal level of filter investment. If the Toll Road method were to be used 
it is unlikely that the filter capacity of the previous example would have been selected. Instead 
with the Toll Road method filter capacity would be installed to reduce the harmonic voltage 
throughout the network to some specified level, as dictated by regulations or some standard. 
The potential difference in network welfare between using Toll Road and marginal pricing, 
is illustrated in Table 5.4. This shows the likely result of the different pricing systems, if under 
Toll road pricing filter capacity is added to the point where the resultant distortion throughout 
the network is approximately zero. The marginal pricing results are the optimal equilibrium 
shown previously, and the re,sult when no action is taken show the consequences if no filter is 
added and loads do not reduce their harmonic injections. 
Table 5.4 Pricing 
Iflmax an Busbar Voltage Vhi System Utility 
No Action Taken 0.000 0.080 -29.76 
Marginal Pricing 0.355 6.28 0.012 -16.72 
Toll Road Pricing 0.807 32.56 0.003 -33.74 
80 CHAPTER 5 ACTIVE FILTER INCLUSION 
From Table 5.4, one can see that with Toll Road pricing, there is a much larger amount 
of filter capacity added to the network, in an effort to reducing the voltage distortion towards 
zero. But the addition of this additional capacity is not economic and the final result is a level 
of network welfare that is lower than before any action was taken. This example has been 
constructed so that reducing the distortion level to zero would be expensive and sub-optimal. 
But until an attempt to measure the value of distortion to each load is made, which in turn 
easily leads to the calculation of marginal prices for harmonic injections, it is impossible to know 
if the filter capacity being added is improving the welfare of the system. This may be especially 
true in the case where filter capacity is added so to meet some predetermined standard. Without 
going through a process essentially equivalent to calculating marginal pricing, there is no basis 
via which to estimate what is the optimal level of filter capacity for the network. The marginal 
prices also have the desired quality that they provide each individual incentives to move towards 
the optimal point. As in this example, there would clearly be individuals willing to install the 
optimal amount of filter capacity at busbar one as they are rewarded for doing so in excess of 
the costs. 
Figure 5.11, shows the net payments made by each load under Toll Road and marginal pricing 
for this example. Previously in Figure 5.10, some loads under marginal pricing had a net cash 
inflow. This is not the case here. Allowing the loads to reduce their injections (if advantageous), 
has seen a dramatic reduction in the voltage distortion, reducing the compensation payments 
received by each load. In the previous example where the filter capacity was fixed at the optimal 
level and the loads were uuresponsive, the two main polluters had the most to gain from Toll 
Road pricing, as it stopped them from having to compensate all the other loads for the distortion 
they cause. But as soon as the loads are allowed to respond to the prices, and one includes the 
fact Toll Road pricing is unlikely to lead to an excess amount of filter capacity, the same loads 
are the ones most in favour of marginal pricing. This is not surprising as they have the largest 
stake in the harmonic state of the network and hence stand to be the most penalised if the 
network is not at an efficient point. 
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Figure 5.11 Comparison of the likely net payments made by loads under Toll Road and 
5.3.2 Non-Linear Utility Example 
This example is identical to that of Section 5.3.1, except that the utility function of each firm 
i, has been altered to be dependent on the square of the harmonic voltage been at their busbar 
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(V~J The utility function for each load has been changed in the same systematic way, as shown 
in equation 5.58. 
Utility of load at bus bar i = 50ki Vh~ Vi (5.58) 
Each load receives negative utility from harmonic distortion (ki < 0 Vi). The utility 
functions as well as being changed to a quadratic function of the voltage magnitude, was also 
multiplied by 50. This was simply to produce numbers of a similar magnitude to the 
example. Clearly no direct comparison should take place between the two examples. 
Table 5.5, shows the likely outcome, in the three situations: 
" No action is taken with respect to installation of filters or reducing injections of loads 
'" Marginal pricing is used, loads and filters react so as to maximise individual utility 
• Toll Road pricing used, filter capacity added till harmonic distortion falls close to zero 
In Table 5.5, harmonic prices have been given for each of the three cases. Note these prices only 
officially exist for the second case where the prices are explicitly used. But the prices contain 
information, in that they specify what value the network places on harmonic injections given its 
present harmonic state. As such the prices are calculated for each case to indicate what harmonic 
injections are worth at the margin, given the harmonic state of the network. The results are 
similar to the previous example in that Toll Road pricing is less efficient than marginal pricing 
on account of the fact that no signals exist as to what is the' optimal level of filter capacity,. and 
reducing distortion to zero proves to be inefficient. Under the Toll Road method the implied 
marginal cost placed on the injections from the active filter is one forth that implied by marginal 
pricing. This would not be a problem, except at the Toll Road pricing equilibrium, the marginal 
cost of filter capacity is twice that of the marginal pricing equilibrium. 
Table 5.5 Likely outcomes under Toll Road and Marginal Pricing 
Iflmax Filter Cost ($) Busbar Voltage Vhi 
No Action Taken 0.000 0.00 0.080 
Marginal Pricing 0.371 6.86 0.011 
Toll Road Pricing 0.808 32.65 0.003 
Harmonic Price J1.hi Injection Reduction IRi System Utility 
No Actiol1 Taken 284.7 nil 119.6 
Margil1al Pricing 37.0 IR3&IR6 -14.9 
Toll Road Pricing 10.6 nil -32.8 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly to deal with the harmonic distortion efficiently, efficient decisiol1s with respect to alloca-
tion of filter resources must be made. It must be determined if the harmonic distortion is serious 
to the point of needing some action to be taken. Also the correct decision must be made be-
tween allocating resources towards filters versus other mitigation methods. Finally information 
is required as to what is the optimal filter, to meet the needs of the network. In the absence of 
marginal harmonic prices, which place an explicit value of harmonic injections, it is impossible 
to achieve the above. The present approach to filter allocation has been to draw a line in the 
sand and say a certain level of distortion is acceptable, and action must be taken to ensure this 
level is not exceeded. Clearly this approach cannot achieve the most efficient outcome. 
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While harmonic prices that signal the value of any potential filter injections, there is an 
added complexity, in that selection of an efficient filter is a multi-period optimisation problem. 
This is because filters take time to design and build, meaning the filter capacity in the network 
can not be instantly altered. Moreover filters have a lifespan that is likely to cover many periods 
of differing harmonic prices. The dynamic nature of the optimisation problem is easily accounted 
for and the results are essentially unchanged from the case where the problem is simplified and 
modelled as a static optimisation problem. 
The conclusions were that in optimality, filter capacity should be added to the point where 
the marginal price for injections equals the marginal operating cost for the injection, plus over 
time an amount equal to the cost of capital for the marginal filter capacity. The result being that 
over the operating life of the filter both its operating and capital costs are covered. There is no 
great surprise with this result, but in practice achieving such a result is not a simple task. It was 
found though, the existence of marginal prices that correctly signal the value the network places 
on harmonic injections, provide an incentive for individuals to install an optimal amount of' filter 
capacity. While incentives exist for individuals to act in an optimal manner, their action will be 
based on expectations of future marginal prices. It is unlikely that these expectations will prove 
to be completely accurate, especially if it is considered that the expectations cover the whole 
period of the filter's life. However this requirement does not make marginal pricing less effective, 
in that no matter how one deals with harmonics there is a requirement for a certain amount 
of forecasting. To suggest this can not be done accurately in a marginal pricing environment, 
also suggests the same for other approaches. Hence this requirement, that for optimality to 
be achieved individuals must be able to accurately for see the future, makes marginal pricing 
no more or less likely to achieve an efficient outcome than other approaches. As mentioned 
though, a likely outcome is an excess amount of filter capacity installed in the network. The 
cost burden of which will fall on those who made the decision to install it. This meets the 
fairness requirement in that loads are not held liable for inefficient decisions made by others. 
Previously it was assumed that each network participant had limited ability to effect the 
marginal harmonic price. In the pressence of filters this might not be the case, due to the large 
affect filters have on the distortion magnitudes throughout the network, and the fact installed 
filter capacity may act as a disincentive towards others considering adding capacity. Simply put 
in a strong network, due to the physical realities any filter will potentially have a very large 
"market share" and hence influence on the price. (In the case of a weak system, harmonic 
externalities are by and large internalised and hence efficient behaviour should result in the 
absence of marginal pricing.) As such there may be an incentive for an individual to install an 
optimal amount of capacity, in the knowledge this will act as a disincentive to others building 
filters; but then inject a sub-optimal amount of filter current into the network so to maximise 
the value of those injections. However while a potential problem, in reality the costs of setting 
up a filter to act in such a way is likely to prove prohibitive. Also this problem ceases to exist 
in the absence of a harmonic market, but yet the marginal pricing tools can still be used by a 
network operator to establish the optimal level of filter investment. 
Finally by way of example it was demonstrated in a marginal pricing environment, the 
choices made by loads with respect to reducing harmonic injections, and the installation of filters, 
will improve the welfare of each individual, and the network as a whole. It was shown harmonic 
pricing leads to large gains in welfare compared to the Toll Road method, on account of the 
fact the Toll Road method is unlikely to lead to efficient allocation of resources. Such methods 
developed with the objective of producing a fair allocation of costs, may fact distribute the 
costs fairly, but it is unlikely these costs will equal the value provided by the filter. There in lies 
the key advantage of marginal pricing, it distributes an efficient level of costs among the loads 
fairly. 
Chapter 6 
PASSIVE FILTER INCLUSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 5 it was that shown marginal pricing should produce efficient behaviour with respect 
to the installation of active filter capacity, if no installed capacity can be withheld from the 
market. In this chapter passive filters in a marginal pricing environment are investigated. 
System 
Filter 
Figure 6.1 Passive harmonic filter model 
For the purposes of this work, passive filters are characterised by their admittance: 
Admittance of filter installed at bus bar i = Ci pu 
= Ciej<:;i pu 
It is assumed that the filters are rated in line with their admittance (i.e. as the admittance 
of the filter increases so does the current through the filter). The result being that the larger the 
admittance of the filter, the larger the required rating and the larger the expense. This allows 
the filter to be broadly characterised, without having to get into particulars, which only serve 
to confuse the general results presented here. 
This representation of a filter does not conform to reality. In real life there are many more 
factors to assocaited with filter instillation. These other factors have been ignored so that only 
issues related to harmonic mitigation need be considered. 
As in the the previous chapter, this work examines the general case where it is possible 
to install passive filter capacity at each busbar throughout the network. This is an unlikely 
out come in practice, and at times there are advantages to restricting the solution to a filter 
at a single busbar, as it greatly simplifies the results and conclusions drawn. Where any such 
restrictions are imposed they are explicitly stated. 
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The filter admittance matrix describes the amount of filter capacity connected to the net-
work. 
Filter admittance Matrix = [Yf (C) J 
~ (~l ~2 (6.1 ) 
In this chapter the optimal allocation of passive filter resources is characterised. It is found 
the inclusion of a passive filter produces two potential candidates to act as the marginal price. 
The relative merits of these two potential marginal prices are investigated. To this point loads 
and filters have always been charged/payed based on their current injections. Some might think 
it natural that passive filter owners be rewarded on the basis of installed capacity. As such 
a set of marginal prices for installed filter capacity are developed. These prices are based on 
the marginal prices for harmonic current injections, and hence have similar properties. As was 
the case for active filters, the allocation of passive filter resources, is a dynamic optimisation 
problem. Yet modeling the problem as a static optimisation problem many advantages, the 
consequences of misrepresenting the problem are detailed. Finally an example is constructed 
using the test system, to investigate the baviour of marginal prices of the presence of a passive 
filter, and to compare the efficiency of different marginal price formuations. 
6.2 NETWORK OPTIMUM 
The intial model of the problem uses a single period. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is not 
an accurate representation of the problem, but the results from this static model are essentially 
the same as those from the dynamic modeL To find the optimal passive filter investment one 
needs to specify a cost function for the filters. As before, passive filters are assumed to have 
an operating and a capital cost. The operating cost is assumed to be dependent on the actual 
amount of filter capacity connected to the network for the period. This cost might include the 
resulting degredation in component life, due to the current carried and voltage across the filter. 
It is thought that this operating cost will be close to zero and ignored without much loss in 
accuracy. 
Operating Cost of Passive Filter at Busbar i Pili ( Ci ) (6.2) 
The cost associated with any filter will be the capital cost. This depends on the rat-
ing/capacity of the filter installed, which is a function the filter admittance. Note the model 
formulation does not preclude the possibility that more passive filter capacity may be installed 
than is actually connected to the system during the period. This is to keep the results as general 
as possible, not because it is a likely scenario. 
Cost of Passive Filter Capital For Filter at BusbaI' i = PFi(Cimax) (6.3) 
:. Total Cost For Passive Filter at Busbar i PIli(Cd + PFi(Cimax) (6.4) 
6.2 NETWORK OPTIMUM 85 
Where Ci = Connected filter admittance at busbar i 
Cimax = Installed filter capacity at busbar i, and hence the maximum 
possible admittance at that busbar 
Using the cost functions for the passive filter at each busbar (should they exist), allows the 
network filter cost functions to be specified. 
n 
Total Operating Cost of Passive Filter Injections = PV(C) = I:Pl!i(Ci) (6.5) 
n 
Total Capital Cost of Passive Filter Injections = PF(Cmax ) = (6.6) 
In this specification the ability of loads to reduce their injections into the network is ignored. 
no consequences for the main results presented here. If injection reductions are allowed, 
the result is the same as in Chapter 5, i.e. it is optimal for loads to reduce their injections into 
the system so long as the marginal cost of doing so is less the value the network places on those 
injections. 
The single utility maximisation problem for the network as a whole is described by: 
Maximise U(Vh) - PV(C) - PF(Cmax ) 
Subject to Ih - (rYh ] + [Yf(C)]) Vh = 0 
C S C max 
problem can be solved using the Lagrangian in equation 6.10. 
£ =U(Vh) - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) 
+ iih (Ih - ([Yh] + [Yf(C)l) Vh) + Ap(Cmax - C) 
The order conditions of interest are: 
[)£ 
[)Cmax 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
Equation 6. ) gives the new marginal prices where a passive filter is included in the network. 
(6.14) 
The inclusion of passive filter capacity changes the form of the marginal harmonic prices. 
The active only changes the marginal prices to the extent it alters the voltage. But the 
inclusion of a passive filter alters the responsiveness of the system to any harmonic injections, 
hence the prices must change in structure to reflect this. This makes sense, as if with 
the inclusion of a filter the resultant voltage distortion for a given injection is changed, 
this implies the value of that injection to the network has changed, and hence the marginal price 
also should change. 
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Looking at equation 6.12, this can be rearranged to give: 
_ ~ 8[Yj(C)ly _ 8PV(C) A 
J-Lh 8C h - 8C + p 
Marginal income for 
= 
connected capacity 
Marginal cost of + Premium if filter 
connected capacity capacity fully utilised (6.15) 
Combining the above expression with equation 6.13, the optimal behaviour where the con-
straint is binding is given by: 
~ 8[Yj(C)ly _ 8PV(C) 8PF(Cmax ) 
- J-Lh 8C h - 8C + 8C
max 
( 6.16) 
Using the result: 
Injection into the network from the passive filter if = -[Yj(C)]Yh (6.17) 
Equation 6.16, can be interrupted as saying that the marginal income from installed filter 
capacity should equal the marginal cost of having it connected to the network, plus the marginal 
capital cost of filter capacity. As was the case with the active filter, the cost of capital term will 
be dominant, with the marginal operating/connection cost close to zero. This result is essentially 
identical to that of the active filter, the only difference being the inclusion of the passive filter 
changes the form of the harmonic prices. 
6.2.1 Filter Admittance Angle 
The first order conditions in equations 6.11 to 6.13 also implicitly define the optimal angle of the 
passive filter admittance. Looking at equation 6.16, both the two marginal cost terms (,JPcYdC ) 
and 8P F(Crnax)) are real numbers. The implication is that: 8Crnax 
(6.18) 
In establishing the above condition, of importance is the angle of harmonic voltage at each 
busbar (0). It was demonstrated in Section 3.3 if there is no filter in the network, so that the 
branch admittances are much greater than the shunt admittances, the harmonic voltage angle 
is given by: 
em = (3-1 + a 'II m (6.19) 
If there is a shunt filter at busbar f, which has an admittance that is large compared to the 
other network admittances, the elements of the inverse admittance matrix can be approximated 
by: 
Where i, j =1= f 
Where i or j = f 
(6.20) 
(6.21) 
(6.22) 
The expressions in equations 6.20 and 6.21, prove to be reasonably accurate where the included 
filter is large. It not possible to specify what is 'large', as that depends on circumstance. But in 
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such cases, equation 6.19 still holds in a slightly modified form. All the elements of the inverse 
admittance matrix no longer have a constant phase angle, but those terms with a different phase 
angle have zero magnitude. As such: 
em = f3p I + a V m 
Where f3pl = Angle of elements of the inverse admittance 
matrix that have non-zero magnitude 
= Xl - X 2 
(6.23) 
Substituting equation 6.23 into 6.14, produces the same result as in Chapter 5, the phase 
angle of the marginal price is equal to the negative angle of the injected harmonic current, plus 
7f radians, if harmonic distortion is detrimental to individuals' utility. (Again in this section it 
has been assumed that all injections are made at a common angle). 
Wh 8U(Vh) ere 8Vh ~ 0 
8U(Vh) 
Where 8Vh < 0 
(6.24) 
(6.25) 
Considering the case where harmonic distortion has negative impacts on each load's utility 
(8~0:h) < 0), equation 6.16 suggests 
(6.26) 
'* c;i = _f3pl Vbusbars i, where there exists a passive filter (6.27) 
Using the result in 6.27, the optimal passive filter current injections are found to have the 
same charactersitics as the optimal active filter injections. 
Optimal passive filter injections If = - [Yf (C) lV h 
~ "0 
'* Ifi = -CieNVhieJ i 
= _Cie-if3;;.lVhiei(f3;;.l+a) (6.28) 
= -CiVhieia 
= Ci Vhiei(a+7r) 
The optimal filter injects harmonic current into the network 7f radians out of phase with the 
current injected by the distorting loads. As such marginal pricing produces the intuitive result 
that the optimal filter for the system will minimise the voltage distortion. In the unrealistic case 
where volatge distortion was viewed as positive by the loads, the opposite result would drop out, 
with equations 6.27 and 6.28 suggesting that the injected current from the filter should be in 
phase with that injected by the distorting loads. This makes sense in that if voltage distortion 
is of benefit for loads, the optimal filter current would be that which maximised the distortion. 
Were this is the case the optimal filter would need to have an impedance with a real negative 
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component, and such would cease to be passive. Phasor diagrams showing the relative angles of 
network quantities are shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. 
(} = f3i,1 ex 1r 2 
LJi - ex 1T 
8 -1 <; - -, F 
7j;-ex 1T 
Figure 6.2 
Angle 
Phasor diagram of system quantities, where 8u~tVh') < 0 Vt 
hi 
The optimal admittance phase angle for any installed passive filter, is that which will minimise 
the prevailing voltage distortion through out the network. The flexibility to install a passive 
filter with any possible phase angle may not exist. Constraining this angle can only result in a 
reduction welfare for the network. In examining the consequences of a fixed filter phase angle, 
the condition that defines the optimal phase angle must be revisited (equation 6.16): 
_ ~ B[Yf(C)l" _ BPV(C) BPF(C rnax ) 
J-th BC h - BC + BC
max 
condition describes the optimal filter phase angle in that it requires: 
~ B[Yf(C)l-
- J-th BC V h = A real number 
two conditions essentially state the marginal value of the installed capacity must equal 
its marginal cost, and that utility is a real number. But this is not the only interpretation of 
the conditions. alternative interpretation is possible when generalising the concept of utility 
to a two dimensional framework, so that it becomes a complex number. In this environment 
the optimal filter via the restriction that the utility from the marginal unit of installed 
filter capacity is a real number is to implicitly state any complex component of utility has no 
value. (To that utility is multi-dimensional quantity is to stretch the generally accepted 
use of concept, but where the different components are able to be manipulated to a single 
measure of value, one is back to the conventional concept of utility.) The optimal filter angle 
defined by equation 6.27 (q = -f3F1), can hence be interpreted as the condition which results 
in all utility from the marginal capacity being of value. If the passive filter angle is constrained 
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Figure 6.3 Phasor diagram of system quantities, where aUJK~t) > 0 "It 
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to some value c;;, the condition c;; = - /3i}, will not hold in general (unless one also constrains 
the solution to infinitely large passive filter at each busbar in the network, which obviously is 
not an efficient solution to the problem). In this environment of complex utility, the marginal 
utility of connected capacity will in general be a complex quantity. 
- - B[Yf(C)]y _ +' (Some complex amount) J.Lh Be h - x JY (6.29) 
If equation 6.18 describes the network optimum, only the real part of equation 6.29 has any value 
to the network (utility is a real entity), and the condition that describes the optimal amount of 
capacity is: 
(6.30) 
In the case where the filter angle is constrained, without specifing the form of the passive 
filter cost functions, it is not possible to explicitly state what is the cost to the aggregate system 
of the constraint. The optimal passive filter capacity where the filter angle is constrained, is 
specified by equation 6.30. The optimal marginal prices for harmonic injections still have the 
same form as equation 6.14. 
As a proxy for the cost to the network of constraining the filter angle, it is possible to use 
the marginal value to the network of a change in the filter angle. 
. . - B[Yf(C)]-Margmal value of a change m c; = Re{ -J.Lh Be;; Vh} (6.31 ) 
= Re{ -jiih[Yf(C)]Yh} 
When the passive filter angle is variable and equation 6.27 is satified, the marginal value of a 
change in filter angle as defined above is zero. Where this value is non-zero, the welfare of the 
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network could be improved if the phase of the filter admittance could be altered. Integrating the 
marginal value of a change in <;, from <;* to -13F\ indicates the cost to the network, resulting 
from the passive filter admittance being fixed. 
Cost to the network of a fixed filter angle = 1<;* Re{ -jiih[Yj(C)]Vh}8<; 
(3 -1 
- F 
(6.32) 
6.2.2 Payment Imbalances 
Before seeing if the harmonic prices described by equation 6.14, encourages efficient behaviour 
from network participants, the payments collected using such prices are detailed. It is assumed 
the harmonic property rights are allocated so that the loads have a right to a distortion free 
supply, hence: 
P d I d d·· t' 8U(Vh)V ayments ue to oa s as IstortlOn compensa IOn = 8 h ~ ~ Vh (6.33) 
Payments made to passive filter = -iih[Yj(C)]Vh 
The amount collected from the nonlinear loads, for their harmonic injections is given by: 
Payments collected from harmonic injections = iih1h 
= 8~~h) [e jB ]-l ([Yh] + [Yj(C)l) -1 ([Yhl + [Yj(C)l) Vh 
_ 8U(Vh)V 
- 8Vh h 
(6.34) 
Equation 6.34 indicates the prices, described by equation 6.14, will collect enough to com-
pensate the loads for voltage distortion seen, but will not cover the amount due to the passive 
filter. It is clearly a problem if the prices that are thought to represent the marginal value of 
injections fail to collect the correct amount. In the previous models this has never occurred. 
One possible solution to the problem is to suggest that the optimisation problem for the 
aggregate network was structured incorrectly, and hence the marginal prices of equation 6.14, 
do not represent the true marginal value to the network of injected harmonics. An alternative 
formulation of the problem is to specify the filter cost as what the network pays for the filter 
injections. 
IS: 
Alternative passive filter cost = iihIf 
iih = Marginal price for harmonic current injections for this alternative formulation (6.35) 
Using this revised cost function the utility maximisation problem for the aggregate network 
Maximise U(Vh) - iih1f 
Subject to Ih - ([Yhl + [yj(C)l) Vh = 0 
C ~ Cmax 
(6.36) 
(6.37) 
(6.38) 
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In this case the Lagrangian of the revised problem is: 
£ = U(Vh) - ji,'h}.f + ji,~(Ih - ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) Vh) + Ap(Cmax - C) 
= U(Vh) + ji,~(Ih - [Yh]Vh) + Ap(C max - C) 
The first order condition of the Lagrangian is: 
The implied marginal prices resulting from this formulation of the problem are: 
-8 = aU(Vh) [ j8]-1[Yi ]-1 
J.lh aVh e h 
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(6.39) 
(6.40) 
(6.41) 
The alternative prices of equation 6.41, are identical to the prices in equation 6.14, were the 
passive filter excluded from the network. The amount collected for harmonic injections using 
these prices is given by 6.42. 
ji,~Ih = a~~h) [ej8r1[Yhr1 ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) Vh 
= a~~h) [e j8r 1 [Yh]-l [Yh]Vh + a~~h) [ej8]-1[Yhr1[Yf(C)]Vh 
_ aU(Vh)v _ -81 
- aVh h J.lh f 
(6.42) 
These alternative prices ji,h' collect exactly the correct amount to compensate loads and pay 
for the filter injections. This would tend to suggest that these prices are the optimal prices for 
the network. On the other hand the prices ji,h' are independent of the passive filter capacity, 
installed in the network. The prices ji,h (equation 6.41) are identical to ji,h (equation 6.14), in 
the case where there is no filter capacity present. Intuitively it would seem natural that the 
inclusion of a passive filter into the network should alter the value of harmonic injections, due 
to the fact it will alter the consequences of the injections. Therefore, using ji,h will collect the 
correct amount, but will not provide the correct signals as to the value of each load's actions. 
The formulation of the problem that produces the prices ji,h' is clearly incorrect as ji,iJf, only 
represents payments between parties in the system, it is not the actual cost of the filter to the 
system as a whole. Hence using ji,hIf to represent the cost of the filter is a misrepresentation, 
and can not lead to an optimal allocation of resources. A more detailed examination of the 
ability of both ji,h and ji,h' to encourage efficient behaviour is covered next. 
6.3 INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES 
The conditions that describe the optimal allocation of filter resources are detailed in equa-
tions 6.11 through to 6.13. But it is not entirely clear from these first order conditions, what 
are the correct marginal prices. Ideally the prices should encourage each load to act so the afore 
mentioned conditions are met, while at the same time collecti~ the correct amount from those 
making harmonic injections into the network (i.e. ji,h1h = 8~~hh)Vh - ji,hIr). 
As it turns out, neither set of prices ji,h or ji,h' will encourage the optimal allocation of passive 
filter resources described by equation 6.16. First the behaviour that results from the prices ji,h 
(equation 6.14), when a potential filter owner looks to maximise the profits they can extract from 
a series of filter installed across the network, will be considered. This approach is in contrast to 
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the last chapter where the behaviour was described with respect to filter owner at some specific 
busbar i. conclusions drawn are independent of how the problem is constructed. The 
problem can be modelled as: 
Maximise iihI, - PV(C) - PF(Cmax ) = -Ith[Yf(C)]Vh - PV(C) PF(Cmax) (6.43) 
Subject to K - Ith ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) [ej8 j = 0 (6.44) 
Ih - IR - ([Yhl + [Yf(C)J) Vh 0 (6.45) 
C:::;; C max (6.46) 
Note that in equation 6.44, the loads' utility functions, with respect to voltage distortion 
have been assumed linear. Also note that it has been assumed the filter admittance angle is 
unconstrained. This problem has an associated Lagrangian: 
£ Ith[Yf(C)]Vh - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) + (K - Ith ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) [ej8l) >"M 
+ >"'11 (Ih IR - ([Yhl + [Yf(C)]) Vh) + >"c (Cmax C) 
Equation 6.47, has associated first order conditions 
8£ 
BC 
8£ 
-Ith[Yf(Cmej8] >"'11 ([Y}!] + [Yf(C)]) [ej8] = 0 
[Yf(C)]Vh ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) [ej8 ]>"M = 0 
- 8[Yf (C)l" BPV(C) - B[Yf(C)] [ )8]>.. >.. B[Yf(C)]V 
- ILh BC h BC - ILh 8C e M - v 8C h 
8PF(Cmax ) >.. _ 0 
8C
rnax 
+ c-
>"c 
(6.47) 
(6.48) 
(6.49) 
o (6.50) 
(6.51) 
Do the conditions described by equations 6.48 through to 6.51 match those that are optimal 
for the aggregate network (equations 6.11 through 6.13)'1 Starting with equation 6.48, this is 
easily rearranged to give: 
(6.52) 
There are two extreme values this Lagrange multiplier can take. 
1. If very large passive filters exist throughout the network: 
(6.53) 
2. If there are 110 passive filters installed throughout the network: 
(6.54) 
This result is expected as: 
>"'11 = BFilter Owner Welfare (6.55) 
6.3 INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES 93 
If there is an infinite amount of filter capacity in the network, all injected harmonic current will 
be sunk by one of the filters, and hence the marginal value to the filter owner of the harmonic 
injections is the prevailing marginal price. But the value of the harmonic injections to the owner 
of a filter with zero admittance is zero. 
Equation 6.49, is easily manipulated to yield the structure of AW 
(6.56) 
Again there are two extremes cases which yield the range of values AJ.L' can take. 
1. Large passive filters throughout the network 
(6.57) 
2. No passive filters installed in the network 
(6.58) 
The constraint values for the two extreme cases can be used to find the bounds on equa-
tion 6.50. 
1. Where [Yf(C)] = [0], equation 6.50 reduces to 
_ ~ B[Yf(C)]V _ BPV(C) _ A - 0 
/-Lh BC h BC C - (6.59) 
This condition is identical to equation 6.16. This indicates that initially when there is no 
filter capacity in the system, the incentives at the margin are those required to produce 
optimal behaviour from a potential filter owner. That is, when there is no installed filter 
capacity in the network, the incentive exists for a potential owner to invest until the 
marginal benefit to the network equals the marginal cost of the filter. 
2. Where ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) -1 [Yf(C)] ~ [I], equation 6.50 reduces to 
~ B[Yf(C)]V _ BPV(C) _ A _ 
/-Lh BC h BC C - 0 (6.60) 
The condition in equation 6.60, is different to the network optimum described in equa-
tion 6.16. It suggests the owner should reduce the amount of filter capacity in the system, 
or that investment in filter capacity should be made to the point where the marginal cost 
is equal to the marginal reduction in network utility as a result of the investment. 
The second condition in equation 6.60 is somewhat hard to interpret, as it represents a 
nonsensical situation. But these two results can be used to bound the behaviour of a filter owner 
for the likely equilibrium situation where 0 S C S 00. For such values of C, the constraints 
will take on values 
-iih S Av SO 
=} Av = -kviih 
Where 0 S kv S 1 
(6.61) 
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-Vh:::; AJL:::;~ 
::::} AJL = -kp Vh 
Where 0 :::; kp :::; 1 
Substituting this into equation 6.50 yields: 
- ~ (1 - k - k )O[Yf(C)]" - oPV(C) AC 0 /-Lh V It oC h oC 
- 8[Yf(C)]" _ 1 (oPV(C) A) 
::::} - /-Lh oC h - 1 - kv - kp oC + C 
Marginal Income of Filter ~ Total Marginal Cost of Filter 
(6.62) 
(6.63) 
Equation 6.63 describes the general behaviour of the filter owner. The filter owner will install 
filter capacity up to some point where the marginal income from filter capacity is in excess of 
the marginal cost. Or put another way, the marginal benefit to the network extra installed 
capacity, exceeds the marginal cost of providing that capacity. Clearly this does not match the 
optimal condition for the network described in equation 6.16. This behaviour from the point of 
view of the filter owner can be understood in that as soon as a reasonably large filter is included 
in a strong network, it will sink a large proportion of the harmonic current. To increase the filter 
capacity serves to only reduce the value of all current sunk by the filter, for little gain in terms 
of increased filter current. This demonstrates a passive filter owner is unlikely to operate in an 
efficient manner, as a filter in a strong network inherently has a great deal of power. 
I-laving established that the prices ji,h, will not encourage efficient behaviour from filter 
owners, the other possible form of prices ji,~ (equation 6.41), are investigated next. As shown 
previously ji,~ collects the correct amount from the injectors of harmonic current, and hence 
if they were to prove as effective as ji,h, in encouraging efficient behaviour from owners, 
ji,~ would be the preferred form of harmonic prices. The corollary being that in calculating the 
optimal harmonic prices, no consideration of the amount of passive filter capacity in the network 
needs to be considered. profit maximisation problem for a passive filter owner in this case 
is given by: 
Maximise ji,'h,1f - PV(C) PF(Cmax) = -ji,~(Yf(C)]Vh - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) (6.64) 
Subject to - IR ((Yhl + [Yf(C)]) "h = 0 (6.65) 
C:::; C max (6.66) 
Note that there is no constraint in this case related to price, as ji,~ is independent of the level 
of installed filter capacity, and exogenous. The Lagrangian associated with this problem 
is given in 6.67. 
L = - ji,~[Yf(C)]Vh PV(C) PF(Cma:xJ + Av* (ih - iR - ([Yhl + (Yf(CJl) "h) 
+ AC* (Cmax - C) 
The first order conditions of interest are: 
oL 
oC 
oC 
----- = oCmax 
AV* ((Yh] + [Yf(C)]) [ej(J] = 0 
oPV(C) _ A o(Yf(C)l" _ A _ 
oC v* oC h c* - 0 
--:.--:-''----':..:..-'.....:.. + AC * 0 
(6.67) 
(6.68) 
(6.69) 
(6.70) 
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In assessing how close the conditions in equations 6.68, through to 6.70 come to matching the sys-
tem optimum (equations 6.11-6.13), the constraint term Av*, must be evaluated. Equation 6.68, 
is easily manipulated to yield 
(6.71) 
Again there are two extreme cases, which will bound Av*. 
1. Where there is no filter capacity installed in the system so that 
(6.72) 
2. Where there is an infinite amount of filter capacity in the network 
(6.73) 
This result is identical to those previously, except that Ii;", replaces lih' The interpretation of 
the constraint term also is identical, as it represents the marginal value of harmonic injections 
to the filter owner. A filter owner with no installed capacity is indifferent to the amount of 
harmonic injections by the nonlinear loads. While if there is infinite capacity installed, so that 
all injections made by nonlinear loads are sunk by the installed filters, the marginal value of all 
such injections is Ii;". . 
In looking at equation 6.69, and substituting in equation 6.71 gives the result: 
BPV(C) 
BC o (6.74) 
Of interest is to compare equation 6.74, with the network optimum given in equation 6.16. But 
before this can be done 6.74, must be restated in terms of lih. This is easily performed using 
the fact: 
(6.75) 
As such equation 6.74, restated in terms of lih is: 
(6.76) 
Again this expression is bounded by the two limiting cases of installed filter capacity. 
1. Where there is no filter capacity in the network so [Yf(C)] = [0] 
BPV(C) _ A - 0 
BC G*- (6.77) 
This equation is the network optimum given in equation 6.16. This indicates if there is 
no filter capacity installed in the network, potential filter owners have an incentive to 
act efficiently at the margin. Naturally both sets of prices lih, and Ii;" produce identical 
behaviour where is no installed filter capacity, as if [y,(C)] = [0], lih = Iii". 
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2. Where there is an infinite amount of filter capacity installed so that [Yf (C)] ([Yh] + [Yf (C)]) -1 = 
[1] 
(6.78) 
Equation 6.78, states where there is an infinite amount of filter capacity installed the cost 
associated with installing filter capacity should be equal to zero. 
It is possible to come up with a simplified representation of equation 6.76, for all the inter-
mediate cases of [0] :::; [Yf(C)] :::; [00]. 
_ ~ k (1- k )8[Yf (C)]y _ 8PV(C) - A -
/-Lh * ** 8C h 8C c* - 0 
Where 1:::; k* :::; 00 
o :::; k** :::; 1 
Using the results of the two extreme cases (equations 6.77 and 6.78), one can infer 
As such equation 6.79, can be simplified further to 
_ ~ k 8[Yf(C)]y _ 8PV(C) _ A _ 
/-Lh *** 8C h 8C c* - 0 
Where 0:::; k*** :::; 1 
[Yf(C)] --+ [00] =* k*** --+ 0 
[Yf(C)] --+ [0] =* k*** --+ 1 
Equation 6.80 , is most easily interpreted with a slight rearrangement of terms. 
(6.79) 
(6.80) 
(6.81) 
Equation 6.81 indicates that the optimal behaviour for a filter owner, will result in payments 
for the filter injections which are in excess of the marginal filter costs. This differs from the system 
optimum, and therefore use of the prices, ii/h, , will not result in a utility maximising amount of 
passive filter capacity connected to the network. 
The next question is which set of prices, jih or ji,P will produce an amount of installed 
passive filter capacity that is closest to the optimal level given in equation 6.16. Consider the 
case where there will be only a single filter installed in the network. (This restriction is made 
as it tidies the result). 
For the prices jih, the resulting condition describing behaviour (equation 6.50), can be 
manipulated (in this restricted case) to: 
(6.82) 
While for the prices jih" the optimal behaviour of filter owners was shown to be described by: 
-jih ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) [yhr 1 ([1]- [Yf(C)] ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) -1) 8[~~C)]Yh = 8P:~C) + AC* 
(6.83) 
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Both these conditions produce optimal behaviour where there is no filter capacity installed) 
but as filter capacity is installed, their behaviour drifts from optimality. To establish which is 
likely to produce behaviour closer to that of equation 6.16) there is a need to measure the relative 
rates at which the conditions in equations 6.82 and 6.83, drift from optimality as [Yf(C)]-+ [00]. 
[0] 
Equation 6.82 drifts from optimal at a greater rate than 6.83. As such the prices ji/h) will 
encourage filter owners to connect an amount of filter capacity that is closer to optimal, than the 
prices lih' Therefore, as the prices Ii'h) will collect the correct amount from harmonic polluters, 
and encourage more efficient behaviour, Ii'h would seem to be the preferred marginal harmonic 
pricing formulation. 
6.3.1 Individual Market Power 
The previous results assumed that the filter owner would thoose to install some level of passive 
filter capacity Cma:Jo and then some fraction of this capacity would be connected to the system 
so that 0 :s: :s: C max . It was also assumed that the filter owner had the ability to influence 
both the harmonic voltages, and the marginal harmonic prices throughout the network CV hand 
lih)' Under this scenario there is no incentive for the filter owner to connect an optimal amount 
of filter capacity to the network. This is because the way the problem been constructed the 
filter owner was given complete market power, and allowed to behave as a monopolist. When 
the filter owner is no longer a price taker, they will install a less than optimal amount of capacity 
into the network, this reduces their costs and inflates the price. 
An efficient passive filter allocation is unlikely using the prices lih and Ii'h, ifthe filter owners 
are in an entrenched monopoly position. But this does not mean the prices lih and lih,) will 
certainly fail to produce optimal behaviour. To know the likely outcome of using the different 
prices, it must be determined if an individual will be able to establish a monopoly position with 
respect to owning filter capacity and is similar to the situation that existed for the active filter. 
If an individual is allowed to install a large amount of filter capacity and then connect varying 
amounts to the network as they see fit, it will be possible to develop a monopoly position. This 
is because a strong network, spare capacity makes any extra filter capacity connected to the 
network potentially uneconomic, as the incumbent possess the ability to drive the value of filter 
injections to zero. In this situation no second individual would rationally add filter capacity, 
and the incumbent would have monopoly power, and the ability to influence lih and Vh. 
If the network is weak, the actions at any busbar will have limited consequence for harmonic 
distortion at other bus bars , and therefore the harmonic prices will be increasingly decoupled 
depending on how weak the network is. Under such circumstances it will not be possible to 
develop substantial market power as spare filter capacity will not act a deterrent other than at 
the busbar where it is related. But in such a network all the problems from harmonic voltage 
distortion are largely internalised and therefore there is no need for harmonic prices to bring 
about efficient behaviour. 
One potential way to stop this development of market power would be to impose the rule, 
that all installed filter capacity must be connected to the network. This may not be required, 
as in reality the owner of filter capacity may want to connect it, and leave it. It. is questionable, 
if such any individual will have the inclination to switch passive filters in and out. Having said 
that, if all went to plan for the filter owner) they would own spare capacity that would never 
need to be touched. It. would just sit there to deter others. 
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By imposing rules, which make the threat of entry into the market legitimate economically, 
the filter owners act as if they were in a competitive market, even though is a single 
individual with filter capacity. Look at the decision making process for the filter owner where 
they face the prices iih, and they have no market power. The problem can be described by: 
Subject to C = C max (6.85) 
Here there are no constraints related to the voltage magnitude or harmonic price, as the im-
posed rule that all available capacity must be connected makes the harmonic market competitive, 
and hence iih and Y h are exogenous. 
This constrained optimisation problem has an associated Lagrangian: 
This has associated first order conditions 
[)£ __ ~ [)[Yf(C)ly _ [)PV(C) _ A - 0 
[)C - JLh [)C h [)C C -
[)£ _ [)PF(C max) A - 0 
[)C
max 
[)C
max 
+ c-
These two conditions are easily combined to produce 
(6.86) 
(6.87) 
(6.88) 
(6.89) 
This equation is identical to that which describes the optimal network conditions in equa-
tion 6.16. Therefore use of the prices iih, in an environment where filter owners do not posses 
market power (the ability to control iilt and Y h), will result in an optimal allocation of filter 
resources. 
On the other hand, when the prices iih are used in an environment where no filter any 
market power the problem for the filter owner can be summarised as: 
Maximise iih1, PV(C) PF(Cmax ) = -iih[Yf(C)]Vh - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) (6.90) 
Subject to C = C max (6.91) 
This problem associated Lagrangian 
With the following first order conditions: 
[)£ 
[)C 
[)£ 
[)Cmax 
Again these two conditions are easily combined to produce: 
(6.93) 
(6.94) 
(6.95) 
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This condition is identical to the network optimum given in equation 6.16, except iih has 
been replaced by iih. Given that for all [Yf(C)] > [0], tth > tth, equation 6.95, suggests that 
when the prices iih are used, a larger than optimal amount of filter capacity will be installed 
in the network. This is not surprising as the addition of filter capacity reduces the value of 
harmonic injections (shown in iih)' If the prices paid to filters for sinking harmonics fails to 
reflect this reduction in value, filter owners will continue to add capacity to the point where the 
marginal cost equals the marginal value of the injections, before any filter capacity was added. 
Note that when the filter owners have no market power the prices given in equation 6.14 
(iih), are preferred to the prices given in equation 6.41 (iih). Yet in the case where filter owners 
do have market power the prices iih, will come closer to encouraging efficient behaviour than iih. It seems odd that the prices that actually reflect the true value of harmonic injections to the 
system can be inferior in guiding the system towards an efficient allocation of resources. This 
happens because the prices iih are dependent on the amount of connected filter capacity, where 
as iih are not. Therefore the rewards to a filter owner from holding back capacity are much 
greater with iih, because not only are costs reduced, but the prices are increased. 
Using the prices iih may lead to an efficient equilibrium where a competitive market can be 
enforced, but the problem still exists in that, as shown in Section 6.2.2, iihIh, will fail to collect 
enough, to both compensate the loads for voltage distortion seen at their bus bar, and to pay 
the passive filter for its injections int~ the network (iihIf)' One obvious potential solution to 
this problem is to add the amount, iih1f, to the payments made by the distorting loads. This is 
essentially what is done when the prices iih, are calculated. As shown in Section 6.2.2, iifih will 
collect the correct amount, but will fail to provide incentives to filter owners. Moreover by having 
harmonic prices that fail to correctly signal the value of harmonic injections, loads will not make 
efficient decisions with respect reducing their harmonic injections into the network (IR)' For 
example with a large passive filter in the network, the value of injections will probably fall to the 
point no resources should be committed by loads to reduce their injections into the network. But 
iih will fail to reflect this change in harmonic value. As such the amount loads continue to pay 
for their injections (11k/ hi ) may make it optimal for them to allocate resources towards reducing 
their injections, where the amount spent exceeds the value the aggregate network places on the 
reduction. 
If iih is charged on the basis that it is desirable to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, 
the payments to the filter owners will need to come from "out of the system" (the harmonic 
market, not the actual physical system). One possible solution could be to incorporate the 
payments to the filter owner (iihIf) , into the consumers' line charges (based on fundamental 
energy consumption). By separating the filter payments from the harmonic economic system, 
an efficient allocation of harmonic resources will result, and everything will be paid for. The 
disadvantage to shifting this cost burden elsewhere is that another market (and hence resource 
allocation) will become distorted. Loads that do not inject any harmonic current into the 
system could quite justifiably feel aggrieved about their fundamental line charges being inflated 
to pay for a filter, on which they place no burden. These inflated line charges, may result in 
them altering their behaviour with respect to fundamental power consumption on the basis of 
harmonic injections from other loads. This is not an efficient situation. 
It would seem there is no simple way around this problem, in that the prices that encourage 
efficient behaviour fail to collect the correct amount of money. The fact this problem exists, 
might seem strange as to this point the marginal prices have been faultless in they have both 
encouraged efficient behaviour, and the books have balanced, even in the presence of active 
filters. The problem is the prices calculated, represent the value of a pure harmonic injection 
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into the network. 
8System Utility 
/-Lh = -8Ih 
(6.96) 
The harmonic injection from a nonlinear load into the network (fhi) , is different to the current 
through a passive filter, as the filter current is associated with a change the network admittance 
matrix. Given the two currents are of a different nature, attempting to charge for filter injections 
as if they were not associated with a change in the network will have problems. No problem 
existed for the active filter as it was modelled as a current source, the same model used for 
the nonlinear loads. As modelled active filter injections are not associated with changes in 
the network admittance matrix, and therefore the marginal prices are efficient, and collect the 
correct amount. This revenue reconciliation problem for passive filters is further detailed in 
Chapter 7. 
6.3.2 Alternative Formulation 
It was demonstrated if filter owners are paid for the injections of the filter, it may be in their 
best interests to build capacity, which is not connected to the system, but acts as a disincentive 
to others thinking of adding capacity to the network. One solution to this problem is to pay 
passive filter owners an amount based on the filter capacity they have installed in the network, 
instead of the current through the filter. The optimal price to pay for filter capacity, will reflect 
what that capacity is worth to the network. This amount is closely linked to the marginal price 
for injections calculated previously. 
Looking at the optimisation problem that faces the aggregate network, this is unchanged 
from previously (Section 6.2), except that all available capacity will be connected. 
Maximise U(Vh) - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) 
Subject to Ih - ([Yhl + [Yf(C)l) Vh = 0 
C = C max 
(6.97) 
(6.98) 
(6.99) 
The first order conditions associated with this problem are given in equations 6.11 to 6.13. 
What is required is a marginal price for connected capacity, which encourages filter owners to 
act so that the optimal conditions are meet. A natural candidate is to pay filter owners an 
amount that corresponds to the marginal value of filter capacity. That is, pay the filter owners 
a price jie given by: 
8 System Utility 
/-Le = 8Cmax (6.100) 
jih, is calculated the same way as it was previously (equation 6.14). With the price jie for 
installed capacity a potential filter owner faces the following optimisation problem: 
Maximise jieCmax - PV(C) - PF(C max ) 
Subject to C = C max 
The associated Lagrangian and first order conditions are detailed below 
/: = jieCmax - PV(C) - PF(Cmax ) + Ae(Cmax - C) 
(6.101) 
(6.102) 
(6.103) 
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Be = _ BPV(C) _ A = 0 
BC BC C (6.104) 
Be = ji,c _ BPF(Cmax ) + AC = 0 
BCmax BCmax 
(6.105) 
Equations 6.104 and 6.105 are easily combined to produce: 
_ BPV(C) BPF(Cmax ) 
/-Lc = BC + BC
max 
(6.106) 
Equation 6.106, combined with 6.100 produce a condition identical to the optimal condition 
shown in Section 6.2. It was implied here that the filter owner had little ability to influence 
the price of filter capacity, this condition should be met as by paying owners an amount based 
on the total installed capacity, there is nothing to be gained from not connecting capacity to 
the network. Connected or not, they receive an amount based on the assumption all available 
capacity is connected. 
The fact that prices for filter capacity can be developed that encourage efficient behaviour 
should come as no great surprise, as the price for filter capacity was only a tweaking of the 
price for injected currents, and hence it is expected that all the previous results will hold true 
for this formulation. In fact it is impossible to calculate the optimal price for capacity without 
calculating the optimal price for injections. This formulation of the problem though has value in 
that for some it may seem more natural to pay filter owners for their installed capacity, instead 
of current through the filter. Though each approach is equivalent to each other, sometimes 
semantics count, and the capacity payments may be more attractive to some and as mentioned 
it may be easier to ensure an efficient outcome. Note that even when the prices for capacity 
are used to pay the filters, the prices ji,h, will still need to be used to charge distorting loads, 
and these charges will fail to collect the amount ji,cCmax , required to pay the filter. The same 
revenue reconciliation problems that exist for ji,h will also exist for ji,c. 
6.3.3 Optimal filter angle 
The filter owner must also decide what is the prefered phase angle of the passive filter admittance, 
along with what amount of capacity to install. Using the same logic as previously, it can be 
suggested that the optimal phase angle for the filter angle is implicitly defined in equation 6.89. 
This condition is identical to that of the network optimum and as such must have the same 
implications. Specifically the phase of the filter admittance is equal to the negative values of the 
elements of network admittance. 
(3 -1 c;= - F 
But, as discussed in Chapter 4, the filter owner will only infact be paid the real part of iihif' 
This helps characterise how the filter owner may behave if the phase angle of the filter admittance 
is constrained. Rewritting the profit maximisation for the filter owner to more accurately reflect 
the problem they will in fact face, gives: 
Maximise Re{iihi!} - PV(C) - PF(Cmax ) (6.107) 
= Re{-iih[Yj(C)]Vh} - PV(C) - PF(Cmax ) 
Subject to C = C max (6.108) 
This problem demonstrates that concept of the loads only paying the real part of iihi! is 
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essentially the same as the condition used to characterise the network optimum, i.e. the loads 
only attribute value to the real part of the utility function. The associated Lagranian of problem 
is: 
n 
e = I:.fthiCiVhi cos (t;i + f3E;,!) - PV(C) - PF(Cmax) + AG (Cmax - C) (6.109) 
The the first order conditions for this problem are: 
Be -1 -1 BPV(C) 
BC = (fth1 C1 Vh1 cos (t;1 + f3F ) , ... ,fthnCn Vhn cos (t;n + f3F )) - BC - AG = 0 (6.110) 
Be = _ BPF(CmaxJ + AG = 0 (6.111) 
BCmax BCmax 
~~ = (-fth1C1Vh1sin(t;1+f3F1),,,. ,-fthnCnVhnsin(t;n+f3F1)) =0 (6.112) 
Obviously equation 6.112 has multiple solutions. Looking at the second derivative: 
~ = (-fth1 C1 Vh1 cos (t;1 + f3F1) '''. ,-fthnCn Vhn cos (t;n + f3F1)) < 0 
Where t;i = -f3F1 Vi 
(6.113) 
These conditions in equations 6.110 to 6.113 produce the same result inferred earlier, given 
the ability to choose the admittance of the passive filter, it is optimal for the filter owner to 
choose a phase angle t;i = -f3F1 V i. Also in the case where the filter phase angle is constrained 
the filter owner faces an optimisation condition identical to that which characterised the network 
optimum: 
R {_ ~ B[Yf(C)ly } _ BPV(C) _ BPF(Cmax ) _ 
e J.Lh BC h BC BC
max 
- 0 
6.4 DYNAMIC PASSIVE FILTER OPTIMISATION 
Modelling the passive filter optimisation problem as a single period problem is not an accurate 
representation of reality. The decision as to allocation of passive filter resources will cover an 
extended period of time, in which there will be many different prices for harmonic injections. As 
was the case for the active filter, modelling the decision making process as a multi-period problem 
does not change any of the major results, or reveal any new insights. The main difference being 
the interpretation of one Lagrange multiplier differs slightly. Due to the close similiarity, and in 
the interests of brevity, the previous passive filter problems are not detailed in a multi-period 
framework. However the basic network optimisation conditions, and the basic behaviour of loads 
when in a competitive environment are shown in a multi-period frame work for completeness. 
The notation used here to differentiate between busbar and temporal variation is identical to 
the notation used in Chapter 5. 
6.4.1 Network Optimum In Dynamic Environment 
Here the ability of loads to reduce their injections is not included. This exclusion has no conse-
quences for explaining for the main results of this example. The optimisation problem for the 
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network as a whole is: 
Maximise U(Vh) - PVD(C) - PFD(Cmax ) 
Subject to i h - ([[Yhll + [[Yf(C)]]) Vh = Q 
C:::; Cmax[Il 
Where the passive filter cost functions in this dynamic envirnoment are: 
Total Operating Cost of Passive Filter Injections = PV D (C) 
Total Capital Cost of Passive Filter Injections = P F D( Cmax) 
The associated Lagrangian is: 
I: =U(Vh) - PVD(C) - PFD(Cmax ) + iih (ih - ([[Yhll + [[Yf(C)]]) Vh) 
+ Ap (Cmax[I]- C) 
The first order conditions of interest are: 
:~h = 8~i:) -iih ([[Yhll + [[Yf(C)ll) [[ejftl] = Q 
81: __ 8PVD(Q) _ ~ 8[[YfCQ)]lV _ A - 0 
8C - 8C Ph 8C ~ ----.E.. - -
81: = _ 8PFD(Cmax ) + Ap[I] = Q 
8Cmax 8Cmax --
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(6.114) 
(6.115) 
(6.116) 
(6.117) 
(6.118) 
(6.119) 
(6.120) 
Equation 6.118 to 6.120 state the conditions which must be meet each time period. The only 
difference being that the capital costs are able to be recovered over multiple periods. Therefore 
the excess in marginal income per unit of filter capacity over the marginal operating costs, 
must over the life of the filter sum to the marginal cost of filter capital (equation 6.121). Or 
simply stated, the capital need only pay for itself over an extended period versus a single period 
previously. 
(6.121) 
6.4.2 Filter Owner Optimum In Dynamic Environment 
The behaviour of the filter owner is characterised in a dynamic environment. The problem a 
potential filter owner faces is given by: 
Maximise E[iihif]- PVD(C) - PFD(Cmax ) 
Subject to C :::; Cmax[I] 
This can be solved using the Lagrangian, i.e. 
(6.122) 
(6.123) 
(6.124) 
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The associated first order conditions are: 
Be = -E[~ ]B[[YfCQJll y _ BPVD(Q) _ A = 0 
BC /-Lh BC -.h BC ~-
Be = _ BPFD(Cmax) + Ac[I] = Q 
BCmax BCmax --
(6.125) 
(6.126) 
These conditions are identical to those in equations 6.118 through 6.120, except the filter 
owner decisions are based on expectations of the future price. The implications of this are 
identical to active filter case detailed in Chapter 5, and hence will not be repeated. 
Modelling the decision making process with respect to passive filters, as a static optimisation 
problem is an obvious misrepresentation. But this section demonstrates that extending the 
model to incorporate its dynamic nature serves to only complicate the notation, as the results 
and conclusions are essentially unchanged. The dynamic model basically states that the results 
from the static optimisation model must be met each time period. 
6.5 PASSIVE FILTER EXAMPLE 
Using the test system detailed in Appendix A, the behaviour of marginal prices in the presence 
of a passive filter are investigated. For the purposes of this example, there is only a single filter 
installed at busbar one. As the test system is strong, the consequences of moving the filter are 
limited. 
1 2 
_ Passive Filter 
3 4 5 
6 7 
8 
9 
Figure 6.4 Test system with included passive filter 
6.5.1 Marginal Pricing With Filter Variation 
There are two potential formulations for the marginal price (iih and ii'hJ, both of which will be 
affected the magnitude and phase of the filter admittance (though in the case of ii'h" these effects 
are only second order effects). One way in which the inclusion of the passive filter will affect the 
marginal prices is via its affect on the harmonic voltages throughout the network. Figure 6.5 
displays the resulting harmonic voltage magnitude at busbar three for a different range of filter 
admittances. 
Figure 6.5 shows that that in general the addition of filter capacity (increasing the admit-
tance of the filter), will reduce the magnitude of the harmonic voltage at busbar three, this is as 
expected. Figure 6.6 shows the variation in the harmonic voltage phase angle at busbar three 
for a range of possible filter admittances. For a given filter admittance magnitude, the voltage 
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Figure 6.5 Resultant harmonic voltage magnitude at busbar three with inclusion of filter 
phase at busbar three approximates a monotonically decreasing function of the filter phase 
Equivalent diagrams for each busbar in the network are contained in Appendix 
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Figure 6.6 Resultant harmonic voltage phase angle at busbar three with inclusion of passive filter 
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Equation 6.27 describes the optimal passive filter phase angle. It was suggested this phase 
angle would minimise the harmonic voltage distortion throughout the network. Figure 6.7 shows 
the voltage distortion throughout the network as as the phase angle of the passive filter (<:) is 
varied (for three different sized filters). For the test system of Appendix A, f3pl ;:::; 0.61. Fig-
ure 6.7 demonstrates that a phase angle <: = _f3pl does indeed minimise the voltage throughout 
the network. 
Figure 6.7 indicates that where the admittance of the installed filter is large, the phase 
angle of the filter has little influence on the harmonic voltage magnitude. Figure 6.8 shows the 
harmonic voltage magnitude and angle for each of the nine busbars where there is an installed 
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Figure 6.7 Resultant harmonic voltage throughout the network as the passive filter 
different magnitudes of filter admittance are considered. 
angle is varied. Three 
filter of variable admittance magnitude, with an optimal admittance phase angle (c; _(3pl). 
In Appendix D similar are shown for filters that look capacitive, resistive and inductive. 
~ _ _ _ _ a _ _ _ _ 
Fll\~(At\I'<t'rtIlf<.'4YI!.:;riludrlC{rml 
(a) Harmonic Voltage Magnitude Vh 
',~~,,,,~c'c,,,,,c-,,,'"", ---'""OC-, ~500 600 7~ ~~ ~ 
filIOlrMrr-lnll'lcoMagn!!udgr::Ip<.<) 
(b) Harmonic Voltage Phase () 
Figure 6.8 Variation in the harmonic voltage at each busbar as the magnitude of the passive filter a busbal' 
one is varied. The phase angle of the filter is the optimal angle from equation 6.27 
There were two different forms of marginal harmonic prices put forward. In one case the 
harmonic prices were calculated after inclusion of the filter iih, while the presence of filter 
was excluded in calculating the prices iih. Both sets of prices will be influenced by the inclusion 
of the filter to the extent that the harmonic voltage throughout the network is influenced. 
Figure 6.9 shows the variation in the magnitude of Jih3 as the characteristics of the filter at 
busbar one are altered. As the admittance of the filter increases, the magnitude of the harmonic 
price decreases. The response of the harmonic price magnitude to changes in the filter admittance 
is identical to the response of the voltage magnitude shown in Figure 6.5. This is as 
given that the value of the injections the network are dependent of the resultant harmonic 
voltage. Figure 6.9, also shows that as the admittance of the filter increases in magnitude, the 
influence of the phase angle on the harmonic price magnitude quickly diminishes towards zero. 
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Figure 6.9 Variation in the magnitude of the harmonic price at busbar three (Pita), as a result in variation in 
the passive filter admittance 
Again this reflects the behaviour of the harmonic voltage as the filter increases in size. 
The angle of the harmonic price at busbar three is shown to be fairly stable in Figure 6.10, 
except in the case where the angle of the filter is highly capacitive, hence the magnitude of 
the included filter does have a significant influence on the phase of the marginal prices. 
Figure 6.11 displays the variation in magnitude of the harmonic price fih3 , as the filter 
admittance is varied. As the harmonic prices Mit do not explicitly account for the included filter, 
the influence of the filter magnitude on the price magnitude is expected to be minimal. This is 
shown to be case in Figure 6.11. A consequence of this is that these prices are unable to 
encourage filter investment. Figure 6.12 shows that the phase angle of the prices Mh) 
will be heavily influenced by the included filter. 
Figures 6.13 and 6.14, show the magnitude and phase angle of Mh and ilit as the magnitude 
of the passive filter at busbar one is varied between 0 and 100 pu. In these figures the phase 
angle of the filter admittance is the optimal value" = . As expected the magnitude of the 
prices, Mh, decrease rapidly as the filter admittance increases, while the prices Mh) are essentially 
unaffected. Where the included filter has a phase angle t:; , the phase of the harmonic 
voltage will be largely unaffected by the inclusion of the filter and hence the prices should to 
be largely unaffected. But this property is specific to load utility functions that are linear in 
the voltage distortion seen at their busbar. If the utility function of the loads were a nonlinear 
function of the voltage distortion, ii lt would be influenced by the magnitude of the included 
filter. Looking at the angle of the prices, in the case of iii~, are relatively constant and 
the angle at each busbar is equaL With Mh, the angles are shown to increasingly diverge as the 
voltage and filter admittance magnitude fall towards zero. 
Having seen how the voltage and marginal prices behave for different installed passive filters, 
the following show the variations in harmonic payments made to/by the loads, as the filter 
admittance changes. In all cases these payments are based on the assumption that loads have a 
right to a clean supply and hence charge for distortion seen at their busbar. Figure 6.15 shows 
how the harmonic utility of each loads change as the filter capacity is increased. The phase angle 
of the harmonic filter admittance is the optimal angle. Naturally the utility of each load and 
the network mirrors the behaviour of the harmonic voltage magnitude. Under marginal clean 
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Figure 6.10 Variation in the angle of the harmonic price at bushar three (L!1h3), as a result in variation in the 
passive filter admittance 
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Figure 6.11 Variation in the magnitude of the harmonic price at hllshar three (f1h3), as a result in variation in 
the passive filter admittance 
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Figure 6.12 Variation in the angle of the harmonic price at busbar three (LJlh3), as a result in variation in the 
passive filter admittance . 
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Figure 6.13 Variation in the magnitude of the two different harmonic prices Mh and M'h, as the magnitude of 
the optimal filter at bus bar one is varied 
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(a) Harmonic Prices iih (b) Harmonic Prices ii'h 
Figure 6.14 Variation in the angle of the two different harmonic prices iih and ii'h, as the 
filter at busbar one is varied 
of the 
pricing the compensation each load receives for the distortion at their busbar is the negative 
value of their individual utility. Therefore as the filter acts to reduce the distortion throughout 
the network, the utility of each load increases, and as such they receive less compensation from 
the distorting loads. 
(a) Individual Utility 
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(b) Total Network 
Figure 6.15 Variation in the individual load and total system utility as the magnitude of the filter 
admittance is varied from Opu to lOOOpu 
The harmonic made by each of the loads as the magnitude of the optimal filter 
is increased are shown Figure 6.16. When the prices iih are used, the payments made by 
the loads quickly decrease with increasing filter capacity. This is expected as the reduction in 
harmonic voltage means the value of the loads' injections must be reduced. On the other hand 
with the prices iii. the payment due from each load is largely unaffected by the of the 
installed filter. Therefore any load, which injects a large proportion of the harmonic current 
into the network will prefer the prices iih' This is shown in Figure 6.17, which shows the net 
harmonic payments received by each load as the filter admittance is varied in magnitude. When 
the net harmonic payment for load i, is the compensation received due to distortion (Ui(Vhi) 
Figure 6.15) less the amount paid for harmonic injections (RefJihJhd I Refiihlhi} Figure 6.16). 
All loads are better if jih is used, compared with the prices iiI.. The reason for this being the 
revenue reconcilliation problem detailed in Section 6.2.2. If the prices iih are used no revenue 
is recovered from the distorting loads to pay the filter for the injected filter current. While the 
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Figure 6.16 Harmonic payments made by the distorting loads under the two different as the 
magnitude of the filter admittance is varied from Opu to lOOpu 
'''' 
(a) Harmonic Prices iih (b) Harmonic Prices Wi, 
Figure 6.17 Net harmonic payments made to the loads under the two different pricing systems, as the magnitude 
of the passive filter admittance is varied from Opu to lOOpu 
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prices ii/h, do ensure enough is collected from the harmonic injections to compensate loads for 
the voltage distortion at their busbar and to pay the filter for its injections. 
The payments for the filter current injected into the network will be heavily dependent on 
the admittance of the filter installed at busbar one. The payments to the filter, as a function of 
the filter admittance are shown in Figure 6.18 for both forms of marginal pricing. 
(a) Harmonic Prices lih (b) Harmonic Prices Ii'h 
Figure 6.18 Payments to the filter under the two different sets of marginal prices, as a function of the filter 
admittance 
The payments to the filter owner are much larger using the marginal prices iih. With these 
prices the marginal income from each unit of filter current is always positive. For the prices iih; it 
can be seen that the marginal income from the addition of filter capacity quickly turns negative. 
Hence for any given filter cost function, it can be seen that the prices iih, will encourage much 
more capacity to be installed than iih. Variation in filter payment as the admittance magnitude 
is varied (r;i = -(3i}), is shown in Figure 6.19. 
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(b) Harmonic Prices iiI, 
Figure 6.19 Payments to the filter under the two different sets of marginal prices, as a function of the filter 
admittance 
Figure 6.19 illustrates the value of a monopoly position to the owner of the filter, if the 
prices iih are used. Variation in the size of the installed filter capacity, has a huge effect on the 
amount of revenue collected and there is a clear level of installed capacity that will maximise 
the payments to the filter. Unless steps are taken to ensure the threat of added capacity is 
plausable, the owner of the filter capacity will naturally operate at this point (cost permitting), 
irrespective of what is the optimal amount of capacity for the network. With the prices iih, the 
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filter owner has less market power (ability to influence the harmonic price and hence revenues 
collected), as such the amount a capacity added under iii", will primarily be dependent on the 
cost of adding filter capacity. As such using the prices iii", results in behaviour that mimics a 
competitive market, except the prices while largely independent, produce the wrong signals. 
6.5.2 Relative Efficiency of Marginal Price Formulations 
N ext the outcomes from using the different marginal prices are compared. In developing this 
example the test system detailed in Appendix A was used. In each case where there is a filter 
included in the network it is at busbar one. In this example the expected outcomes under four 
different scenarios are detailed: 
1. No filter included in the network, the prices iih are used 
2. A filter installed at busbar one, where the prices iih are used 
3. A filter installed at busbar one, where the prices iih are used 
4. A filter installed at bus bar one, where the prices iih are used, but the filter admittance is 
constrained to being capacitive 
In each case the cost function associated with the installation of a filter was of the form: 
Cost of Passive Filter = 0.00lC2 ( 6.127) 
The numbers in the cost function are choosen for illustration purposes. This precludes excludes 
loads from reducing their injections at a given cost. 
In Figures 6.20 and 6.21 the harmonic voltage and price magnitude at each of the busbars are 
shown. In the final three scenarios, the filter admittance was choosen to maximise the payments 
to the filter. The filter was assumed to have no market power, hence the included filters are 
those which would result from a competitive market under each of the different pricing systems. 
The magnitude of the filter for each of the different cases is shown in Table 6.1. These figures 
demonstrate what a large effect the inclusion of a passive filter has on the value of injected 
harmonics, and hence the marginal harmonic price (scenario 1 compared with scenario 2). In 
equilibrium the inclusion of the filter reduces the value of all harmonic injections to about a 
sixth their original value. This ability to quantify the value/cost of harmonic injections and 
included filters is necessary if resources are to be allocated efficiently. Where the prices iih, 
are used the harmonic marginal prices hardly respond to the inclusion of the filter. The result 
being it is optimal for the filter owner to install a filter with an admittance over twice as large 
as the optimal filter when the prices iih, are used. But the cost function of equation 6.127, and 
voltages displayed in Figure 6.20, show despite a three fold increase in the marginal cost of filter 
capacity, the marginal reduction in voltage magnitude in scenario 3 compared with scenario 2 
is small. This demonstrates the reduction in efficiency that results from a pricing system that 
fails to signal true marginal costs. 
Table 6.1 Magnitude of included passive filter 
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Passive Filter Magnitude (pu) 47.9 115.4 56.5 
Constraining the phase angle of the included filter has few consequences for the optimal 
filter magnitude and the resultant price magnitude. If the example had been constructed so 
that filter capacity was more expensive and the optimal filters had a smaller admittance, this 
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Figure 6.20 Harmonic voltage magnitude at each busbar, under the different scenarios 
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Figure 6.21 Magnitude of the harmonic marginal prices at each busbar under the different scenarios 
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constraint would of had more influence. Once the included filter is large the influence of its 
phase angle is limited. 
The net payments made by each load is the compensation each load receives for distortion 
seen at their bus bar , less the harmonic payments each load makes for their current injections. 
In this example it has been assumed each load has a right to a clean voltage supply. Where 
a filter is included and prices ji,h are used, each load's net payments are maximised. This is a 
product of the revenue reconciliation problem detailed earlier. 
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Figure 6.22 Net harmonic payments received by each load (Re{/IhJhd Ui(Vhi)) under the different scenarios 
Table 6.2 details the filter revenue and costs, along with the total system utility for each 
scenario. The first thing to note is the increase in filter profits when the prices ji,'h are used. The 
increased profit to the filter owner is associated with a large decrease in efficiency, compared to 
the case where the prices better reflect the true value of injections (ji,h). In this example the 
ability of loads to reduce their injections at some cost was ignored. Had it been considered, 
the reduction in efficiency associated with using ji,'h would have been greater, as not only would 
the prices ji,'h encourage non-economic filter capacity, they would also encourage loads to make 
non-economic reductions in their injections. As shown, the inclusion of a filter quickly reduces 
the value of harmonic injections, if loads fail to see this fall in value, they cannot be expected to 
behave efficiently. In all cases the inclusion of the filter was found to improve network welfare. 
It may seem odd that the scenario with the constrained filter angle resulted in the filter owner 
making more profit then when the filter angle was unconstrained. The filter admittance was 
constrained to phase angle that resulted in a small voltage resonance at the local busbar, which 
increased the value of the filters injections. In a competitive market this enhanced price at 
busbar one would be capitalised on by other filter owners, adding appropriately phased capacity 
and reducing the voltage to a level comparable with scenario 2. In this simple example with 
a filter, this could not happen. Though this does serve to demonstrate the potential 
consequences of allowing filter owners market power, specifically it will be in their interest to 
install filters that instead of minimising the local voltage, manipulate the local price so the value 
of the injected filter currents are maximised. 
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Table 6.2 Filter Revenue and System Utility 
Scenario Filter Revenue Filter Cost Filter Profit System Utility 
1 I 0.00 0.00 0.00 -29.76 
2 4.59 2.29 2.30 -7.96 
3 I 26.63 13.32 13.31 16.33 
4 I 6.39 3.19 3.20 -8.33 
6.5.3 Toll Road Pricing Comparison 
The allocation of passive filter costs is something Toll Road pricing wa,q designed for. It is 
difficult to make a comparison of the relative merits of marginal pricing and Toll Road pricing 
as it is impossible to know what filter would be installed were Toll Road pricing used. As 
demonstrated, failure to install an efficient amount of capacity has a large effect on total system 
welfare. Toll Road pricing fails to provide any signals as to what the admittance of the included 
filter should be. Under Toll Road pricing the filter owner is guaranteed to receive revenue in 
line with the cost of the filter, hence the incentive exists to install excess filter capacity. 
In this example each load injected harmonics into a strong network at a common angle. 
Hence if the same filter were to be included in both cases, the distribution of harmonic charges 
under marginal and Road pricing would look very similar. As soon as some loads started 
injecting at a phase angle greater than 'if /2 radians out of phase, marginal pricing and the 
Toll Road method will result in very different distributions of the harmonic costs. This is as 
marginal pricing injections that reduce the harmonic voltage throughout the network 
as beneficial, while Toll Road pricing see all harmonic injections into the network as a burden. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of a passive filter in the network was shown to change the marginal value of 
all injected harmonic currents. This value of injected currents is summarised in the 
multiplier iih' For marginal harmonic prices to be efficient, they must reflect this in 
value. Efficiency with respect to passive marginal filters is characterised by the marginal value 
to the network of the filter capacity being equal to the marginal operating and capital cost of 
the filter. This condition is identical to that of active filters and results in the harmonic voltage 
throughout the network being minimised. That is the optimal phase angle for the included filter 
is that which minimises the harmonic voltage, given the filter admittance magnitude. In cases 
where the phase of the filter admittance is constrained, this must lead to a reduction in 
system welfare. But if the installed filter has a large admittance, the loss in welfare associated 
with this constraint is small, because the harmonic voltages throughout the network fall to values 
close to zero, independent of the filter's phase. 
While it is easy to characterise the ideal passive filter for the system, bringing about this 
optimal result through a market mechanism can be difficult. The previous technique of using 
iih as the marginal prices was shown to have some deficiencies. Specifically these prices fail to 
collect the correct amount of revenue. Another form of marginal prices was developed (ii'h) , 
that do collect the correct amount of revenue. But WIt ignores the presence of the passive filter 
and hence conveys inefficient signals to the market as to the value of injected harmonics. 
Where the filter owner is given a large amount of market power (the ability to control 
price), neither set of prices will encourage optimal behaviour with respect to the inclusion of 
passive filter capacity. Paradoxically under such conditions, the fact that the prices ii'h are 
less responsive to the included filter capacity mean these prices will encourage more efficient 
behaviour, than the prices iih' But if the filter owners have little influence over the harmonic 
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price (competitive harmonic market), the prices that accurately reflect the true value of harmonic 
injections (p,h) will encourage the most efficient behaviour. The advantage of marginal pricing 
is that, in theory, by making the value of individual actions transparent, an efficient allocation 
of resources can be achieved. With respect to harmonic pricing, one of the goals of the pricing 
system must be to achieve an effiecient allocation of filter resources. It has been demonstrated 
the market is structured to restrict the abuse of market power, marginal pricing has 
diminished value. However the information which falls out of the marginal prices is "true", 
independent of if a market per se exists or not. As such the use of the marginal prices will 
be of value to any authority that wishes to mitigate some harmonic problem via the use 
of a passive filter. The marginal prices will indicate what type of filter is optimal given the 
pn31el:ences of the loads in the network. 
Restricting filters from abusing market power should be possible by paying filter owners 
an amount based on the amount of installed filter capacity. It is possible to develop marginal 
filter capacity prices, which have the same efficient properties as the marginal harmonic current 
These prices for filter capacity are essentially a modified version of prices for current 
injections. 
It was shown that ji,h and hence the value to the network of injected harmonics is heavily 
dependent on the magnitude of any included filter capacity. As the size of any included filter 
increases, the value of injected harmonics rapidly decreases towards zero. On the other hand 
the prices ji,i., were shown to be largely independent of the magnitude of any installed filter. 
The consequence being P,i., will encourage uneconomic filter capacity to be installed, which 
ultimately results in a reduction of aggregate network utility. Network utility will be maximised 
harmonie market is competitive and the prices P,h are used. 

Chapter 7 
DYNAMIC NONLINEAR DEVICES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
To this point nonlinear loads have been modelled as static harmonic current sources (Figure 7.1). 
System 
Figure 7.1 Static nonlinear load model 
This model fails to accurately represent the true behaviour of most nonlinear loads. In 
particular it fails to recognise that the injected current from the nonlinear load will be a function 
of the voltage waveform at the busbar. If harmonic prices are to reflect the true marginal value 
of injected harmonic current into the network, they must account for the effect each injection 
has on all the other injections in the network. 
One common problem arising from the standard based control of harmonic distortion is how 
to deal with non-characteristic harmonics produced by loads due to a distorted commutating 
voltage. In situations where, if given a pure fundamental commutating voltage, the nonlinear 
load meets the standards, but the voltage distortion results in injections that fail to comply 
with the standard, who should bear the costs of making the nonlinear load compliant can be a 
contentious issue. It is possible to incorporate rules into the harmonic standards to deal with all 
such possible situations, but these rules are likely to be rather arbitrary, and shaped by superior 
lobbying and influence. Such rules cannot produce an efficient outcome as an efficient outcome 
will require a different response for each situation. 
This chapter looks at marginal pricing where the nonlinear loads are modelled as voltage 
dependent current sources or as Norton equivalents. An example of marginal pricing where the 
nonlinear loads are modelled as dynamic sources is included. Also active and passive filters are 
included in this new pricing environment. 
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MARGINAL PRICES 
1 Nonlinear Loads: Voltage Dependent Current Sources 
One alternative for modelling the nonlinear loads is to use a voltage dependent current source, 
where the harmonic injections are given by: 
Harmonic current injections into the network by load i = hi f(Vhi) (7.1) 
System 
Figure 7.2 Voltage dependent current source model of nonlinear loads 
With such a model the harmonic current injected into the network will be on 
both the phase angle and magnitude of the harmonic voltage seen at the local busbar. 
hi = fmag(Vhi, Oi) (7.2) 
ai = fang (Vhi' Bi) (7.3) 
In modelling such devices tensors must be used. There are three possible candidates [Smith1996] 
[Daza1988]. 
Rectangular 
Conjugate 
Polar 
Modelling the nonlinear devices in the polar domain is attractive, as the magnitude of 
harmonic distortion is the variable of interest. Network circuit analysis in the polar domain 
ceases to be linear, ruling it out as an alternative. As such working in the conjugate harmonic 
space is the preffered option as it allows differentiation by voltage magnitude, and circuit 
analysis is linear. 
Working in this domain the network nodal equation can be rewritten as: 
[ !h 1 [Yh 0] [ ~ h 1 1* 0 y* V* h h h (7.4) 
Where Yh = The network admittance matrix, which previously was specified as [Yh] 
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Using the network nodal equation as the sole constraint (at this point ignore the ability of 
loads to reduce their injections, and the possible inclusion of filters), the utility maximisation 
problem for the aggregate network can be solved using the following Lagrangian: 
The first order condition associated with this problem is: 
ae [ &U(Vh) 1 + [ Ii; 0 1 ([ &Ih &V h + &Ih &V;; J - [ ~' ~h ] [ &Vh ]) &V{} &Vh &Vh &V;; &Vh &Yh aVh &U*( h) -* &1;; &V h + &1;; &V;; &V;; &Vh J.LN ~ &Vh &v;; &Vh &Vh 
[ &U(Vh) 1 + [ liON 1([ &Ih _ Y'i &lh J[ &Vh ]) [ ~ ] &V{} 0 &Vh h &V· &Yh _ h &U*( h) -* &1* &1;; _ y;* &V;; &Vh J.LN ~&Vh &V;; h &Vh 
(7.6) 
The term iiN can be solved for using the first equation in matrix Equation 7.6. 
aU(Vh) ([Y,-2lh- _ &!h ] [ &Vh If J.LN = &Yh aVh h &Vh &V;; &V;; &Vh . (7.7) 
= aU(Vh) ([ Yh _ &!h _ &lh ] [ [e j8 ] ]) -1 aVh &Vh &V;; [e- j8 ] 
Given that Ih is a function of the voltage, it is not all together clear what the Lagrange 
multiplier iiN represents. As such it is of value to look at the consequences of modelling the 
nonlinear load as a Norton equivalent. 
7.2.2 Nonlinear Loads: Norton Equivalent 
For small perturbations around the operating point (at the margin), the Norton equivalent, and 
voltage dependent source models look identical [Bathurst1999]. The Norton representation of 
the nonlinear load is shown in Figure 7.3. 
System 
Figure 7'.3 Norton equivalent model of nonlinear loads 
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To come up with the terms of Yc, the device is linearised around its operating point. 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
(7.10) 
Therefore for the purposes of the Norton equivalent: 
[!Y_ [Yl Y2][~hl I* y;* Y* V* y 2 1 h (7.11) 
The Norton injection IN, is then the residual given by: 
(7.12) 
When using the Norton equivalents, the nodal equation takes the form: 
[i~ 1 + [ ~; ]- [~h ~: J[ ~~ 1 ~ [ ~ 1 
[~~ 1 + [\~/h Y/\: J[ ~~ 1 [ ~ 1 (7.13) 
Given equation 7.13, the constrained utility maximisation problem can be solved using the 
following Lagrangian. 
c = [ U(V h)] [/iN 0] ([!N 1 [Y1 -Yh Y2 ] [ ~ h 1) U* (V) + 0 Ii* I* + y;* Y* - y;* V* h r-N N 2 1 h h 
The associated first order condition is: 
Y2 
y* - y* 1 h 
(7.14) 
(7.15) 
(7.16) 
This is exactly the same formulation for /iN as Equation 7.7. Working within the Norton 
framework, /iN is easily seen to represent the marginal value to the system of Norton injections 
into the network, as: 
(7.17) 
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7.2.3 Norton Injection Prices to Harmonic Injection Prices 
By modelling the nonlinear loads as either voltage dependent current sources or Norton equiv-
alents, it is possible to develop the marginal price for Norton injections into the network. But 
the Norton injections are a mythical mathematical construct, charging loads on the basis of an 
imaginary quantity is not ideal. It would be preferable to use marginal prices for the actual har-
monic injections (Ih ), which reflect the value of the actual harmonic injections into the network. 
It is possible to convert the prices jiN, into such a value. 
Looking at Figure 7.3, and ignoring the fact the variables must be described via tensors. 
Iy = lYe]Vh (7.18) 
Where 
~ 1~ 
Vh = lYT]- IN (7.19) 
[YT] = [Yh ] - [Ye] (7.20) 
~ -1~ 
... Iy = [Yc][YT] IN (7.21) 
So that 
~ 1~ ~ 
Ih = [YC][YT]- IN + IN 
= ([YC]lYTr l + [In IN (7.22) 
Looking at the marginal value of the Norton injections. 
8U 
8IN OIh 8IN 
8U ( 1) 
= 8Ih [Ye][YTr + [I] (7.23) 
=* 8:1 = 8!! ([YdlYTrl + [In- 1 
8Ih 8IN 
jiT = jiN ([YC][YTr l + [In-1 
The above result can be extended to the tensor environment in which the nonlinear device 
must be described. Using the following definitions: 
IIh = [ i~ 1 
lIN = [t 1 
Equation 7.23, can be extended to a tensor equivalent. 
-Y2 
y;* - y;* h 1 
From the constraint shown in Equation 7.13, it can be seen: 
8U [~ jiN* ] 8llN = /-tN 
(7.24) 
(7.25) 
r)-l (7.26) 
(7.27) 
As such working within the tensor framework, the marginal prices for harmonic injections 
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can be derived from the marginal prices for Norton injections using: 
(7.28) 
From Equation 7.28 the desired marginal prices for harmonic injections, /-tT, can be ex-
tracted. 
7.2.4 Revenue Reconciliation 
In the case where each loads' utility function is a linear function of the harmonic voltage mag-
nitude (Ui(Vhi) = kiVhi Vi), the total amount that needs to be collected from the injectors of 
harmonic currents is: 
Total harmonic compensation payments = KV h (7.29) 
The question whether if the harmonic prices fiT, calculated above in Equation 7.28, collect 
the correct amount from the nonlinear loads? Given the complexity of fiT, direct calculation 
of fiTIh, is difficult. Instead consider the amount collected from Norton injections into the 
network, if harmonic charges were based on such injections. 
_ ( [ [ejOj ])-1 
/-tN = K [Yh - Y1 -Y2 ] [e-jOj 
= K ([Yh - Y1][e jOl _ [Y2:1[e-jOl)-1 
(7.30) 
- [Vh l IN= [Yh- Y1 -Y2 J Vh J (7.31) 
= ([Yh - Y1][ej Oj - [Y2][e- j Ol) Vh 
(7.32) 
Equations 7.30, 7.31 and 7.32, show that ifloads were charged fiN for their Norton injections, 
the required amount would be collected. 
Given that (7.33) 
(7.34) 
As Ih is linear in IN (equation 7.22) 
(7.35) 
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Combining the above two equations produces the required result: 
jiTh = KVh (7.36) 
Therefore, the adjusted prices for total harmonic injections will collect the required amount from 
the polluting loads. 
7.3 EXAMPLE 
In this example the test system of Appendix A is used. The behaviour of the prices for Norton 
(jiN), and harmonic injections (jiT) are investigated, as the parameters of the impedance tensor 
for the load at busbar four are varied. In this example one of the nonlinear load's polar para-
meters is varied. The sensitivity of the harmonic injections from the nonlinear load at busbar 
four to the harmonic voltage seen at that busbar can be described via: 
(7.37) 
In this example the sensitivity of injected current magnitude, to changes in harmonic voltage 
magnitude (g{{!) is varied. All the other parameters are set equal to zero. 
[ 61 h4] [k 0] [ 6 Vh4 ] 6a4 0 0 6()4 (7.38) 
Where k = 0 ---7 20 
This variation in the load's polar parameters, is easily transformed to variation in its complex 
conjugate tensor parameters, using the transform detailed in Appendix E. This transform is 
required to keep the network nodal equation linear. All the other loads are modelled as static 
harmonic current sources, as before. 
7.3.1 Constant Norton Injection 
The injected harmonic currents detailed in Appendix A are specified as the Norton injections 
for each load. Except for the nonlinear load at busbar 4, these Norton injections are their total 
injections for each load. The nonlinear load at busbar four is modelled as a Norton equivalent, 
where the impedance parameters are varied (as described above). The result being the Norton 
injection for each the loads is constant, but the total harmonic injection from the load at busbar 
four will vary with the change in that load's tensor impedance (Figure 7.4). 
As all the nonlinear loads apart from that at busbar four are modelled as static, their 
harmonic injections are constant as shown Figure 7.5. It can be seen that the harmonic injections 
for the load at busbar four vary considerably as the parameters of it's Norton impedance are 
varied. Specifically, there is a resonance at the point where g{{! approximately equals 10). This 
resonance in the injected harmonic current from the load at busbar four, is accompanied by a 
similar resonance in the harmonic voltage at each busbar as shown in Figure 7.6. As the network 
is strong, the voltage at each busbar is very similar, this was also seen in previous examples. 
Figure 7.7 shows the magnitude and angle of the prices for Norton injections as the para-
meters of the nonlinear load at busbar four are varied. The resonance in the harmonic current 
and voltage, is associated with a resonance in the marginal price for Norton injections. This is 
expected as at this resonance point, the Norton injections from all the loads are contributing to 
a distortion voltage at busbar four, which in turn is producing a very large (in phase) harmonic 
injection from the local nonlinear load. 
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System 
(a) Bushar four 
{h} All other busbars 
Figure 7.4 Norton equivalent models of the nonlinear loads used in the example 
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Figure 7.5 Magnitude and angle of harmonic injections from the loads as parameters of busbar four are varied 
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Figure 7.6 Magnitude and angle of harmonic voltage at each busbar as parameters of busbar four are varied 
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Figure 7.7 Magnitude and angle of the prices for Norton injections as parameters of busbar four are varied 
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Figure 7.8 Complex payments due from nonlinear loads on the basis of Norton injections, and the magnitude 
of those payments 
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Figure 7.9 Real and imaginary components of payments due from nonlinear loads on the basis of Norton 
injections and prices 
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show the Norton payments due from each load. That is, they show the 
payments each load would face if charged on the basis of Norton injections, using the calculated 
price for such injections CiLN). In general these payments are complex and, as before, it is 
only the real part of these payments that actually represent the cost associated with each load's 
injections, and hence it is only the real part of these charges each load needs to pay to achieve 
optimality. Because the Norton injections from all the loads have the same phase, and hence 
affect the distortion voltage at busbar four in a similar manner, each load faces a similar charge 
for their Norton injections. The relative real payments made by each load are therefore just a 
reflection of the magnitude of each loads Norton injection as detailed in the appendix. One can 
see that the payments due from each load while complex are mainly real, this is a consequence 
of the fact that all the Norton injections are at a common angle, and the network is strong. 
Naturally, at the voltage resonance point, there is also a resonance in the value of the Norton 
injections. 
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Figure 7.10 Total real payments due for Norton injections, and the total harmonic compensation payments 
due to loads 
It was shown that if loads were to be charged based on their Norton injections, the amount 
collected for these injections (Re{iLN iN}) would equal the compensation payments due for 
distortion seen at each busbar (KVh) (assuming loads have a right to a clean voltage supply). 
This holds true in this example as shown in Figure 7.10. 
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(a) Price Magnitude P.T (b) Price Angle LilT 
Figure 7.11 Magnitude and angle of the prices for harmonic injections as parameters of busbar four are varied 
Figure 7.11, shows the variation in the price for harmonic injections as the parameters at 
bus bar four are varied. The magnitude of these prices, not surprisingly behave in a similar 
manner to the prices for Norton injections. At the resonance point, the phase angle of the 
harmonic price at each busbar shifts. 
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Figure 7.12 Absolute value of the complex payments due for the harmonic injections 
Figures 7.12 through 7.14, show the variation in the harmonic payments due from each load 
as the parameters of the nonlinear load at busbar four are varied, when charging loads on the 
basis of their harmonic injections (fiT used). Of particular interest is the real of 
the complex as they represent the true value/cost of the harmonic injections. 
first point to note is that the vast majority of the harmonic payments are due from the load 
at busbar four. is expected given the majority of the injections into the network are from 
this load. The shift in phase of the harmonic voltage (Figure 7.6) suggests the non-Norton 
current injected into the network is out of phase with the Norton injections of each load. 
shift in the voltage phase angle is therefore associated with the Norton injections of the other 
~ads changing being being the dominant cause of voltage distortion, to less influential than 
I1'4. Figure 7.13 shows that at the resonance point, the loads apart from that at busbar four 
go from being charged for their injections, to being rewarded as a result of this shift voltage 
angle. 
Figure 7.15, shows the total real amount charged to the injectors of harmonic current and 
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Figure 7.13 Real component of the complex payments due for the harmonic injections 
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Figure 7.14 Imaginary component of the complex payments due for the harmonic In]ect;!0I1S 
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Figure 7.15 Total real payments due for harmonic injections, and the total harmonic compensation payments 
due to loads 
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the total amount due to loads as compensation for the distortion seen at the local bus bar. As 
suggested the adjusted prices for harmonic injections iiT, will collect the correct amount. 
The defining feature in all the previous figures is the resonance at Z{~! ~ 10. The resonance 
occurs as at the point where the total system ceases to be passive (Appendix F). Figure 7.16 
shows the admittance loci looking into busbar 4, for different values of Zit!. These loci form 
a series of concentric circles. As zfr:!, increases the radius of the admittance loci increases, to 
the point where for some voltages the real part of the admittance looking into the system is 
negative. Such a situation is artifical, as power electronic loads are passive. 
10,---------~--------,_----~==~==~----_,--------_,--------_, 
"'" Ci1 5 ........... . 
..Q 
(I) 
::l 
a::J 
o 
.-
c 
OJ 
c 
:52 
o 
o 
-I 
(J) 
() 
c 
m 
:::::: 
'E 
o 
l:J 
« 
_ -5 
o 
t 
m (L 
e-
m 
.!; 
OJ 
m 
E -10 
_15L----------L----------L----------L----------~--------~--------~ 
-15 -10 -5 o 5 10 
Real Part of Admittance Looking Into Busbar 4 
Figure 7.16 Admittance loci looking into busbar four as the parameters of the local nonlinear load are varied. 
Specifically as gu~! = 2 -+ 20 in steps of two 
Figure 7.17, shows the minimum possible real component of the admittance looking into 
each busbar, along with the actual real component of the admittance looking into each busbar. 
That is, the two diagrams show the earliest possible point at which the system could cease to 
be passive, and the actual point at which it ceases to be passive. As the network is strong, 
the impedance looking in at each busbar is approximately equal. It can be seen that at the 
resonance point (Zit! ~ 10) the system switches to from being active to passive. 
Another example is detailed in Appendix G. The example is identical to the one above, 
except the total harmonic injection of each load is fixed, with the Norton impedance and current 
at busbar four both variable. 
15 
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(a) Minimum Possible Real Compo-
nent 
(b) Actual Real \.)Olnp(}ne:nt 
Figure 7.11 The minimum possible, and actual real components of the admittance looking into busbar four 
7.4 ACTIVE FILTER A TENSOR ENVIRONMENT 
Previously in Chapter 5, filters where modelled as a controllable current source. This is 
an adequate representation that will now be used within the tensor environment. 
To incorporate the presence of active filters into the utility optimisation problem within this 
tensor environment one needs to specify some quantities: 
Active filter injeotiollB into the network = [ ~; 1 
Operating cost of active filter injections = [ ::* (N;) ] 
Capital cost of active filter = [ :; ~i::;) ] 
The utility maximisation where active filters are included can be described by: 
Maximise [ U(Vh) ] _ [ FV(I
f ) ] _ [ FF(Ifmax} ] 
U*(Vh) FV* (If) FF* (IfITIax) 
Subject to [ ~~ 1 + [ ]- [~ ~: J[ ~~ ] [ ~ 1 
[ If ] :::; [ Ifmax ] If Ifmax 
The Lagrangian associated with this problem is: 
+ [ iL; 
[ A f 0] ([ Ifmax ] + 0 Xj Ifmax 
[ F F (I
fmax) J 
(Ifmax) 
(7.39) 
(7.40) 
(7.41) 
(7.42) 
(7.43) 
(7.44) 
(7.45) 
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The first order conditions associated with this Lagrangian are: 
DC [8U1V,) 1 [- 0 1 ([}\ }\ Y2 l[lli ]) [ ~ ] _ av J-lN 1 - h aVh (7.46) aVh - aUa*~:h) + 0 fJ,'N Y2* Yt -y; av' ~
aVh 
DC [ 8FV(I,) 1 [- 0 1 [ ~ 1 [ ~~ ] [ ~ ] _ _ _ aIr J-lN a!J, (7.47) aIf - aF~;r(Ir) + 0 fJ,'N ali. -alh 
ae [ 8FFllhn~) 1 [A 1 [ 0 1 _ _ aIr ax f _ (7.48) aIfmax - aFF*{Yrmax) + Ai - 0 aIrmax 
Equation 7.46 is the exact same expression as that used to develop the prices for the Norton 
injections (equation 7.16). This indicates the inclusion of an active filter has no 'structural' 
affects on the value of Norton injections. Equations 7.47 and 7.48 can be combined to indicate 
the optimal level of active filter investment. 
~ [N] _ aFV (If) aF F (Ifmax) 
J-l N e - aIf + aIfmax 
(7.49) 
Equation 7.49, specifies that the optimal level of active filter capacity results in the value of 
the injection (as specified by fJ,N), being equal to the marginal costs of providing the injection. 
Note that as an active filter is modelled as a current source, the value of it's injections are those 
of a Norton injection. 
While equations 7.46 to 7.48 specify the optimal allocation of active filter resources in this 
tensor environment, of interest is can this allocation be achieved using a market mechanism? In 
answering this consideration must be made of what set of prices are used. Or more specifically 
should loads be charged for their Norton injections or harmonic injections. Given that the 
Norton injections are an imaginary construct, it would seem natural to charge loads on the 
basis of their harmonic injections. Thus the problem faced by the potential filter owner can be 
described as: 
Maximise fJ,Tlf - FV (If) - F F (Ifmax) 
Subject to If ~ I fmax 
(7.50) 
(7.51) 
Where the price for harmonic injections (fJ,T) is derived from fJ,N, according to equation 7.28. 
The associated Lagrangian and first order condition for this problem are: 
12 = iiTIf - FV (If) - F F (Ifmax ) + A f (Ifmax - If) 
ae _ ~ [N]_ aFV (If) _ A - 0 
aIf - J-lT e aIf f -
ae = _ aFF (Ifmax) + Af = 0 
aIfmax aIfmax 
(7.52) 
(7.53) 
(7.54) 
These conditions are identical to the optimal condition of equation 7.49, except that fJ,N 
has been replaced with iiT' This is a problem as the two sets of prices are likely to vary 
considerably. The current injections from the harmonic filter are essentially Norton injections, 
and hence efficiency requires that they be valued on such a basis. But it is unlikely loads could 
be charged on the basis of their Norton injections. 
The consequence of charging the active filter iiT, instead of fJ,N, for harmonic injections is 
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likely to be a sub-optimal level of investment in active filter capacity given that: 
(7.55) 
7.5 PASSIVE FILTER IN A TENSOR ENVIRONMENT 
This section starts off initially ignoring the dynamic nature of the nonlinear loads. It was shown 
in Chapter 6, that the prices which actually represent the true value of harmonic injections 
when a passive filter was included in the network (equation 6.14), fail to collect the correct 
amount from the distorting loads. Specifically the amount collected is less than that required 
to compensate loads for the distortion seen at each busbar, and to pay the filter for injected 
current. The reason for this being the marginal prices reflect the value of Norton injections into 
the system, and hence rewarding the injections from a passive filter, using these prices causes 
problems. This is a similar situation to that described previously in this chapter, where it was 
shown that nonlinear loads could be charged on the basis of their harmonic injections or Norton 
injections, but the prices used in each case differed if one was to achieve revenue reconciliation. 
Of interest is can the techniques that were used to convert the prices for Norton injections into 
prices for harmonic injections be used to alter the prices in the presence of a passive filter, so 
that the correct level of harmonic revenue is raised to compensate both the loads and the filter 
owner? 
Previously the injections from the passive filter into the network were specified as: 
(7.56) 
This passive filter injection can be respecified in terms of a Norton equivalent: 
(7.57) 
Where the Norton current INf, is known to be zero. 
If the problem of finding the optimal passive filter for the network is internalised, it can be 
described as: 
Maximise U(Vh) - P17(C) - PF(Cmax) 
Subject to Ih + INf - ([Yhl + [Yf(C)l) Vh = 0 
C:::; C max 
(7.58) 
(7.59) 
(7.60) 
Note: the ability of loads to reduce their injections is not considered in this example. This 
has no consequence for the behaviour of interest. The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
£ =U(Vh) - P17(C) - PF(Cmax) 
+ ji,N (Ih + INf - ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) Vh) + ,\p(Cmax - C) (7.61) 
The first order conditions that describe an optimal allocation of resources are identical to 
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those of Section 6.2. 
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(7.62) 
(7.63) 
(7.64) 
Equation 7.62 , gives the marginal prices, which were previously specified in Chapter 6 as 
the true marginal value of harmonic injections into the network. 
(7.65) 
This price can clearly been seen to represent the marginal value of Norton injections into the 
network. The price for Norton injections can easily be converted into a price for harmonic 
injections. 
IT = Ih + INf - [Yf(C)]Vh (7.66) 
Where Vh = ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) -1 (Ih + INf) (7.67) 
=? IT = Ih + INf - [Yf(C)] ([Yhl + [Yf(C)]) -1 (Ih +INf) (7.68) 
. aIT = [I]- [Yf(C)] ([Yh] + [Yf(C)]) -1 (7.69) 
.. a (Ih + INf) 
Then using the fact: 
~ a System Utility 
f..LN = a (Ih + INf) 
a System Utility arT 
arT a (Ih + INf) (7.70) 
The adjusted marginal price for all harmonic injections into the system, including those 
from nonlinear loads, and passive filters are given by: 
(7.71) 
Using the adjusted marginal prices of equation 7.71, the correct amount is collected from 
the harmonic injections, i.e. 
~ ~ ~ 
Where IT = Ih + If 
~ ~ ~ ~ aU(Vh ) 
=? f..LTIh + f..LTIf = aVh Vh As required 
(7.72) 
(7.73) 
(7.74) 
(7.75) 
This is an identical result as was achieved using the prices fi", of equation 6.41. These two 
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prices can be shown to be identicaL From equation 6.75, setting the two prices equal to each 
other suggests: 
-8 -J-Lh = J-LT 
=} (lYh] + lYf(C)]) (yh]-1 = (lI1- [Yf(C)] (lYhl + [Yf(C)]) -1) -1 
(lI}- lYf(C)] ([Yh] + lYf(C)l) -1) ([Yh] + [Yf(C)l) [Yht 1 [I] 
r
[Yh] + [Yf(~)]) [yh]-l [Yf(~)] ([Yhl + [Yf(C)l) -1 (lYh] + [Yf(C)]) [yh]-l = [I] 
[Yh] + [Yf(O)]) [yh]-l [Yf(O)][Yht l = [I] 
[Yh] + [Yf(C)]- [Yf(C)]) [Yh]-l = [I] 
(7.76) 
[I] = [I] 
Therefore the process of transforming the marginal prices for Norton injections, into the 
prices for total harmonic injections, is equivalent to excluding the presence of the filter when 
calculating the prices. This equivalence will also hold if the dynamic characteristics of the 
nonlinear loads are included. But only if the variable component of the nonlinear load current 
is a linear function of the voltage and therefore does not require tensor representation: 
Y2]=[Y1 0] Yt ° Yt 
so that 
In such cases the price for harmonic injections (liT) is equivalent to the price for Norton 
injections, if the passive filters and dynamic components of the nonlinear loads are excluded 
from the network. 
Given that liT and Jilt are identical the same problems that exists with respect to using Ii'h, 
will exist for liT, Specifically if the filter is charged liT, for their injections, it is optimal for the 
filter owner to commit filter resources up to the point where: 
__ 8[Yf(C)]y _ 8PV(0) 8PF(Omax) 
J-LT 80 h - 80 + 80max 
(7.77) 
The condition in equation 7.77 is clearly different to the optimal condition of equations 7.63 
and 7.64. As was found in Chapter 6, there will exist an incentive to over invest in passive filter 
capacity, as the prices JiT' essentially ignore that filter capacity has been added and therefore 
J-LT > J-LN· 
This problem is similar to that of Section 7.4, where active filters were included in the 
network and the nonlinear loads were modelled as Norton equivalents. When the marginal prices 
for the Norton injections were converted to marginal prices for harmonic injections, these prices 
(liT) failed to provide the correct incentives to the network participants. Except in Section 7.4, 
it was stated the price for harmonic injections would understate the true value of the injections 
(J-LT < J-LN), where here the opposite is being suggested (J-LT > J-LN). The difference stems from 
the type of admittance, which is essentially being ignored when liT is being calculated. The 
Norton admittance associated with the nonlinear loads aggravates the voltage distortion present, 
and hence its exclusion from the prices liT, will result in an understatement of the true value 
of the injections. On the other hand, the passive filter acts to reduce the consequences of any 
injection, and hence it's exclusion results in the marginal prices liT overstating the true value 
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of any injections. 
Having looked at the inclusion of passive filters, where the nonlinear loads are static current 
injections, the model is easily extended to consider the inclusion of a passive filter where nonlinear 
loads need to be represented by tensor Norton equivalents. Initially internalising the filter 
optimisation problem to characterise the conditions, which describe an efficient allocation of 
resources, the problem can be stated as: 
Maximise (7.78) 
Subject to 
(7.79) 
(7.80) 
the nodal equation specified above, the Norton current component of the injections from 
the passive filter have been excluded, as they are equal to zero. The associated Lagrangian for 
this constrained optimisation problem is: 
8£ 
8C 
(7.81) 
first order conditions, which specify optimality are given in equations 7.82 through 7.84. 
- 81~ (C) 1 [~~ 1 
ac h 
[ ~~ ] = [ ~ ] 
(7.83) 
(7.84) 
equations 7.83 and 7.84, the optimal level of passive filter cpacity is described by: 
~ 8[y,(C)lV _ 8PV(C) 8PF(Cmax ) 
- JL N 8C h - 8C + 8C
max 
(7.85) 
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Where the marginal value to the network of Norton injections can be pulled out of equa-
tion 7.82, i.e. 
fLN (7.86) 
While the prices for the Norton injections represent the true value of injections into the 
network, the same revenue reconciliation problem still exists. Specifically 
(7.87) 
Again it is possible to adjust these marginal prices for Norton injections to marginal price 
for the total injections using equation 7.88. 
fiT ] = [fiN fiN ] 
x ([1]+ [y, -YZ 
Yh + Yj(C) - Yt 1 
-1) -·1 
(7.88) 
i,Vhere both a passive filter and dynamic nonlinear loads are included, it is not possible to 
make any general statements as to the magnitude of the prices fiT, compared with the magnitude 
of the price for the Norton injections fiN, The passive filter will act to fLT < fLN, while 
the opposite is true of the Norton admittance associated with the nonlinear loads. As before 
this adjustment of the marginal prices will result in the harmonic payments from the loads being 
equal to the compensation payments to each load, along with the amount owing to the filter for 
their injections. 
(7.89) 
But while the marginal prices fiT, will collect the correct amount from all those making 
injections into the network, as was previously the case, these prices will fail to provide the 
correct incentive to the potential filter owners. It will optimal for the filter owner to invest up 
to the point where: 
= 8PV (C) + _8P_F_(,--C_m_ax....c..) 
8C 8Cmax 
(7.90) 
Clearly the condition in equation 7.90 differs from the network optimum shown i:o. equa-
tion 7.85. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The harmonic injections of nonlinear loads are not those of a static current source. These in-
jections will almost certainly be dependent on the voltage seen at the local busbar. In the 
theoretical case of an infinitely strong system, the voltage at each busbar consists only of funda-
mental irrespective of what the harmonics the loads inject. Under such conditions the harmonic 
injections could validly be modelled as static, but as harmonic distortion cannot exist, there is 
no need to value the injections. The point being, so long as there is some voltage distortion 
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throughout the system, there is a need to consider how this distortion affects the injections of 
each of the nonlinear loads. 
With marginal pricing, of interest is how the load behaves at the margin, as a result there is 
no between modelling the load as a voltage dependent current source, or as a Norton 
equivalent. Modelling the nonlinear loads as Norton equivalents is convenient on account of the 
fact it helps the interpretation of the prices, and identification of what is 'of value'. Specifically if 
the dynamic characteristics of the load is to be included in the pricing model, what the marginal 
prices actually represent is the marginal value of any Norton injections into the network. This is 
potentially a problem as the Norton injections are a mathematical construct. As a consequence it 
is impossible to verify what the Norton injections for each load are with out explicitly modelling 
each load in the network. In the case where the harmonic injections of the nonlinear loads are 
close to static, the total injections will be close to the constructed Norton injections. Under such 
circumstances using the total injections as a proxy for the Norton injections will not be of much 
consequence. 
Unfortunately the it is not possible to impose such a constraint on the physical system, 
and demand that all nonlinear loads behave as static or near static current sources. As was 
shown, it is possible to transform the prices for Norton injections ('1i'N) into prices for the 
total harmonic injections (liT)' The adjusted prices for total harmonic injections have both 
advantages and disadvantages. '-E-he main advantage is the charges for each load are based on 
their total harmonic injections (Ih)' If the prices for Norton injections are used, presumably 
loads must be charged on the basis of their Norton injections (IN)' The fact calculation of the 
Norton prices and injections is difficult (read practically impossible), has been mentioned, but 
of more importance, is the fact that the harmonic injections are the real tangible cause of all 
the distortion throughout the network. Looking at the example of Section 7.3, the majority of 
the voltage distortion was caused by the load at busbar four, which had the variable Norton 
impedance. Most would agree, as that load was responsible for the majority of the distortion, 
it should bear majority of the compensation costs. If one charges loads on the basis of their 
harmonic injections this is what occurs. On the other hand, if the loads are charged on the basis 
of their Norton injections, the load at busbar four is charged an amount comparable to the other 
loads, this is clearly not reasonable. 
The disadvantage of using the adjusted prices for harmonic injections (liT) is that they fail 
to provide the correct incentives to network participants, i.e. aggregate network and private 
welfare diverge. The price for Norton injections (liN) do represent the true marginal cost to the 
network of any additional harmonic injections into the network When making decisions about 
committing resources to harmonic mitigation, for these decisions to prove optimal the true value 
of any mitigation action taken must be known. Clearly if the harmonic prices (liT) are used, 
these fail to articulate what is the true value of any injection. 
Of interest is the equivalence between the prices for harmonic injections, and the Norton 
prices where the dynamic qualities of the loads, and any passive filters are ignored. This intu-
itively makes sense in that if one considers the total injection of the nonlinear load as a single 
quantity, this is an injection into a system that excludes the Norton admittance of all the loads. 
The question is, what set of prices should be used? To this there is no clear answer. Charging 
loads on the of their Norton injections is not an attractive offer for a number ofreasons. It is 
also worth considering that if harmonic charges are to be based on Norton injections, this results 
in no value being attributed to the injections of a passive filter. Given the potential importance 
passive filters may play the mitigation of voltage distortion, the pricing system must reward 
passive filters. Passive filter could be rewarded using some criteria outside of the pricing system, 
but this would defeat the purpose. Charging loads liT for their harmonic injections cannot 
achieve an efficient outcome, especially in the presence of passive filters. The degree to which 
this will fail to achieve optimality will depend on the system. But while not perfect, using the 
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prices J1,T j and charging loads on the basis of harmonic injections is feasible and as shown, the 
correct amount will be collected so that the books balance. Another option is to use the prices 
for Norton injections J1, N, but apply it to the total harmonic injections of each load. This is 
attractive in that it will encourage efficient behaviour, and hence network welfare will 
be maximised. However the books will not balance and there may potentially be large cash flows 
into or out of the system to finance the difference between what comes in from the harmonic 
charges and what goes out the form of payments to filter owners and compensation for voltage 
distortion. The best solution to this problem is likely to depend on circumstance. 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 CONCLUSIONS 
liThe economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate Igiven' re-
sources, ... rather a problem of how to secure the best use oj resources known to any members 
of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. It is a problem of 
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality." [Hayek1945] 
It has been shown that harmonic distortion reduces the welfare of loads in the network. Sim-
ply put harmonic distortion may prevent proper operation of equipment, and cause accelerated 
wear or destruction. The consequences of harmonic distortion are known and individuals go to 
considerable, and often expensive lengths to minimise the potential damage which can result. 
The goal of any harmonic mitigation action is to efficiently commit resources to the problem. 
In other words when solving the problem, every dollar spent at the margin should improve the 
welfare of the aggregate network by an equivalent amount. 
Given a full information set this constrained optimisation problem is easily solved. Any 
individual, with knowledge as to the preferences of each individual in the network, the technology 
available and circumstances of each individual along with the all the physical specifications of 
the network, can easily use this information to determine the optimal allocation of resources. 
This allocation will be Pareto efficient. In each chapter a similar process was undertaken to 
characterise the optimal allocation of resources that is desirable. Clearly the weakness in the 
above approach is that no single entity has this complete knowledge set. A network operator 
may well have a very good idea as to the technology available and the physical specifications of 
the network, but they certainly will not have much idea as to the preferences of each of the loads. 
As it turns out it is these preferences that are the single most important piece of information, 
as they determine the severity of the harmonic problem experienced and what loads will give in 
return for reducing the harmonic levels. 
How effective are the standards and regulations used in most networks in utilising the 
information dispersed throughout the network? The answer is clearly not very effective, on 
account of the fact the standard and regulations make no effort to discover the preferences of 
the loads, instead they implicitly assume that each load has identical preferences of a particular 
form. To their credit the standards are often crafted with an eye towards the requirements 
of modern technology and the harmonic mitigation technology available. But none-the-Iess, 
it is clear given their inability to harvest and use information about individuals preferences, 
standards mandated by the network operator can never come close to achieving theoretical 
optimal allocation of resources. 
The other option to a central authority dictating the required behaviour of each load, is to 
decentralise the decision making process. As before, the question is how well is information used 
with a decentralised decision making process? Clearly the one advantage is each load knows its 
142 CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE "VORK 
own preferences, then given information as to the value of harmonic injections the loads are in a 
position to make rational decisions as to allocating resources. An efficient allocation will occur so 
long as loads know the value of the harmonic injections, however they do not need to be aware the 
underlying determinants of the value. The marginal pricing techniques developed in this work 
represent an attempt to develop prices that accurately reflect the value of harmonic injections, 
and hence can be used by individual loads to make decisions, which while independent of each 
other, collectively act to maximise aggregate welfare. The prices if effective, will essentially be 
a summary of every thing the individual loads need to know to act in an efficient manner. 
The question is, "how well do the marginal prices make use of all the dispersed information, 
and encourage the separate loads to behave in an efficient manner?" It was found in the case 
where there are no filters in the network and nonlinear loads behave as static current sources, by 
acquiring information as to the preferences of each load, and using information about the physical 
parameters of the network, it is possible to develop marginal prices that accurately reflect the 
true value of injections throughout the network and which encourage efficient behaviour by 
each load. How will this information be acquired to incorporate into the prices developed, and 
will this information be accurate? The marginal pricing system as put forward here simply 
extracted a value for harmonic distortion from each load. Unfortunately it was found that it 
might potentially be difficult to extract this information from the loads, as they might have 
incentives to mislead others about their valuation of distortion. Depending on whether the 
loads have the right to a clean supply or the right to inject what they wish into the network, 
it was demonstrated incentives potentially exist for loads to over or understate their harmonic 
valuations. In the case where each load is small compared to the network no such incentive 
exists. Therefore marginal pricing, while not perfect at extracting and making use of individual 
preferences, works reasonably well. Also for the marginal prices to accurately reflect the true 
value of the injections they require information as to the physical state of the network. It is 
here that some central authority comes into play. At present all the required information with 
respect to the harmonic voltages throughout the network are unavailable. Also information as 
to what the network admittance looks like, is not known by each individuaL This information, if 
available, is likely to only be known by the system operator. Hence marginal pricing that 
the system operator acts to collect (as best possible) information as to the individual TW,ptPl'PT1f'A 
and then incorporates the knowledge it has with respect to the physical state of the system, to 
develop the final prices. 
Marginal pricing may be unable to extract the true valuation some loads place on the voltage 
distortion seen at their busbar. While a shortcoming, this does not consign marginal !JJ.J.va,.!; 
to being of little value. While the loads are 'small' there exists no incentive for the loads to 
mis-state their valuation of harmonic distortion. But more importantly, there have been no 
better alternatives put forward for making use of this information, as the standards in place 
disregard that each of the loads is likely to have different preferences. One possibility is that for 
large loads which have an incentive to mis-state their harmonic valuation, it may be desirable to 
have the central authority that collates the prices) to do an audit to ensure that the harmonic 
valuation given is reasonable. With such a system in place the marginal pricing system, as put 
forward would do an job of extracting and communicating the required information 
to each load that encourages efficient allocation of resources. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, extra problems creep in when considering the possibility of passive 
filters being included in the network. The owner of a passive filter potentially acquires a large 
amount of market power. At this point the owners actions change from responding to the price 
signals to manipulating the prices for maximum gain. This has negative consequences for the 
aggregate system, as the marginal prices if distorted cannot provide the correct incentives to 
all the other loads in the network. Given the important role passive filters potentially play in 
dealing with distortion, marginal pricing will be a failure if it is unable to encourage an efficient 
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use of filter resources. It was found by ensuring that no filter capacity is withheld from the 
network, marginal pricing could work to efficiently allocate filter resources. In fact marginal 
pricing has the potential to considerably improve the current allocation of filter resources, as it 
should ensure the preferences of the loads are considered, and also allow the knowledge of every 
individual in the network to be put to use. Even with marginal pricing it is likely the majority of 
the filters included in network will be installed by the network owner/operator. But by allowing 
everyone to potentially profit from an investment in a filter which adds value, marginal pricing 
effectively harnesses the collective knowledge of the total network. 
The above point raises an important issue, in that this work does not suggest that there 
is no place for some form of system operator making decisions with respect to the allocation 
of resources to mitigate the costs of harmonic injections. To the contrary, on account of the 
fact each load has no way of knowing what proportion of the distortion seen at their busbar is 
attributable to each load in the network, the system operator is required to calculate the marginal 
prices. The system operator is a participant in the electrical network with considerable expertise 
in knowledge in the analysis and operation of filters. Therefore to exclude the system operator 
from building and profiting from filters is illogical. It is suggested that the basis of their decisions 
should be the marginal prices, on account of the fact they make superior use of the available 
knowledge, specifically the preferences of each load in the network. 
The prices for harmonic injections will be complex and in general the amount charged to 
each load will also be complex. As detailed in Chapter 4, should only the real part of the 
harmonic charges due from any load are of interest. This is important as it makes charging 
for harmonic injections viable. Clearly if loads had to pay some complex amount for their 
injections, implementation of marginal pricing would be impossible. The complex prices and 
amounts calculated are a consequence of the fact any injection into the network will have in 
phase and quadrature components, with respect to the prevailing voltage at their busbar. The 
complex amount charged to any load represents the value of the quadrature component of their 
harmonic injections, had it been in phase with the prevailing voltage. But as the quadrature 
component of all injections has no effect on the voltage magnitude at the margin, it need not be 
considered for marginal pricing purposes. 
The final problem associated with marginal pricing relates to how the market should be 
structured. It was shown at a fundamental level, the quantities of value are the Norton injec-
tions made into the network. The price associated with these injections indicate what is the true 
marginal cost of any current injection into the network. Calculating the price for Norton injec-
tions requires models of every nonlinear load in the network. Should it be possible to calculate 
this price, using it to charge for the total harmonic injections of each load will fail to collect the 
required revenue. On the other hand prices can be calculated for the total harmonic injections 
that are based on the premise the nonlinear loads and filters are not part of the network per se. 
These prices fail to reflect the fact that the nonlinear loads and the filters do effect the value 
of any harmonic injection into the network. There would seem to be no neat solution to this 
problem. 
As demonstrated, marginal pricing is attractive as it potentially summarises all the informa-
tion relating to the physical state of the network and the preferences of each load, so that each 
individual is encouraged to act in the best interests of the system. The potential impediments 
to marginal pricing being efficient is that individuals must reveal their personal preferences 
honestly, and in some circumstances excess market power will result in a divergence between 
the collective and individual utility. The other final potential impediment is there is a poten-
tially massive amount of information, which must be incorporated into the prices if they are to 
encourage optimal behaviour from each load. Much of this information is unavailable at present. 
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8.1.1 Achievement Summary 
Briefly summarised the main achievements of this work are: 
@II The required information to achieve an optimal allocation of harmonic resources is speci-
fied. 
@II The specification of the optimal marginal prices under different network models and condi-
tions ranging from the simplest network models, to networks including passive and active 
filters, and systems where the nonlinear loads are modelled as voltage dependent current 
sources, have been achieved. 
@II Demonstration that given the required information, marginal prices can be formed which 
will encourage individual loads to behaviour efficiently. The marginal prices align individ-
ual and aggregate network welfare. 
@II Specification of the conditions that are likely to cause market failure, and consequences of 
any such failure. 
@II An analysis of the resultant amounts charged/paid to different types of loads and filters 
using marginal pricing. Demonstrating that while marginal pricing will specify complex 
payments from each load, only the real part of such payments need to be considered for 
marginal pricing to be efficient. 
@II Establishment that the fundamental elements of value are the Norton injections into the 
network. 
@II Techniques to impliment marginal pricing in the absence of any measured or calculated 
Norton injection values. 
@II Investigation of the formulation of a harmonic market, including specification of some of 
the important issues associated with such a market. 
8.2 FUTURE WORK 
This work has developed methods to make use of all the possible information, which will result 
in an optimal allocation of harmonic resources. But naturally the methods developed can only 
be used in the case where all the required information is available. It will be quickly apparent 
that at present there is a serve case of information scarcity, in which the required information 
to implement marginal pricing as postulated, does not rest with any member of the network. 
A good economic system is one, which fully utilizes all information, but any system cannot 
be judged on its failure to utilize information that does not exist. To that extent comparing 
any system for allocating harmonic resources to the marginal prices developed in this work, 
and declaring them inefficient is not valid, on the basis that the marginal harmonic prices 
are not a feasible allocation mechanism at present, because of the information scarcity that 
exists. This would seem to fly in the face of the previous criticism of the use of standards 
to allocate harmonic resources. Certainly one cannot declare that standards are presently an 
inferior allocation mechanism compared to marginal harmonic pricing, on account of the fact 
standards are implement able, while the marginal prices are not. But the criticism that standards 
make no attempt to utilize all the information presently available, and will fail to incorporate 
new information as technology makes it available is valid. 
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8.2.1 Information Scarcity 
There is a need to investigate the extent to which information scarcity with respect to 
the implementation of marginal pricing. There are two different sets of prices developed in this 
work, the marginal prices for total harmonic injections (including filters) liT, and the marginal 
prices for Norton injections liN. The two sets of prices require different amounts of information 
and as such their implementation is impeded by information scarcity to different extents. 
Table 8.1 Required information for different marginal forms of marginal pricing 
Available Information Scarce Information 
Harmonic Individual Preferences 8~r:..h) Harmonic Injection Magnitude Ih 
Prices Basic Admittance Matrix [Yh ] Harmonic Injection Angle Cth 
~ 
J.LT Harmonic Voltage Magnitude V h Harmonic Voltage Angle (}h 
Individual Preferences aU(Vh) Harmonic Injection Magnitude Ih Norton aVh 
Prices Basic Admittance Matrix [Yh ] Harmonic Injection Angle Cth 
~ Harmonic Voltage Magnitude V h Harmonic Voltage Angle (}h 
J.LN 
Norton Admittance of Nonlinear Loads r Yl Filter Admittance Matrix [Yf(C)] y;* 2 
Note that the distinction between what information is available and scarce as detailed in 
Table 8.1, will not hold for every network. Certainly in some cases information as to the harmonic 
voltages throughout the network will not be available, while in other cases information as to 
the harmonic injections of loads might be available. Table 8.1, is only indicative, and is to an 
extent based on the difficulty of gathering the information. Of interest is that for any network 
where harmonic injection information is not collected, enforcing a standard such as IEEE 519 
is not possible. In such cases a different resource allocation mechanism will be required, as 
implementing a standard to which compliance cannot be tested serves no purpose. 
8.2.2 Immediate Solution 
One area of future work is to consider, given what information presently exists throughout the 
network, what is the best possible resource allocation mechanism possible. Given that each 
load knows about their own preferences, and the system operator might have some idea as to 
what the admittance matrix looks like, and what are the harmonic voltages around the network; 
what economic system will allow an allocation of resources, which is as close as possible to the 
optimal allocation, associated with complete knowledge. Naturally a big part of this problem 
is developing systems so that loads honestly reveal their Given the very limited 
information available in most networks some sort of standard may be the best option, but 
only if compliance with the standard can be determined, and if the standard incorporates the 
preferences of load. 
8.2.3 Information Accumulation 
The main impediment to achieving an optimal allocation of resources is information scarcity. 
It must be established exactly what information is of value, and how this information can be 
accumulated. But in doing this the potential benefits associated with the accumulation of the 
information must be considered i.e. an attempt must be made to calculate the expected marginal 
increase system welfare that accrues due the accumulation of all types of knowledge, and com-
pare it to the marginal cost of acquisition. Many types of information while potentially useful, 
Y2l y* 1 
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are no doubt prohibitively expense to acquire, this problem should ease with the advancement 
of metering technology. 
8.2.4 Full Harmonic Solution 
This work only considered a single harmonic order. The techniques should be extended to include 
all harmonic orders of interest. A useful advancement would be to move to a full harmonic 
domain solution where the coupling between all the harmonic orders would be captured. Also 
with multiple harmonic orders, consideration must be made of the structure of the harmonic 
utility functions. Not only will loads have preferences with respect to the magnitude of each 
harmonic at their busbar, but they are also likely to have preferences linked to the aggregate 
distortion, which is represented by measures such as total harmonic distortion. Of interest is 
how utility functions liked to multiple harmonic frequencies and THD affect the valuation of 
different types of injections. 
This will also present a new set of difficulties in that information will be required as to 
the relative values loads place on different harmonic orders. The way different harmonic orders 
interact will have different implications for each load and this too will need to be accounted for 
the utility function for each load. This comes back to the question of just what value do different 
types of loads loads place on different types of harmonic distortion? A question that has yet to 
be answered. 
8.2.5 Three Phase Solution 
This work a.ssumed balanced loads. An improvement will result from the to move to a three phase 
solution, so that the consequences of load imbalance can be considered. Load imbalance can play 
an important role in determining the harmonic state of the network, given that negative sequence 
fundamental can be a major cause of harmonic injections from power electronic converters. The 
consideration of unbalance in the solution will require the incorporation of fundamental power 
flow into the pricing system. 
8.2.6 Harmonic Current 
This work was based on the utility of each load being a function of the harmonic voltage distortion 
at their busbar. The harmonic current flows also have costs associated with them. The owner of 
the transmission and distribution assets almost certainly would like to see the harmonic current 
flows across their networks minimised, to ensure correct operation and avoid the premature 
aging of the assets. For the harmonic allocation mechanism to be efficient, the costs associated 
with both harmonic currents and voltages must be considered. Also harmonic sources that may 
exist in the network such as the nonlinear magnetising characteristics of must be 
considered. 
A 
SYSTEM 
following appendix details the base case test system, which is used throughout the thesis. 
A.I details the layout of the nine busbar test system, and indicates the leugth of the 
of transmission lines that connect each busbar. The impedance of the transmission lines is 
1.719 x 10-3 + j4.402 x 1O-3pu/ m i, at fundamental. 
1 2 
O.25mi O,Smi 
0.5 mi 100 
3 4 5 
200 Q,25mi 
6 7 
Q,5mi 1.500 
8 
100 
9 
Figure A.l Schematic of the nine busbar test system 
There is assumed to be only one load at each busbar. Each load is part linear and part 
nonlinear. Details of the linear and nonlinear load at each busbar is given in Table A.I. The 
table also indicates the fifth harmonic current injected by each load in the simplest case where 
all injections are made at a common angle. The injected harmonic current is that which would 
result for six-pulse converter in the presence of a undistorted commutating voltage, where the 
is 15° [Arrillaga1983]. For simplicity, through out the thesis only the fifth harmonic 
is considered. The techniques are easily extended to allow consideration of multiple harmonic 
Table details the (base case) valuation each load places on voltage distortion seen at 
their busbar, where this is a linear function. Also contained is the marginal cost of a reduction 
in injected harmonic current) for each load, where this is a constant amount per unit. 
many of the examples certain elements of the above test system of varied. In such 
elements that are not explicitly stated as a variable will have a value as detailed in 
this appendix. 
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Table A.I Test System Load Data 
Bus L' onlinear Load (pu) Injected 5t Harmonic Current (pu) 
1 0.29 + jO.08 0.060elI2' 11' 
2 0.04 + jO.01 0.008ej T211" 
3 0.58 + jO.16 0.29 + jO.08 O.060ej T211' 
4 1.16 + jO.31 1.45 + jO.39 0.300ejT2 11' 
5 2.00 + jO.OO 0.04 + jO.01 0.008ej T211' 
6 1.16 + jO.31 1.45 + jO.39 0.300ej T21l" 
7 0.38 + jO.lO 0.19 + jO.05 0.040ej T21r 
8 0.29 + .f0.08 0.14 + jO.04 0.024ejT2 11' 
9 0.38 + jO.10 0.19 + jO.05 0.040ejT2 11' 
Table A.2 Test System Valuation Data 
Bus Harmonic Valuation K ($/pu) ~iiarmonic Reduction Cost p ($/pu) 
1 -60 I 60 
2 -10 100 
3 -50 25 
4 -70 80 
5 -10 100 
6 -50 15 
7 -30 42 
8 -40 58 
9 -50 42 
App 
PUBLIC OD 
It was stated that harmonic current injections have properties similar to that of a public 
good. Hence when loads are given the right to pollute, the lack of an organised harmonic market 
might result in a sub-optimal resource allocation. To prove this examine the decision making 
process for a load at busbar t (referred to as t). Load t, will be willing to pay any other 
load at a busbar s (referred to as 8), to reduce their harmonic injections, an amount up to t's 
marginal valuation of the injected harmonic current by s. As such t, is willing to pay s, an 
amount up to: 
( aUt) -1 OVht Yts (B.1) 
Which in the case of constant marginal utility equals ktyt/. Load t, will be willing to 
pay the load at busbar s, to reduce their harmonic injections should the condition described in 
equation B.2 exist. 
(B.2) 
To simplify the notation and graphical presentation of this appendix it is assumed that 
cost to load s, of harmonic injection reduction, is a linear function of reduction magnitude ie. 
constant marginal cost of harmonic current reduction. 
This assumption does not change any of the important results. 
tion B.2 can be restated as: 
(B.3) 
this assumption equa-
(B.4) 
Despite that the combined benefit to the whole network (as given in the shadow price 
fLhs I:::~ kiYi/) may exceed the cost of the reduction in current, no one load will be willing to 
bear this whole cost as Ilktyt:;lll < IlfLhsll "It. As a consequence the good (harmonic reduction) 
will not be provided despite the fact it efficient to do so. 
For example if one is to look at the decision making process for a single load t. Here t is 
considering whether to pay s to reduce their harmonic injections. Load t has an endowment of 
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gall -+ Amount of harmonic reduction purchased by 
all other network participants 
gt -+ Amount of harmonic reduction purchased by t 
Wt -+ Monetary wealth of t 
If s has a constant marginal cost for harmonic reduction Ps. 
Current Reduction G = gt + gall 
Private Consumption Xt = Wt - Psgt 
As such when deciding how much to pay for a reduction in injected harmonic current, load t, 
faces a constrained optimisation problem: 
max Ut(G,Xt) = Ut(gt + gall,Wt - Psgd 
Subject to the constraints 
gt ~ 0 
gt + gall S; hs 
This problem has the following equilibrium condition 
BUt 
< 
BUt 
8G )..+PS& Xt 
~ ).. 8G < -+p ~ aUt S 
aXt aXt 
If we assume that constraint B.6, is not binding (* ).. = 0), then 
(E.5) 
(B.6) 
(B.7) 
(E.8) 
Equation B.8 indicates in equilibrium, load t will have a marginal rate of substitution 
between private consumption and harmonic reduction, that is less than or equal to the price 
ratio of the two goods Pa, (as the price of private consumption is defined as one). Optimality 
demands they be equaL In the case where the two ratios are equal, we have a situation like that 
shown in In this case the indifference curve of the load at busbar bar t, is tangent to 
the budget line. (Note the slope of the budget line will be lips), Hence in the case where the 
load's preferences are such that they will want to contribute to the public good we will still have 
optimal result the ratio of marginal benefits equals the ratio of marginal costs. 
But the above situation will not occur for each load. It can be shown, should provision of a 
public good be left to private decision, only the individual with the highest valuation of the public 
good will contribute. Once the load with the highest valuation of the public good has finished 
contributing, the marginal cost of further reduction in the harmonic injections will exceed the 
private valuation of any other load. As such it will be optimal for every other individual load 
to choose to contribute nothing to the public good despite that it would be collectively optimal 
to do so. This incentive for an individual to free ride is shown in Fig. B.2. 
There is a limit as to how much of the public good can be provided. As stated in the 
constraints, the harmonic input of s can only be reduced to zero. There may be occasions where 
a load t, would like to see .9 sink the harmonic current from the system. In this situation where 
151 
G 
gall 
G ~'-- -- ---
Wt 
Figure B.l The indifference curve and budget set where load t, chooses to contribute to the reduction of 
harmonics injected by s 
Firms indifference curve 
G = gall I 
Figure B.2 The indifference curve and budget set where t, chooses to free ride on other loads contributions 
the constraint is binding: 
OUt A 
oG < _+ > 
OUt - OUt Ps Ps (B.g) 
OXt OXt 
This is represented graphically in Fig. B.3 
G=hs 
gall 
Firms Jdifference curve 
~t_______ u,(G,Xt) 
Figure B.3 The indifference curve and budget set for t, where the constraint is binding 
It is of interest to compare equation B. 7 (the first order conditions for an individual decision 
making process) with equation 3.31 (the first order conditions for harmonic system optimisation). 
Rewriting equation 3.31 to reflect the linear harmonic reduction costs assumed, the result is: 
(B.I0) 
In developing equation B.I0, there was a tacit assumption that the marginal utility of private 
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consumption is 1, for all loads. This is as the problem was constructed as: 
max Utility(Voltage Harmonics) - Cost(Hannonic Reduction) 
Using the definition of the shadow price Phs one can find the ratio of, system marginal utility 
of harmonic reduction, to the marginal utility of private consumption (by definition equal to 1). 
au au -~g 
Phs = a1 = - aG = au 
hs ax 
Combining B.lO and B.11, one ends up with an expression identical in form to B.7 
One can also develop this expression by solving the problem 
max U(Vh'X) 
subject to 
-Ihr ::; 0 
Ihr ::; I h* 
Ih* = Ihr + [YhrV h 
Where x private consumption = w - plhr 
(B.11) 
(B.12) 
Equation B.12 is identical to B.7, expect that 'Ut has been replaced with This shows that 
the conditions which result in overall system optimisation, do not coincide with the outcome 
that results from a private decision making process, where there is a lack of an organised market 
and should property rights be allocated so that loads have a right to pollute. A background to 
public good economics can be found in [Varian1992]. 
VOLTAGE MAGNITUDE 
Here it is demonstarted how equation 4.6 is derived. The voltage at each busbar is given by C.l. 
( 
1'lej(p-l+a) + 6ej (p-l+oz) 1 
Vh 1'2 e j(t3- 1 +a) ~ 6ej (p-l+a z ) 
1'nej(I3- 1 +a) + ~nejCB-l+az) 
(C.l) 
..La,,,.UL;; the magnitude of each row of the above vector 
[(1'1 sin(,8-1 + a) + 6 sin(,8-1 + a z))2 + (1'1 cos(,8-1 + a) + 6 COS(,8-1 + az))2]~ 
[(,2 + a) + 6 sin(,8-1 + a z))2 + (,2 cos(,8-1 + a) + 6 cos (,8-1 + az))2l~ 
+ a) + ~n sin(,8-1 + a z))2 + (1'n cos(t3-1 + a) + ~n eos(,8-1 + az))2]~ 
(C.2) 
Looking at first element of the vector in C.2 
Vh(l,l) [(,lsin(t3-1 +a) + sin(,8-1 +az))2 + (,lCOS(,8-1 +a) +6eos(t3-1 +az ))2]! 
+ a) + 2'"1'16 sin(,8-1 + a) sin(,8-1 + a z ) + ~i sin2 (t3-1 + az ) 
+ 1't cos2(,8-1 + a) + 21'1.6 eos(,8-1 + a) sin(,8-1 + a z) + a cos2(,8-1 + a z )] ~ 
= bi + 21'16 (sin(,8-1 + a) sin(t3-1 + a z ) + cos(,8-1 + a) cos(,8-1 + a z)) + ~i]! 
[1'r + 1'16 (cos(a a z) - cos(2,8-1 + a + a z ) + costa - a z) + cos(2,8-1 + a + a z)) + en! 
br + 21'16 costa a z ) + dl! 
(C.3) 
Equation C.3, can then be generalised to each busbar throughout the network to produce 
the desired 
br + 21'16 costa - a z ) + ~r]~ 
hi + 21'26 costa - a z ) + ~il! (C.4) 

Appendix D 
PASSIVE FILTER EXAMPLE 
This appendix contians the plots detailing the variation in the magnitude and phase angle of 
the harmonic voltage at each busbar, due to variation in the filter installed at busbar one. 
(a) Voltage magnitude 17h1 (b) Voltage phase angle 81 
Figure D.l Harmonic voltage variation at busbar one, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
(a) Voltage magnitude 17h2 (b) Voltage phase angle 82 
Figure D.2 Harmonic voltage variation at busbar two, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
Figures D.l0-D.12 shows the voltage at each busbar as the magnitude of the filter admittance 
varies. In developing some the results of Chapter 6, assumptions were made as to the behaviour 
of the harmonic voltage at each busbar. Specifically it was stated, that at each busbar if the 
harmonic voltage is of a significant magnitude, the phase angle will be a consistent value. The 
following diagrams show this to be approxiamately true in that the phase at each bus bar is 
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(a) Voltage magnitude Fh3 (b) Voltage phase angle Oa 
Figure D.S Harmonic voltage variation at busbar three, due to variation of filter admittance 
(a) Voltage magnitude 11M (b) Voltage phase angle 04 
Figure D.4 Harmonic voltage variation at busbar four, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
(a) Voltage magnitude Fha (b) Voltage phase angle 05 
Figure D.5 Harmonic voltage variation at busbarfive, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
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(a) Voltage (b) Voltage angle fh 
Figure D.6 Harmonic voltage variation at busbar six, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
(a) Voltage magnitude Vh7 (b) Voltage 
Figure D.T Harmonic voltage variation at bllsbar seven, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
(a) Voltage magnitude Vh8 (b) Voltage phase angle Os 
Figure D.S Harmonic voltage variation at busbar eight, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
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(a) Voltage magnitude Vh9 (b) Voltage phase angle 09 
Figure D.9 Harmonic voltage variation at busbar nine, due to variation of passive filter admittance 
equal until the filter becomes enough that the voltage distortion drops towards zero. At 
this point the harmonic phase at different bus bars does diverge. 
(a) Voltage magnitude Vh (b) Voltage phase angle 8 
Figure D.lO Harmonic voltage variatioll at each busbar, due to variation of filter admittance magnitude, where 
the filter is inductive 
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400 .,. Wl 
'''' F.lerAarrmlir;;::..,Mag:C>l..mI;>J) 
(a) Voltage magnitude Vh (b) phase angle e 
Figure D.II Harmonic voltage variation at each busbar, due to variation oUilter admittance magnitude, where 
the filter is resistive 
(a) Voltage magnitude Vh (b) Voltage phase angle (J 
Figure D.12 Harmonic voltage variation at each busbar, due to variation of filter admittance magnitude, where 
the filter is capacitive 
(a) Harmonic Prices /th (b) Harmonic Prices iiI. 
Figure D.13 Variation in the magnitude of the two different harmonic 
an inductive filter at busbar one is varied 
/tl. and iiI.) as the magnitude of 
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" 
(a) Harmonic Prices iih (b) Harmonic Prices ii'h 
D.14 Variation in the magnitude of the two different harmonic prices iih and iih) as the magnitude of 
an resistive filter at busbar one is varied 
"" 
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(a) Harmonic Prices iih (b) Harmonic Prices iih 
Figure D.15 Variation in the magnitude of the two different harmonic prices iih and iii" as the magnitude of 
an capacitive filter at busbar one is varied 
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(a) Harmonic Prices iih (b) Harmonic Prices ii'h 
Figure n.16 Variation in the angle of the two different harmonic prices iih and iih, as the magnitude of an 
inductive filter at busbar one is varied 
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(a) Harmonic Prices Mh (b) Harmonic PI'ices Mh 
Figure D.lT Variation in the angle of the two different harmonic prices Mh and MI.) as the magnitude of an 
resistive filter at busbar one is varied 
(a) Harmonic Prices M" (b) Harmonic Prices iii-. 
Figure D.lB Variation in the of the two different harmonic prices ii" and iih, as the of an 
capacitive filter at busbar one is varied 

Appendix E 
POLAR TO CONJUGATE TRANSFORM 
The nonlinear load dynamics are described using complex conjugate tensors. The harmonic 
source's sensitivity to the busbar voltage is given by the matrix Ye. 
When investigating the affect on the harmonic prices, of variation in the sensitivity of 
injections to the voltage, changes in the matrices Y1 and Y2 , are not very intuitive. But instead 
if the nonlinear load is described in polar form: 
So that 
h=h(Vh,e) 
a = h(Vh,e) 
(E.l) 
Variation in the sensitivities of h and a, to Vh and e, are intuitively easy to understand. 
Hence when investigating the behaviour of the harmonic prices to changes in the dynamic quali-
ties of the nonlinear loads, it is preferable to work in the polar domain. As nodal circuit analysis 
is only linear in the conjugate domain, a transform what is required that can convert variation 
of polar parameters (intuitively understood), to variation, in the complex conjugate parameters. 
v = Ve jO 
V* = Ve- jB 
jVejl1 
-jVe-jl1 J [~ J 
[ ] -1 "2e 2 [ 
1 -jO lejl1] 
Transo = . 1 -jl1 J'lejl1 
-J 2V e 217 
(E.2) 
(E.3) 
Equivalent matrices can be developed, which link variation in the complex conjugate current 
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terms to variation in the current polar parameters ([Transo:]). 
[Trans"[ [ ~~ 1 = [Trans"! [ !!!.iL ?!.!.ll ][~' 1 8Vh 80 (E.4) 80: 80: 8Vh 80 
[Trans"! [ ~~ 1 = [Trans"! [ !!!.iL ?!.!.ll 1 [Trans,r 1 [ :t 1 8Vh 80 (E.5) 80: 80: 
8Vh 80 
[ ~~ 1 [ ejo: jhejo: J[ !!!.iL Yf][ 1 -jO !d' l[ ~V 1 8Vh 2e j ;~7ejO Ll 11* LlIft e-jo: -jhe-jo: 80: -j.le-jO 817h 2V 
(E.6) 
[ Y1 Y2 ] [ejO: jhejo: J[ !!!.iL Yf][ 1 -jO lejO ] 8Vh 2e jlejO (E.7) =} Y2* Yt = e-jo: -jhe-jo: 80: -j.le-jO 8Vh 2V 2V 
Equation E.7, is the transformation that converts variation in the polar parameters, to variation 
in the complex conjugate parameters. 
Appendix F 
PASSIVITY CRITERION 
Passivity requires the admittance looking into any busbar has a positive real component. 
System )--------i 
Impedance looking 
<E('----- into bus bar i 
Figure F.1 Impedance looking into given busbar includes the local load and the rest of the system 
In choosing polar parameters for the nonlinear loads it is possible to choose values, which fail 
to meet this criteria. As true power electronic loads are passive, one needs to be aware as to when 
the nonlinear load's parameters are specified so that the device ceases to behave realistically. 
In the example demonstrating the behaviour of marginal prices in response to changes in the 
nonlinear loads parameters, one must expect strange behaviour (resonances) should the system 
created cease to be passive and the system unstable. For instance if the parameters of the 
nonlinear load are created so that any harmonic injection is amplified to an infinitely large 
harmonic voltage, there will be a corresponding explosion in the prices and payments due from 
all distorting loads. Obviously infinitely large prices are ridiculous under normal circumstances, 
but in response to a ridiculous situation, they are what one would expect. 
Requiring the real part of the impedance to be positive equates to requiring the system and 
load to absorb harmonic energy from any Norton injections. Passivity also needs to be defined 
for a tensor environment. The tensor representation of the system is based on the assumption 
the variables can be described via: 
(F.l) 
So that if iiI and 112 are admittances: 
lh = ih Vh + ;ih V* 
h ~ V* 
=} =- = Yl + Y2-=-
Vh Vh 
(F.2) 
166 APPENDIX F PASSIVITY CRITERION 
:. Tensor Admittance = Til + Y2 ej(L.fh- 2(}) (F.3) 
For if the nonlinear is to be passive under all conditions, the impedance tenor must be such 
that: 
ReHh} < Y2 (F.4) 
This impedance tensor can be shown graphical on the so called lollipop (Figure F.2) [Smith1996]. 
Imaginary 
Re{fiI} Real 
Figure F.2 vornpH~x impedance locus for an impedance tensor 
To find the tensor impedance looking into each busbar in the network, one can manipulate 
the full admittance matrix of the system. If the system nodal equation is rewritten: 
(F.5) 
Where I, [ 1 (F.6) 
Inot i All busbars execpt i (F.7) 
V·-1 
Vnoti 
[ ~t.l 
V h1 
~hl 
Vh2 
V h2 All busbars execpt i 
Inot i 0, one can derive the admittance looking into busbar i. 
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(F.8) 
(F.9) 
(F.lO) 

Appendix G 
DYNAMIC NONLINEAR LOAD 
In this appendix the test system of Appendix A is used. The behaviour of the Norton (ji,N), 
and harmonic injection prices (ji,T) are investigated, as the parameters of the impedance tensor 
for the load at bus bar four are varied. Also the variation in the harmonic payments made and 
received by the loads is detailed. This example is identical to the example in Chapter 7 in the 
polar parameters of the load at busbar are varied. Specifically the sensitivity of injected current 
magnitude, to changes in harmonic voltage magnitude (g~~!) is varied. All the other parameters 
are set equal to zero. 
[ ~~: ] = [~ ~] [ ~~:4 ] (G.l) 
Where k = 0 --+ 20 
This variation in the load's polar parameters, is easily transformed to variation in its complex 
conjugate tensor parameters, using the transform detailed in Appendix All the other loads 
are modelled as static harmonic current sources, as before. 
G.I CONSTANT HARMONIC INJECTION 
In this example the injected harmonic currents detailed in Appendix A, are specified as the 
harmonic injections for each load. for the nonlinear load at busbar four, these harmonic 
injections are also the Norton injections for each load. The nonlinear load at busbar four is mod-
elled as a Norton equivalent, where the impedance parameters are varied (as described above). 
As a result the harmonic injection for each the load is constant, but the Norton injection from 
the load at busbar four, will vary with the change in that load's tensor impedance (Figure G.l). 
As the total harmonic injections into the network are constant, the harmonic voltage through-
out the network is also constant G.2). As such the harmonic compensation paid to each 
load (kiV,ti) and in total (KVh), are also constant (Fig. G.3). 
For all the nonlinear loads, apart from that at busbar four, the harmonic injections are equal 
to the Norton injections and are constant. For the load at busbar four, the Norton injections 
of the load vary as its polar parameters are varied. This variation in the Norton injections are 
shown in Fig. G.4. 
Figure G.5, shows the price for ::.,rorton injections. Again there is a resonance at the point 
where the network switches from being passive to active. Unlike the example in Chapter 7, this 
resonance in the Norton prices is not associated with a resonance in the voltage. 
Figures G.6 and G.7, show the amount each load is charged for their Norton injections, 
when the prices ji,N are used. Where 88[}4 :::::: 4, there is no Norton injection into the network by 
, 1<4 
the load at busbar four. At the same point the Norton payments made by the load are zero. 
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System 
(1\) Busbar four 
(b) All othlC-r bllsbars 
Figure G.l Norton equivalent models of the nonlinear loads used in the example 
.,'.--....... -.--~---,-~-~~--r-~-~---, 
(a) Voltage YIagnitude lIhi (b) Voltage Angle 8; 
Figure G.2 Magnitude and angle of harmonic voltage at each busbar as parameters of busbar four are varied 
G,l CONSTANT HARMONIC INJECTION 
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(b) Total Payments KV h 
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Figure G.3 Harmonic distortion compensation paid to each load, and in total as the parameters of busbar four 
are varied 
( a) Current Magnitu de I lIN II (b) Current Angle 
Figure GA Norton current injections by each load into the network, as the parameters of bus bar four are varied 
(a) Price Magnitude IIJLNII (b) Price Angle 
G.5 Variation in the price for Norton injections into the network, as the of busbar four are 
varied 
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O~1&3 
~~~~~~-,~oc---~~--~,--~~~~,oo~~~~ 
w!l~1rJfmY.)·rf:.dmrlf{('1!!rt!iA~~'Ml 
(a) Complex Norton Payments 
/iN;!Ni 
Ij 10 12 
OxtJcrtilt 'trf:')trnlm ~ l~tJ v .. 
(b) Magnitude of Norton Payments 
II/iN;!Ndl 
G.6 Norton injection payments made by each load, as the parameters of busbar four are varied 
(a) Real 
Re{/iNiI'li} 
Norton 
Figure G.7 Real and imaginary parts of the 
busbar four are varied 
(b) Imaginary Norton 
Im{/iN;!Ni} 
:-Tort on charges faced by each load, as the parameters of 
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Figure G.8, shows the summation ofthe real component of the Norton charges (2::: Re{P,NJNi}) , 
is equal to the value the aggregate system places on the voltage distortion. Evidence that the 
real component of the charges, indicates the value the network places on the injections. 
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(b) Total Payments KV h 
Figure G.8 Total real Norton payments made by each load, and the total harmonic compensation payments 
due, as parameters of. busbar four are varied 
Figure G.g, details the prices for harmonic injections (iiT) , as the parameters of the load 
at busbar four are varied. These prices have a very similar magnitude to those for the Norton 
injections into the Network. This is because the total Norton injections and the total Harmonic 
injections into the network are very similar. This was not the case in the Chapter 7 example, 
where the total harmonic injections were many times larger than the total Norton injections, and 
as such the prices for the harmonic injections were much smaller than the prices for the Norton 
injections. In Chapter 7, it was shown the prices for the harmonic injections (iiT) are equivalent 
to the to the price for the Norton injections (iiN), if the passive filter and dynamic components 
of the load are excluded. But this interpretation only holds if the nonlinear load current is a 
linear function of the voltage distortion present (does not require tensor representation). In this 
example variation in filter injection is a tensor function of the voltage, and as such the price 
for the harmonic injections is a function of the load variation. If the harmonic injection was a 
straight linear function of the harmonic voltage (i.e. Ih = IN + [YIlV h), these prices would have 
been independent of the parameter variation at busbar four. 
Figures G.10 and G.ll, show the variation in the harmonic charges faced by each load. Of 
particular interest is that the real component of the charges (which represents the true value 
of the harmonic injections), is negative for some of the loads, despite that the loads' injections 
are constrained to a common phase angle. The harmonic injection of each load have similar 
consequences for the network, but yet some loads pay for their injections and others are rewarded. 
This demonstrates how the true value of the injections into the network is represented by the 
price for the Norton injections. As such the prices for harmonic injections while convenient, can 
provide inefficient signals. 
Figure G.12 demonstrates the summation of the real component of the harmonic charges is 
equal to the total amount due to loads in the way of voltage distortion compensation. This is 
the main advantage of using the adjusted harmonic charges (iiT), the books will balance if loads 
are charged based on their total harmonic injections. 
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(a) Price Magnitude IliiTII 
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"f 
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(b) Price 
Figure G.9 Variation in the price for harmonic injections into the network, as the parameters of busbar four 
are varied 
(a) Complex Harmonic Payments 
/iTJhi 
(b) :tviagnitude of Harmonic Payments 
II/iTJhdl 
Figure G.10 Harmonic payments made by each load, as the parameters of busbar four are varied 
6!.L'1bar~ Bwbar2&S 
(a) Real 
Re{/iTJh;} 
Harmonic (b) Imaginary Harmonic 
Im{/iTJh;} 
G.11 Real and imaginary parts of the complex harmonic charges faced by each load, as the parameters 
of busbar four are varied 
G.l CONSTANT HARMONIC INJECTION 
(a) Individual Harmonic Payments 
Re{JiTi Ihi} 
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(b) Total Payments KV h 
Figure G.12 Total real harmonic payments made by each load, and the total harmonic compensation payments 
dUe, as parameters of busbar four are varied 
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